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This dissertation examines the impact of political leadership on economic reform in 
China’s state-owned economy. I argue that the heads of public sector organizations, at 
the central level and below, shape reform policy experimentation and implementation 
through their choices concerning organizational strategy and structure. Following a 
review of the key state-owned enterprise reform policies in China since 1978, I utilize 
case study analysis to assess the effects of political leadership exercised by 
consecutive chairmen of a central state-owned enterprise on the firm’s reform. As the 
government-directed restructuring of state-owned assets remains an important 
component of economic reform in China, I next use logistic regression models to 
analyze the effects of political leadership on mergers among central state-owned 
enterprises between 2003 and 2015. Finally, I identify four mechanisms that link the 
organizational change fashioned by political leadership with broader evolution in the 
institution of state ownership.  
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1 
Introduction 
Economic Reform through Political Leadership 
 
China Building Company, a central state-owned enterprise in the construction industry, 
celebrated its first decade of operations in the twenty-first century with a milestone: 
the number and value of its contracts for projects overseas surpassed that for projects 
within China. This marked a new era for an enterprise that originated in the 
Communist Party of China (CCP)’s efforts to advance national industrialization during 
the 1950s. For decades, China Building Company focused on domestic development 
through its nationwide network of engineering bureaus. Its earliest commercial forays 
into international markets were highly centralized, reflecting its roots in a planned 
economy. Its headquarters dispatched delegations to foreign governments to cultivate 
relationships for potential projects in an approach that company leaders termed “point 
to point” (点对点, dian dui dian) or “direct line style” (直线式). Later, China 
Building Company also began to bid for international tenders through a tightly 
centralized internal process. It referred to overseas projects by number, just as it had 
for domestic projects during the planned economy period.  
By the early 2010s, changes in the company’s behavior and organizational 
structure had become evident to its clients—governments and developers in now more 
than 50 countries in Central Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. China Building 
Company’s engineering bureaus, which were responsible for carrying out the actual 
construction work, began to approach them to discuss potential projects, particularly 
small projects for which they now could exercise bidding and management authority 
2 
and sign their own contracts. Yet in 2016, another shift occurred. China Building 
Company headquarters revoked the engineering bureaus’ authority to independently 
authorize and manage small project contracts. It recentralized administrative authority 
by establishing a new subsidiary responsible for all international business and even 
suggested the dispatch of engineering teams from Beijing to tour client countries and 
recommend possible infrastructure projects. In less than a decade, China Building 
Company’s overseas expansion efforts transformed from centralized to decentralized 
and back again. At the same time, corresponding shifts in influence occurred between 
its administrative-oriented headquarters, more market-oriented engineering bureaus, 
and other entities within the firm.  
  China’s “economic reform” writ large is invoked to explain such a wide 
variety of political, economic, and social phenomena that micro-level changes at the 
organization level receive little critical attention. What explains changes in the 
economic reform of state-owned enterprises in China—both over time and across units? 
An organization-level analysis reveals that the process of economic reform does not 
exhibit linear trends of decentralization or consolidation of authority and assets. For 
state-owned enterprises like China Building Company, this is manifest in changes in 
the levels of marketization of global expansion efforts, shifts in influence among 
market-oriented and administrative entities within the firm, and how intra-firm entities 
conceptualize their relationship with international markets. For the central 
government’s portfolio of state-owned enterprises as a whole, economic reform can be 
broadly conceptualized as a dual process involving government-directed restructuring 
of state-owned assets as well as the extension of decision-making authority away from 
3 
the state toward markets. Organization-level analysis here too reveals significant 
variation. For example, between August 2003 and May 2017, 88 out of 189 central 
state-owned enterprises underwent mergers or other forms of major restructuring.  
 Organizational change at the enterprise level is linked with broader changes in 
the institution of state ownership in China. Since the 1978 advent of Chinese market 
reforms, several important shifts in the institution of state ownership have occurred. 
State ownership has expanded to include state ownership and control of capital as well 
as of assets. It is now concentrated in a group of large state-owned enterprises in 
sectors that the Chinese government has designated as strategically important, even as 
the overall proportion of state ownership in the economy has declined. In addition, the 
state has steadily devolved both ownership and control rights to enterprises and their 
managers as well as non-state shareholders—state ownership and control is no longer 
absolute. Finally, the orientation of state ownership toward an internationalizing 
domestic economy has expanded to include the participation of state-owned 
enterprises in international capital markets and their ownership and control of assets 
and capital overseas. What factors explain these changes in the institution of state 
ownership in China?  
 
Competing Perspectives 
I argue that political leadership at the organization level is the omitted factor in 
existing research on China’s economic reform. While scholars look at China from 
myriad angles, they neglect one of the most important—elite agency spanning the 
apex of the political system and the grassroots. Yet the political leadership exercised 
4 
by the heads of public sector organizations at multiple levels and across functional 
domains is a crucial part of what constitutes the “authority” in “authoritarianism” in 
China. The under-theorized factor of political leadership helps to explain changes in 
economic reform within and across state-owned enterprises as well as changes in the 
institution of state ownership. The heads of organizations bring about change by 
determining the specific strategies through which to achieve broad central goals and 
by altering organizational structure. Organizational change fashioned by political 
leadership can also generate broader institutional change through multiple channels, 
such as the political promotion of successful organizational leaders, the center’s 
designation of a particular organization as a model for emulation, and formal and 
informal sharing of organizations’ reform experiences. Studying political leadership at 
the organization level provides analytical leverage needed to answer three key 
questions in the study of Chinese and comparative politics: 1.) what factors affect 
policy experimentation and implementation? 2.) why do the structure and behavior of 
political and economic organizations change over time? and 3.) how are these 
organizational changes linked to broader institutional change?   
Existing research has largely failed to move from studying Chinese leaders to 
examining their actual exercise of political leadership and its impact on organizations 
and institutions.1 I argue that extending the concept of political leadership beyond the 
top national leaders to the heads of central-level government agencies, state-owned 
enterprises, and subnational governments is essential to understand economic reform 
                                                
1 Notable exceptions are Jean-Luc Domenach, The Origins of the Great Leap Forward: The Case of 
One Chinese Province (Westview Press, 1995); John A. Donaldson, “Why Do Similar Areas Adopt 
Different Developmental Strategies? A Study of Two Puzzling Chinese Provinces,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 60 (2009): 421-444. 
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in contemporary China. Neither central directives nor external market forces can fully 
explain organizational and institutional change. Furthermore, the decentralization of 
decision-making authority away from the central planners has increased the space for 
political leadership at the organization level. In a planned economy, the center 
determines national development priorities, the allocation of resources to different 
industries and regions, the management of individual enterprises (for example, their 
inputs, production, sales, and investments), the nature of wage systems (for example, 
wage amounts and wage differentials), and even the assignment of individuals to 
particular work units.2 Since the 1978 advent of Chinese economic reform, heads of 
public sector organizations have gained significant autonomy to shape policy 
experimentation and implementation by determining the specific strategies to achieve 
broad central objectives, and by altering the structures of the organizations they lead.   
Beyond political leadership, current scholarship suggests two alternative 
perspectives on interlinked processes of organizational and institutional change in 
China’s state-owned economy. A top-down, “strategic design” perspective emphasizes 
deliberate choices by top national leaders about economic policies, institutions, 
organizational forms, and resource allocations. In this view, policy experimentation 
may be linked with elite power struggles, as competing national leaders carry out pilot 
programs or influence local experimentation and then use the results to support their 
preferred positions. For example, Hongbin Cai and Daniel Treisman (2006) suggest 
that central authorities often initiate and even direct what may appear to be local 
                                                
2 Robert Wade, “The Relationship Between Political Leadership and Economic Development in 
Socialist Countries,” Political Leadership and Economic Development: Korea and China, ed. Se-Hee 
Yoo (Seoul: Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, Hanyang University, 1983): 20. 
6 
experiments, arguing that local policy experiments are “gambits in a game played 
between competing factions centered in Beijing.”3 Elite politics at the center can also 
impact the timing of reform policy implementation, as different individuals might 
propose different timetables for reform, or seek to advance or delay particular reform 
policies. In addition, a strategic design perspective highlights the institutional 
mechanisms by which national elites shape the incentives that affect local behavior. 
For instance, Susan Shirk (1993) details Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of “playing to the 
provinces” by using fiscal decentralization to local governments to incentivize 
improved enterprise performance and to build a political constituency supportive of 
further reforms.4 Sebastian Heilmann (2008) details the institutional practice of 
“experimentation under hierarchy,” in which policy-makers at the center selectively 
integrate local experiences into national policy.5 Finally, national leaders may attempt 
to control implementation of reform policies formally through personnel appointments 
or informally through patron-client relationships connecting central and local 
officials.6 For example, Yasheng Huang (2006) argues that Beijing systematically 
appointed officials with greater experience and ties with the center to govern those 
provinces with higher levels of international trade and foreign direct investment.7   
                                                
3 Hongbin Cai and Daniel Treisman, “Did Government Decentralization Cause China’s Economic 
Miracle?” World Politics 58, no. 4 (2006): 505-535. 
4 Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1993). 
5 Sebastian Heilmann, “From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China’s Distinctive 
Policy Process,” The China Journal, 59 (2008): 1-30; Sebastian Heilmann, “Policy Experimentation in 
China’s Economic Rise,” Studies in Comparative International Development 43, no. 1 (2008): 1-26. 
6 Pierre F. Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
7 Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Reform Era (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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 A top-down, “strategic design” perspective on China’s economic reform 
emphasizes the center’s diverse means of exerting economic and political control, 
including the power to rework rules related to ownership, enterprise restructuring, 
market entry and exit, business scope, technology, and service standards.8 The state 
exercises both regulative and constitutive authority. It can create new standards and 
laws, for example through industry-specific regulations. It can also create new 
categories of organizational forms or determine the “strategic value” of an industry.9 A 
strategic design perspective also points to the state’s role as an institutional 
entrepreneur, for example, in the design of a dual-track economic system combining 
plan and market during the 1980s, which permitted firms to sell goods produced in 
excess of central targets at market prices and to retain and allocate the returns. Last but 
certainly not least, the state maintains political control through the cadre management 
system, by which the CCP governs cadres at all levels by controlling appointments, 
evaluations, transfers, and dismissals. 
In contrast, a bottom-up “organic transformation” perspective highlights 
actors’ on-the-ground adaptation to changing external conditions, particularly rising 
market competition, and their network interactions in the context of economic 
decentralization.10 For example, enterprises may adapt to changing environments by 
adjusting their organizational structures, seeking to forge alliances with other firms, or 
                                                
8 Roselyn Hsueh, China’s Regulatory State: A New Strategy for Globalization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2011): 22. 
9 On the concept of strategic value in Chinese industry, see Hsueh 2011 and Roselyn Hsueh, “State 
Capitalism, Chinese-Style: Strategic Value of Sectors, Sectoral Characteristics, and Globalization,” 
Governance 29 (2016): 85-102. 
10 On the decentralization of China’s economic system, see Chenggang Xu and Juzhong Zhuang. “Why 
China Grew: The Role of Decentralization,” Emerging from Communism: Lessons from Russia, China, 
and Eastern Europe, eds. Peter Boone, Stanislaw Gomulka, and Richard Layard (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1998): 183-212. 
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looking for new sources of capital. What may begin as scattered or idiosyncratic 
incidences of adaptation can become standardized and spread such that existing 
institutions must ultimately evolve to accommodate them.11 For example, Victor Nee 
and Sonja Opper (2012) argue that capitalism in China emerged “from below” as 
entrepreneurs in the Yangtze River Delta built networks that generated and enforced 
business norms and facilitated financing for fledgling private firms, ultimately 
diffusing market institutions nationwide.12 As Katherine Verdery (2003) describes 
such bottom-up adaptation in a post-socialist context: “Daily life rested on constant 
improvisation, generating routines and networks that could at length produce their 
own social infrastructure, which would then shape outcomes at the top at least as much 
as the other way around.”13 
A bottom-up “organic transformation” perspective also underscores the 
numerous ways in which local agents seek to deliberately manipulate existing 
conditions to their advantage. For example, Joseph Fewsmith and Xiang Gao (2014) 
argue that local officials’ lack of accountability to constituents and profit orientation—
institutional byproducts of the cadre management system and fiscal decentralization—
enables some county leaders to collect rents and enhance their influence at the expense 
of central dictates.14 Other officials exploit the information asymmetries inherent in 
the decentralized and fragmented nature of China’s political system in order to 
                                                
11 Kellee S. Tsai, “Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China,” 
World Politics 59, no. 1 (2006): 116-141. 
12 Victor Nee and Sonja Opper, Capitalism From Below: Markets and Institutional Change in China 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
13 Katherine Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in Postsocialist Transylvania (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003): 27.  
14 Joseph Fewsmith and Xiang Gao, “Local Governance in China: Incentives and Tensions,” Daedalus 
143, no. 2 (2014): 170-183. 
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selectively implement policies that benefit their interests. For instance, Kenneth 
Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg (1988) describe how some officials take advantage 
of the self-contained nature of public sector units in China by publicly declaring their 
support for policies they oppose but then doing nothing to carry them out within their 
units.15 Instead of engaging in “directed improvisation,” in which the center directs 
and local agents improvise, such instances suggest that actors may on occasion 
deliberately ignore the center’s directives and simply improvise to suit their own 
scripts.16 
  Bottom-up, organic transformation accounts of economic reform assume 
significant decentralization of economic and political authority. Because of this, they 
typically situate their analyses within center-local analytical frameworks, focus on 
actors and networks at the local level, and address subnational variations in 
development outcomes among localities or enterprises. They do acknowledge that the 
state deliberately designs political institutions, such as the cadre management system, 
to centralize authority by incentivizing or even directing actors to behave in particular 
ways. They argue, however, that more important than these top-down controls is the 
space that decentralization creates for interpretation, experimentation, learning, 
competition, and cooperation for all actors—from local governments to private 
enterprises to individuals. Further, organic transformation accounts emphasize that 
actors’ behavior and the outcomes of the economic reform process may in fact diverge 
significantly from the center’s original intentions.  
                                                
15 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and 
Processes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988): 166-167. 
16 See Chapter 2, “Directed Improvisation,” Yuen Yuen Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).  
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 Both top-down and bottom-up approaches fall short in explaining 
organizational and institutional change during economic reform. National leaders and 
central-level policies do not control—and in most cases they do not attempt to directly 
control—the internal decision-making or the specific actions of individual public 
sector organizations. In practice, the decentralization of political and economic 
authority and the self-contained nature of these organizations in China can often make 
it difficult for administrative superiors to even ascertain what is actually occurring 
within them, let alone to control their behavior. But on the other hand, it would be 
inaccurate to suggest that economic reform in China is an organic process in which 
public sector organizations adapt to external changes as they see fit, or that it is a 
spontaneous product of individuals and organizations interacting freely in a 
decentralized context. Government intervention and institutional mechanisms for 
central control, such as the cadre management system, continue to characterize 
China’s political economy. Especially during the early reform era, government bodies 
routinely intervened in the operations and restructuring of state-owned enterprises, 
promoted organizational change via government-directed pilots, and sanctioned firms 
if their behavior deviated from what was considered permissible according to the 
institution of state ownership at a particular time. 
Top-down and bottom-up perspectives also fail to account for changes over 
time in the institution of state ownership itself. Elite redefinition of the relationship 
between the state and the economy did shape distinct periods of institutional evolution. 
That said, a top-down explanation cannot fully explain the micro-level changes that 
underpinned broader institutional shifts during each of these periods. Similarly, 
11 
although the support of national leaders did influence when and which pilot schemes 
and enterprise reform policies were adopted, they did not control the enterprise 
responses and market factors that determined both the experimental strategies adopted 
and their ultimate outcomes. In fact, the proliferation of competing enterprise policies 
that top leaders advanced at various times actually expanded organization heads’ 
leeway for maneuver. Changing market conditions also influenced shifts in the 
institution of state ownership in China, for example its reorientation from domestic to 
international and its expansion to include state-owned capital as well as state-owned 
assets. Yet neither external conditions nor bottom-up actions can account for other 
changes, such as the concentration of state ownership in a specific set of industries. 
Instead, top national leaders at the center continued to shape some of the particular 
contours of state ownership through a varying mix of administrative interference, 
direction, and accommodation. 
 
Reform through Political Leadership in China’s State-owned Economy  
This project analyzes the impact of political leadership at the organization level on 
reform in China’s state-owned economy. The state sector is the most important area to 
study economic reform in China today because its share in the domestic as well as the 
global economy is both large and growing. The contribution of state-owned 
enterprises to China’s industrial output has been estimated at between 25% and 30% in 
2014.17 Moreover, the state’s share of the domestic economy is actually increasing: in 
2012, state-owned enterprises’ share of fixed-asset investments reversed years of 
                                                
17 Nicholas R. Lardy, Markets Over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China (Washington, DC: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2014). 
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decline and now is on the rise.18 The sheer size of China’s state-owned economy 
means that its reform has global implications: if Chinese state-owned companies were 
a country, they would constitute the world’s fourth-largest economy—ahead of 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and India.19 The growing prominence of 
China’s state firms on the global stage also compels critical attention. Many of its 
“national champions” are now among the world’s largest firms: 48 Chinese central 
state-owned enterprises appeared on the 2016 Fortune Global 500 list, up from 9 in 
1999. They have also expanded rapidly in international markets: central state firms 
currently operate in 185 countries and regions worldwide, with total overseas assets of 
$725.6 billion and 346,000 employees.20 
 With the question of economic reform in China’s state-owned economy 
approached in so many ways, terminological precision is essential. I define economic 
reform within central state-owned enterprises as an increase in the level of 
marketization in three areas. The first is the level of marketization of expansion efforts 
in international markets: is marketization high (when decision-making about resource 
allocation is decentralized and responds to local market conditions) or low (when 
decision-making about resource allocation is centralized and seeks to shape local 
market conditions)? The second is growth in the influence of market-oriented actors 
relative to administrative actors within the firm. This is measured by the extent to 
which market-oriented entities can act autonomously of administrative entities. The 
                                                
18 Gavekal Dragonomics, “The State of the State Sector,” March 2017. 
19 “China’s State Firms Are Bigger than Germany and That’s a Problem,” Bloomberg News, August 31, 
2016. 
20 Yunbi Zhang, “Nation Will Fine-Tune SOE [State-owned Enterprise] Management Abroad,” China 
Daily, March 22, 2017. 
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third is how these intra-firm entities conceptualize their relationship with international 
markets: do they define their functions through active engagement with international 
markets or do they view international markets through an administrative lens? I define 
economic reform across central state-owned enterprises as comprising the 
government-directed restructuring of state-owned assets (for example, through 
mergers) and the extension of decision-making authority away from the state toward 
markets (for example, through corporate governance development or public listing of 
state-owned assets). 
I investigate the impact of political leadership exercised at the organization 
level on economic reform by examining the heads of central state-owned enterprises 
and the directors of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), China’s government ownership agency.21 In China’s state-
owned economy, central state-owned enterprises are the largest in terms of assets and 
revenues, make the most profits, pay the most taxes, and possess the greatest strategic 
importance. These firms dominate numerous sectors in China’s domestic economy—
from petroleum to telecommunications to aviation to electricity generation and 
transmission. Each central state-owned enterprise is typically a multi-layered 
enterprise group with more than 100 subsidiary entities.22 Their heads are officials 
who hold the equivalent of either vice-ministerial or department-level administrative 
                                                
21 The Hu Jintao administration established SASAC in 2003 as a special agency of the State Council, 
China’s main government body. This study focuses on the SASAC at the central level; it does not 
examine the parallel SASACs established to administer state-owned assets at the subnational levels. 
22 Lisa A. Keister, Chinese Business Groups: The Structure and Impact of Interfirm Relations During 
Economic Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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rank.23 The directors of SASAC are responsible for the oversight, performance 
assessment, and reform of the central government’s portfolio of state-owned 
enterprises.  
 
Overview of the Study and Methods 
In Chapter 1, I introduce the political leadership approach to studying economic 
reform in China. In Chapter 2, I detail key enterprise reform policies since 1978 to 
document the creation and expansion of space for political leadership at the 
organization level. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 assess the impact of political leadership at 
the organization level on economic reform within and across central state-owned 
enterprises. In Chapter 3, I use a most-similar case study design to analyze the effects 
of political leadership by consecutive chairmen of a central state-owned enterprise on 
firm-level reform outcomes: changes in the levels of marketization of the firm’s global 
expansion strategy, shifts in influence among intra-firm entities, and how they 
conceptualize their relationship to international markets. The empirical analysis in 
both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 evaluates the political leadership explanation against 
competing explanations derived from the top-down strategic design and bottom-up 
organic transformation perspectives on economic reform. Finally, Chapter 5 connects 
the organizational change wrought by political leadership with the broader evolution 
of the institution of state ownership in China.  
The methodological approach of this dissertation exhibits “analytic 
eclecticism”: pragmatic triangulation of methods and data, creative combination of 
                                                
23 The ranks of these individuals depend on the administrative ranks of their firms.  
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multiple mechanisms, and investigation of broad, substantive questions grounded in 
the social and historical circumstances of China’s state-owned economy.24 First, I 
employ mechanisms-based analysis, using process tracing to study how central state-
owned enterprise heads exercise political leadership to shape economic reform at the 
firm level and use a varied repertoire of tactics to advance their agendas. I also 
investigate the feedback loops between organizations and institutions and identify 
several potential mechanisms through which organizational change in China’s state-
owned economy can generate co-evolution in institutions such as state ownership. 
This mechanisms-centered mode of analysis disaggregates complex organizations 
based on internal structures, relationships, and processes; reveals the strategic 
interactions among organizational and individual actors; and illuminates the 
institutional and social environments in which they operate.25 In addition, I use 
variable-based, large-n analysis to examine the relationship between the political 
leadership exercised by organizational leaders at multiple levels and the likelihood of 
mergers for all central state-owned enterprises between 2003 and 2015. This 
methodological approach makes it possible to identify systematic relationships across 
a large number of units and to assess their relative strength.  
                                                
24 Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World 
Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
25 Kevin O’Brien, “Discover, Research (Re)design, and Theory Building,” Doing Fieldwork in China, 
eds. Maria Heimer and Stig Thøgersen (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2006); Elisabeth J. 
Wood, “Field Methods” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, vol. 4, eds. Carles Boix and 
Susan C. Stokes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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Chapter 1 
Political Leadership at the Organization Level 
 
Most scholars of China’s politics are well acquainted with top national leaders—such 
as Deng Xiaoping, Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao or Xi Jinping—and their roles in the 
country’s economic reform process. However, fewer are familiar with individuals like 
Li Rongrong, founding director of government ownership agency the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), or Chen Qingtai, 
former head of the Second Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Plant. Researchers have 
traditionally paid less attention to heads of public sector organizations—government 
bodies, Party organs, or state-owned enterprises—even at the central level. Instead, 
many scholars emphasize the institutional constraints shaping China’s political 
economy, from the level of top central leadership down to individual citizens.26 
Embrace of institutional approaches has prompted organization heads to be largely 
written off as bureaucrats with little autonomy engaged primarily in management or 
administrative tasks. In contrast, this chapter argues that organization heads need to be 
taken seriously as political leaders deeply and directly engaged in the process of 
economic reform. I propose a political leadership approach to studying economic 
reform that proceeds in four parts. It highlights organization heads’ bounded 
autonomy to make choices within organizational and institutional constraints, 
                                                
26 Victor Nee and David Stark, Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern 
Europe (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989); Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: 
Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999); 
Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1993); Samantha A. Vortherms, “Between the Center and the People: Localized 
Citizenship in China,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2017).  
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identifies the main methods through which they actually exercise political leadership, 
discusses the role of political leadership in policy experimentation and implementation 
processes, and analyzes the obstacles to a political leadership approach. 
I define political leadership at the organization level as a process of influence 
through which the heads of public sector organizations seek to maintain continuity or 
to bring about change in the structure and operations of their organizations and others’ 
behavior that would not have otherwise occurred.27 This study focuses specifically on 
those individuals at the helm of central-level state-owned enterprises and government 
bodies in China’s state-owned economy.28 Studying political leadership at the 
organization level involves closely analyzing the top-ranked individual in a given 
organization and the effects of their choices and actions on the structure and behavior 
of that organization and those under its immediate administrative authority.29 What are 
the strategies that organizational leaders advance to achieve central reform goals or to 
maintain the status quo? How do they alter or maintain the structures of the 
organizations that they lead? Locating the study of political leadership at the 
organization level enables fine-grained analysis of the factors that condition political 
leadership, the methods through which it is exercised, and its organizational and 
                                                
27 This study centers on the realm of formal politics, in which officials hold positions of formal 
authority as the heads of government bodies, Party organs, and state-owned enterprises at multiple 
levels of government.  
28 Public sector organizations in China also include a wider array of entities, such as schools and 
hospitals at multiple levels of government; however, these organizations are beyond the scope of this 
study. 
29 This study focuses on individual heads of organizations, rather than broader leadership groups (领导
班子, lingdao banzi), because top leaders typically exercise predominant influence and ultimate 
decision-making authority in political and economic organizations in China. Similarly, although 
organizational leaders may be active in broader networks of political elites, because this study addresses 
organization level outcomes, I focus on top leaders’ individual exercise of political leadership within 
the organizations that they lead and its impact at the organization level. 
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institutional impact. A political leadership approach entails empirically evaluating this 
impact relative to the effects of other factors.30    
I use the term political leadership to emphasize that public organization heads 
in China are first and foremost political rather than administrative actors. Scholarship 
on public administration has collapsed the crisp Weberian distinction between 
professional politicians and professional bureaucrats, showing how civil servants can 
exercise leadership within administrative organizations by making decisions, acting 
strategically, leveraging technical expertise to influence others, and imbuing the work 
of bureaucracies with values.31 The central-level organization heads examined in this 
study are more politicians than bureaucrats in fact as well as function. Leaders of 
public sector organizations in China are Party politicians as well as state bureaucrats. 
Most of them do not expect—nor do they desire—lifetime careers in a particular 
public sector organization, even if they may spend years working there. Instead, these 
leading cadres expect that the Party center will regularly transfer them to different 
geographic locations and/or functional areas of the Chinese government or Party 
bureaucracy, either via new appointments or cadre exchanges, and most of them strive 
for promotion to higher-ranked central-level positions.32 Individual political gain—
                                                
30 These may include factors external to the organization, such as a major policy shift or change in 
external market conditions. 
31 On Weber’s original distinction between professional politicians and professional bureaucrats and a 
comparative study of the empirical overlap between the two, see Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” 
in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: 
Routledge, 2009 [1947]): 77-128. See also Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, 
Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1981). For an overview of the literature on administrative leadership, see Montgomery Van Wart, 
“Administrative Leadership Theory: A Reassessment After 10 Years,” Public Administration 91, no. 3 
(2013): 521-543.  
32 The CCP institution of cadre exchange (干部交流制度, ganbu jiaoliu zhidu) is the routine rotation of 
Party and state officials to serve in different posts and/or in different localities across the country. Its 
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beyond the context of a particular organization—is equally if not more important to 
organization heads in China than simply gaining resources and authority for their 
particular organizations. As a senior executive of a Chinese central state-owned 
enterprise put it bluntly: “State-owned enterprise leaders will always think more about 
their own promotion (升官, shengguan) than about the particular interests of their 
enterprises.”33 
A political leadership approach links three levels of analysis: individual, 
organizational, and institutional. It integrates analysis of the institutional factors that 
mediate influence—the general form of the state and economy within which elite 
groups operate—with attention to how members of those groups exercise this 
influence relative to others through their decisions and actions.34 Scholarship 
addressing the scope for agency relative to institutional constraints has focused 
primarily on collective actors—like interest groups, organizations, networks, and 
advocacy coalitions—rather than individual actors.35 In contrast, a political leadership 
approach contends that individual actors can also be a source of endogenous 
institutional change. Specifically, it highlights organizational leaders’ capacity to 
make choices within constraints and to engage in strategic action. These individual 
actors play key roles in the interactions between endogenous and exogenous sources 
of institutional change—such as critical junctures and external shocks—and the 
                                                                                                                                       
aims include: promoting organizational learning, evaluating cadre performance for potential further 
promotions, spreading successful policies, and limiting localism and corruption.  
33 Interview with senior executive of central state-owned enterprise, Beijing, October 2015. All 
interviews cited in this study followed the protocol approved by the Cornell Institutional Review Board, 
number: 1507005681.   
34 Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (London: Hutchinson, 1973). 
35 Jan Olsson, Subversion in Institutional Change and Stability: A Neglected Mechanism (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016): 4. 
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political processes of influence, competition, and conflict that they involve.36 A 
political leadership approach also illuminates the everyday politics of institutional 
change by showing how organizational leaders exercise influence relative to superiors 
and subordinates in specific issue areas. Organizationally grounded analysis suggests 
the limitations of viewing institutional change as the product of abstract, 
unconstrained clashes between a dichotomous set of “actors that support and defend 
institutional rules, norms, and practices and opponents who question and try to 
undermine institutions.”37 
A political leadership approach to the study of economic reform has four key 
characteristics. First, it foregrounds individual actors and the concept of choice within 
institutional and organizational constraints. To use Douglass North (1990)’s classic 
analogy, if institutions are the “rules of the game” and organizations are the “players 
of the game,” then organization heads make choices about how organizations will 
actually play the game, either in accordance with existing rules or challenging their 
limits.38 Organization heads also make choices that shape organizational structure as 
well as behavior. For example, they make decisions about organizational form and 
purpose within “organizational repertoires”: the set of alternative organizational forms 
                                                
36 Critical junctures are limited periods of time in which the range of plausible choices and scope for 
policy action expands and the potential consequences of actions are greater. Giovanni Capoccia and R. 
Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical 
Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (2007): 343. 
37 Olsson 2016: 5. 
38 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990): 4-5. As Olsson 2016 observes: “the rule of the game metaphor 
seduces us to accept the view of a clear distinction between the rules of the game and the game actually 
played, as if the game in itself is not allowed to interact with its rules.” Olsson 2016: 14. 
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available to actors in a given institutional context.39 In addition, a political leadership 
approach highlights the hierarchies of influence that exist among actors themselves, 
for example between an organizational leader and his subordinates. Organizations and 
institutions do not constrain all actors uniformly: some actors may have greater ability 
than others to maintain or to modify existing organizations and institutions. Finally, a 
political leadership approach at the organization level enables study of fine-grained 
organizational and institutional change in the short- to medium-term (over a period of 
several years to several decades) by locating its analysis at the micro-level.  
Studying political leadership at the organization level calls for rethinking some 
conventional assumptions about the roles that heads of public sector organizations 
play in Chinese politics. Scholars rarely use the term “political leadership” to describe 
the activities of officials below or even at the ministerial level. Instead, they often 
portray heads of central ministries or state-owned enterprises as bureaucrats 
performing primarily managerial and administrative functions. The conventional 
wisdom remains that top officials and advisors at the center make decisions; public 
sector organizations and their heads carry them out. Such a division reflects Craig 
Hickman’s (1990) stylized portrayal of leadership and management as two opposite 
ends of a continuum: leaders engage in experimental, visionary, flexible and creative 
activities, while managers carry out more structured, controlled, deliberate, and 
orderly activities.40  
                                                
39 Organizational repertoires may change exogenously (for example through changes in legal categories) 
or endogenously (for example through organizational innovation). Elisabeth S. Clemens, 
“Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women’s Groups and the Transformation of U.S. 
Politics, 1890-1920,” American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 4 (1993): 755-798. 
40 Craig Hickman, Mind of a Manager, Soul of a Leader (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990).  
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However, the heads of government bodies, Party organs, and state-owned 
enterprises at the central level and below in China also carry out leadership functions: 
engaging in experimentation, formulating strategies, restructuring their organizations, 
adjudicating conflict and taking stands, and requiring, persuading, or coercing others 
to follow the directions that they set.41 Bureaucracy and leadership are deeply 
intertwined, not diametrically opposed, because the operations of public sector 
organizations in China rarely involve the simple application of authority from the top 
down. As James M. Burns (1978) writes: “To the extent that it [bureaucracy] 
exemplifies conflict, power, values, and change in accordance with leader-follower 
needs, it embodies leadership.”42 Recognizing that political authority remains highly 
centralized in China and that organization heads do engage in managerial and 
administrative work should not preclude taking them seriously as political leaders who 
possess significant if bounded autonomy and influence in Chinese politics.  
A political leadership approach to studying China’s economic reform expands 
empirical domains of study and offers a new explanation for variation in 
organizational behavior and structure during economic reform. Opening up the black 
box of organizations as diverse as central ministries, state-owned enterprises, 
regulatory agencies, and local environmental protection bureaus is valuable because it 
provides insight into the functioning of China’s political and economic system. For 
example, instead of simply comparing lists of experimental pilot programs with 
                                                
41 On leadership functions, see W. Andy Knight, “Distinguishing and Unifying Visionary Leadership 
and Mechanical Management,” The Ashgate Research Companion to Political Leadership, eds. Joseph 
Masciulli, Mikhail A. Molchanov, and W. Andy Knight (New York: Ashgate Publishing, 2009): 136-
137. 
42 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978): 298. 
23 
subsequent central regulations and laws, or promulgated central policies with later 
implementation outcomes, studying political leadership at the organization level can 
illuminate how processes of policy experimentation and implementation actually occur. 
It can help to explain observed variation in the structure and behavior of multiple 
organizations as well as changes over time within a single organization.  
  
Political Leadership at the Organization Level in China  
The heads of state-owned enterprises and government and Party organizations in 
China are officials governed by the Communist Party of China (CCP)’s cadre 
management system.43 The Party center has long used the cadre management system 
as an institutional mechanism to control and integrate the governance of localities as 
well the largest state-owned enterprises.44 In theory, the Party’s authority to appoint, 
assess, transfer, promote, and remove top officials aligns their individual career 
incentives with the Party center’s objectives.45 The official cadre evaluation 
framework has five elements: morality, ability, diligence, performance, and 
                                                
43 At the central level, the fifth department (五局, wu ju) of the Central Organization Department’s 
Enterprise Cadre Bureau (企业干部局, qiye ganbu ju) directly manages the top leaders of central state-
owned enterprises designated as ‘important backbone enterprises’ in conjunction with higher Party 
authorities; SASAC appoints top leaders for the remaining central state-owned enterprises in 
coordination with the Central Organization Department.   
44 On the cadre management system functioning as an institution of central control over local 
governance, see Pierre F. Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Reform 
Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). On the cadre management system functioning to 
integrate the largest state-owned enterprises with a Party-led system of governance, see Kjeld Erik 
Brødsgaard, “Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?” The China 
Quarterly 211 (2012): 624-648; Chen Li, “Holding ‘China Inc.’ Together: The CCP and the Rise of 
China’s Yangqi,” The China Quarterly 228 (2016): 927-949. 
45 Two other important mechanisms of Party control over personnel are staff and budget allotments (编
制, bianzhi) and the routine circulation of officials to serve in different posts and/or different localities 
through the institution of cadre rotation (干部交流制度, ganbu jiaoliu zhidu). 
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uprightness (德、能、勤、绩、廉, de, neng, qin, ji, lian). Its aim is to incentivize, 
guide, and homogenize the behavior of Chinese officials by making clear the shared 
standards by which individuals in disparate posts and localities are assessed. The cadre 
management system represents the “rules of the game” for participants in the CCP’s 
internal labor market. 
 In the context of the cadre management system, Chinese officials’ exercise of 
political leadership has two main aims. The first is to deliver the goals that the center 
tasks their organizations to achieve. Economic performance is typically the most 
important: a large body of scholarship on Chinese officials’ political mobility provides 
evidence linking economic growth with increased likelihood of promotion.46 Other 
studies document officials’ systematic falsification of economic statistics, 
demonstrating the great lengths to which cadres will go to show that their performance 
meets central targets.47 In the cutthroat tournament competition among Chinese 
officials, each individual has often only several years in which to deliver better results 
than his peers, in order to be promoted.48 Political leadership in this economic 
                                                
46 Ye Chen, Hongbin Li, and Li-an Zhou, “Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of 
Provincial Leaders in China,” Economics Letters 88, no. 3 (2005): 421-25; Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, 
“Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,” 
Journal of Public Economics 89 (2005), 1743–62; Frederick Teiwes, “Normal Politics with Chinese 
Characteristics,” The China Journal 45 (2001): 69-82. Others argue that political connectedness and 
patronage relationships (assessed by measures such as central government work experience, factional 
ties, or central appointments for officials at lower levels of government) make promotion more likely. 
See Jay Chih-Jou Chen, “Elite Mobility in Post-Reform Rural China,” Issues and Studies 42 no. 2 
(2006): 53-83; Pierre F. Landry, “The Political Management of Mayors in Post-Deng China,” 
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 17 (2005), 31-58; Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph, and 
Mingxing Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central 
Committee Members in China,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 1 (2012): 166-187. 
47 Jeremy L. Wallace, “Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China,” British Journal 
of Political Science 46, no. 1 (2016): 11-29.  
48 For example, Li and Zhou 2005 find that the average tenure for Chinese provincial leaders between 
1979 and 1995 is only 3.03 years, while Eaton and Kostka 2014 find that the average tenure for 
municipal Party secretaries between 1993 and 2011 is 3.8 years. Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, “Political 
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selection environment is essentially an exercise in creative problem solving. How can 
one achieve the center’s goals given the constraints and resources available in a 
particular organizational setting?  
  The second impetus for organizational leaders in China to exercise political 
leadership is what I term “political product differentiation.”49 Officials want to stand 
out relative to both their peers in similar organizations and their predecessors in a 
particular post. The best way to be promoted is not just to deliver successful results—
it is also to associate oneself indelibly with them. The distinctive strategies that heads 
of organizations propose and their efforts to alter existing organizational structures 
thus represent political product differentiation as well as problem-solving efforts to 
deliver performance gains. Political leadership is an important way by which officials 
distinguish themselves within the cadre management system and thereby gain 
competitive advantage. In short, it is a means of individual-level “niche creation” in a 
political selection environment. 
 However, not all heads of public sector organizations in China are compliant 
reformists jockeying for higher-ranked political positions by striving to achieve the 
center’s goals. Some organization heads are content to simply stay in their current 
positions as long as possible, even up until retirement. Those who assumed leadership 
                                                                                                                                       
Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,” Journal of 
Public Economics 89, no. 9 (2005): 1,753; Sarah Eaton and Genia Kostka, “Authoritarian 
Environmentalism Undermined? Local Leaders’ Time Horizons and Environmental Policy 
Implementation in China,” The China Quarterly 218 (2014): 362. On tournament competition in 
Chinese political economy, see Li-an Zhou, “Governing China’s Local Officials: An Analysis of 
Promotion Tournament Model,” Economic Research Journal 7 (2007): 36-50. 
49 There are multiple reasons why scholarship on Chinese politics has not yet investigated this 
motivation for official behavior: the still pervasive idea that heads of state-owned enterprises and sub-
national governments act more as bureaucrats than as politicians; the dearth of in-depth studies on 
individual organizational leaders below the central level; and the implicit assumption of quantitative 
studies that officials are interchangeable observations differentiated only by demographic attributes. 
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positions after years or even decades in their organizations often possess deep 
professional and personal networks and specialized expertise that cannot be exported 
elsewhere easily. They may perceive that the advantages of staying in their current 
positions outweigh the risk, uncertainty, and greater pressure of a new organizational 
environment, despite the potential for greater material and political benefits. Others, 
eager to move on from their current posts and aware that their tenures may be limited, 
endeavor to achieve some central goals (like economic growth) while superficially 
implementing or even ignoring others (like environmental issues).50 Both those 
seeking to stay in their current positions and those attempting to move on may choose 
to ignore or to delay carrying out the center’s goals. This is especially likely if central 
goals are unclear, cannot be easily measured, or if their implementation will 
negatively impact other actors in an official’s organization or locality. Some 
individuals may even abuse the state authority vested in their positions to advance 
central goals while simultaneously enriching their organizations—and themselves—in 
the process.51 
 
Bounded Autonomy and Domains of Influence 
“Bounded autonomy” is the autonomous capacity for choice and action within specific 
organizational and institutional contexts. Institutional and organizational settings do 
                                                
50 Sarah Eaton and Genia Kostka, “Authoritarian Environmentalism Undermined? Local Leaders’ Time 
Horizons and Environmental Policy Implementation in China,” The China Quarterly 218 (2014): 359-
380. 
51 A well-known example is Liu Zhijun (刘志军), the former head of the now-abolished Ministry of 
Railways. During his tenure as minister between 2003 and 2011, Liu oversaw the rapid expansion of 
China’s railway system, in particular its successful development of high-speed rail. However, Liu was 
convicted in 2013 of corruption and abusing state power. 
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not determine actors’ choices and behavior, even if they constrain and guide it in 
significant ways. Existing research has primarily examined bounded autonomy as it 
characterizes state-society or center-local relations.52 In contrast, this study examines 
bounded autonomy as it enables heads of public sector organizations to exercise 
political leadership within particular organizational and institutional contexts. This is 
expressed by the Chinese term “operational space” (操作空间, caozuo kongjian), 
which refers to the delineated domain within which one possesses freedom of choice 
and action. In this project, I analyze the sources of bounded autonomy, its limits, and 
the potential it creates for heads of organizations to exercise political leadership and 
thereby shape policy experimentation and implementation. 
The bounded autonomy of organization heads in China originates from both 
institutional and organizational sources. Its first institutional source is the cadre 
management system. While the cadre management system strongly influences 
organizational leaders’ behavior, it is ultimately a mechanism of macro-level control. 
It incentivizes their efforts to achieve central goals through a combination of carrots 
(political promotion) and sticks (sanctions). However, it neither specifies nor 
determines their micro-level choices as they engage in policy experimentation and 
implementation or political product differentiation. This built-in institutional 
ambiguity is an important source of autonomy for organizational leaders. Moreover, 
the cadre management system does not always serve its intended control functions. 
Mandatory retirement ages linked with positions of different administrative ranks may 
                                                
52 Andrew Cooper, “State Power and Patterns of Late Development: A Comment on Zhao and Hall,” 
Sociology 28, no. 2 (1994): 539-546; Ding-xin Zhao and John A. Hall, “State Power and Patterns of 
Late Development: Resolving the Crisis of the Sociology of Development,” Sociology 28, no. 1 (1994): 
211-229. 
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prompt officials to seek quick returns through risky or unnecessary investments in 
order to get promoted.53 Conversely, they may foster inaction or even illicit behavior if 
officials infer that due to their ages their current position is likely to be their last. Some 
even question whether the prospect of promotion is really the primary driver of official 
behavior to begin with, instead suggesting that the immediate material benefits 
conferred by a present position may be more desirable than potential future gains in a 
higher-ranked political position.54  
Beyond the cadre management system, multiple other institutional factors 
grant heads of organizations in China bounded autonomy for choice and action during 
economic reform. The first is the decentralized context in which China’s economic 
reform has occurred. A high degree of decentralization characterizes China’s 
economic system, particularly the relationship between the center and lower levels of 
government.55 This decentralization has expanded from authority sharing (分权, 
fenquan), such as localities’ participation in decisions about economic planning and 
distribution of materials during the Mao Zedong era, to the devolution of authority (放
权, fangquan) for economic decision-making, like that Deng Xiaoping granted to 
                                                
53 In China this is colloquially referred to as the “59 phenomenon” (59现象, 59 xianxiang) or “58 
phenomenon” (58现象, 58 xianxiang). On concerns about this issue, see SASAC (Research Office): 
《探索与研究：国有资产监督管理和国有企业改革研究报告》 [Exploration and Research: State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Management and State-Owned Enterprise Reform Research Report] 
(Beijing: Jingji chubanshe, 2012): 351. 
54 Yuen Yuen Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016): 
117. 
55 China has five levels of government: center, province, prefecture, county, and township. Compared to 
decentralization between the center and the provinces, authority remains more centralized between the 
provincial and township levels; recentralization has even occurred in some cases. Andrew C. Mertha, 
“China’s ‘Soft’ Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations,” The China Quarterly 184 
(2005): 791-810. 
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enterprises and localities, especially special economic zones and coastal regions.56 
Decision-making authority is not only decentralized, it is also increasingly fragmented 
below the central level among a growing number of actors.57 Heads of the public 
sector organizations examined here have some if limited scope to engage in “policy 
entrepreneurship” by framing policy issues and outlining possible alternative 
approaches to address them.58 Another factor granting organization heads bounded 
autonomy for choice and action in their particular organizational realms is the 
widespread governance practice of “administrative subcontracting” (行政分包, 
xingzheng fenbao). In administrative subcontracting, the center assigns responsibility 
for carrying out government functions like budget-making or personnel selection 
and/or public service provision to subordinate organizations or levels of government, 
which in turn reassign it to those below them, all the way down to the bottom level.59 
A final factor is the nature of central reform objectives themselves. When top 
authorities in China issue goals for economic reform, they do not specify precisely 
how these goals are to be achieved. In what Yuen Yuen Ang terms “directed 
                                                
56 Some economic functions of government remain centralized despite this widespread decentralization, 
such as taxation, banking, and customs. 
57 On fragmented authoritarianism, see: Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, ed., Chinese Politics as Fragmented 
Authoritarianism: Earthquakes, Energy and Environment (New York: Routledge, 2016); Kenneth 
Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Andrew C. Mertha, “‘Fragmented Authoritarianism 
2.0’: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process,” The China Quarterly 200 (2009): 995-1012. 
58 For example, Xu 2016 details how Liu Zhenya, head of the State Grid Corporation of China, a central 
state-owned enterprise, engaged in policy entrepreneurship to garner top-level support for controversial 
ultra-high-voltage transmission networks by framing them as the policy solution to a set of energy and 
environmental challenges. Yi-chong Xu, Sinews of Power: Politics of the State Grid Corporation of 
China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). On policy entrepreneurship, see Andrew C. Mertha, 
China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2008); Mertha 2009. 
59 周黎安 [Zhou Li’an], 《行政发包制》 [Administrative Subcontract], 《社会》 [Society], 34, no. 6 
(2014): 1-38; 周黎安 [Zhou Li’an]:《转型中的地方政府:官员激励与治理》 [Local Government in 
Transition: Official Incentives and Governance] (Shanghai: Gezhi chubanshe, 2008). 
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improvisation,” the center’s reform goals are deliberately broad in scope in order to 
allow subordinates some leeway to engage in experimentation and figure out how to 
successfully realize them in accordance with local conditions.60 Some contend that 
there may be even greater leeway for subordinates to make divergent and even 
contradictory interpretations of central goals when conditions of weak 
institutionalization and fundamental, endemic uncertainty are present.61 
Organizational leaders’ bounded autonomy also derives from organizational 
sources. The institutional factors discussed above primarily grant organizational 
leaders’ scope for bounded autonomy vis-à-vis external actors like administrative 
superiors. At the same time, their de jure (legal) authority as the ‘number-one hands’ 
(一把手, yi ba shou) of their respective organizations widens their scope for choice 
and action relative to other actors within their particular organizations. Organization 
heads can draw upon governance and management practices stressing organizational 
hierarchy, authority, and conformity that trace their origins not only to the communist 
period but also to Confucian tradition.62 While clashes among leaders and their 
subordinates in Chinese organizations do occur, few avenues exist to formally 
challenge or usurp organization heads’ decision-making authority within the 
organizations they lead, and those who attempt to do so are likely to face reassignment 
or dismissal.  
                                                
60 Ang 2016. 
61 For example, Segal 2003 suggests that such conditions during the 1990s enabled local and municipal 
governments to interpret the concept of ‘people-run [private] enterprise’ (民营企业, minying qiye) in 
widely divergent ways. Adam Segal, Digital Dragon: High-Technology Enterprises in China (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003): 39-41. 
62 John Child, Management in China During the Age of Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
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In practice, administrative hierarchies intersect with functional issue areas and 
informal networks to delineate organization heads’ specific domains of authority. 
Organization heads exercise influence over restricted ranges of issues, and their 
authority may be greater with regard to some issues compared with others. For 
instance, central state-owned enterprise heads have greater leeway for decision-
making regarding commercial matters than Party affairs, for which their primary role 
is to implement the campaigns that the Central Organization Department launches.63 
Decision-making authority within a given issue area also varies by administrative rank. 
For example, central state-owned enterprise heads possess authority to make decisions 
about the internal integration of resources within a particular state-owned enterprise 
group; however, SASAC and the State Council determine which central state-owned 
enterprises will be merged together, when, and how. Informal networks also shape the 
contours of organization heads’ influence by facilitating their distribution of benefits 
derived from formal administrative hierarchies to subordinates, especially key allies. 
By crafting “political settlements”—sustainable balances of relative authority among 
actors in a particular institutional and organizational context—organization heads can 
ensure their influence and amplify its reach.64 In summary, organization heads’ 
domains of authority, within which they possess bounded autonomy to exercise 
                                                
63 Since central state-owned enterprise heads frequently serve as both the chair of the board of directors 
and the Party secretary, this disparity in influence is not the product of differences in roles between 
enterprise management and Party positions. 
64 While political settlements are typically studied as distributions of power among elite groups at the 
national level, their logic can also be applied to examine distributions of influence among sectors or 
firms at the industry level as well as among actors at the organization level. Mushtaq Khan, “Political 
Settlements and the Governance of Growth-enhancing Institutions,” (2010); Mushtaq Khan, “The Role 
of Industrial Policy: Lessons from Asia,” David Bailey, Keith Cowling, and Philip R. Tomlinson, 
eds., New Perspectives on Industrial Policy for a Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015): 79-98. 
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political leadership, varies by issue area and is a product of both institutional factors as 
well as administrative hierarchies and informal networks within and among 
organizations.   
 
Exercising Political Leadership 
Given this bounded autonomy, heads of public sector organizations in China exercise 
political leadership in multiple ways. They possess primary decision-making authority 
to appoint key personnel, make major decisions about investments and budgets, 
determine performance assessment and salary standards for employees, set key 
priorities for organizational culture and operations, and periodically assess the 
organization’s activities and performance. On a daily basis, heads of organizations 
exercise political leadership through their authority to review and approve a wide 
range of detailed organizational matters, from decisions about office relocation to 
approvals for subordinate leaves and travel. However, while organization heads’ 
exercise of political leadership through these methods shapes day-to-day operations, 
they are not likely to fundamentally impact reform policy experimentation or 
implementation in the short- to medium-term.    
This study therefore focuses on the two main ways in which heads of 
organizations exercise political leadership to shape reform policy experimentation and 
implementation: by determining the specific strategies to respond to central objectives, 
and by altering organizational structure. These two mechanisms of political leadership 
are complementary and leaders often use them in tandem. Leaders of the organizations 
charged with implementing central goals must first interpret them, formulate multiple 
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possible methods to achieve them, select a strategic path of action (or inaction), 
determine how to allocate and mobilize organizational resources and personnel, and 
then endeavor to carry out their preferred strategy. For example, the center tasks 
central state-owned enterprise heads with realizing the goals of preserving and 
increasing the value of state assets and building their firms into ‘national champions,’ 
but state-owned enterprise heads determine how to achieve these goals in their 
particular organizations. Even within the same organization over time, different 
leaders may have divergent interpretations of central goals and ideas about how to 
achieve them, thereby generating variation in the policy experimentation and 
implementation processes.  
Organizational leaders also exercise political leadership by altering the 
structure of their organizations. Specifically, changes to organizational structure may 
include: creating, eliminating, or changing existing departments; altering hierarchical 
authority relationships among subordinate units; and reallocating assets, capital, and 
personnel within an organization. For example, the “lean and healthy body” (瘦身健
体, shoushen jianti) reform goal that Premier Li Keqiang announced in May 2016 
calls on state-owned enterprise heads to modify their firms’ organizational structures 
by streamlining layers of management and reducing the number of subsidiaries by at 
least 20 per cent.65 State-owned enterprise heads are the ones who will actually decide 
whether to act in response to this central goal and, if so, specifically how to alter the 
structure of their organizations in order to achieve it.  
                                                
65 State-owned enterprise heads are responsible for determining which and how many headquarters 
departments and subsidiaries to eliminate. State Council: 《李克强主持召开国务院常务会议》 [Li 
Keqiang Chairs State Council Executive Meeting], May 18, 2016. 
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However, organizational leaders’ behavior is not limited only to enacting 
change. The exercise of political leadership also entails choices about whether to 
continue predecessors’ policies, to not act at all, to delay, to subvert, or even to oppose 
the implementation of central reform goals. Such choices reflect both leader 
preferences and strategic assessment about which courses of action (or inaction) are 
feasible and desirable in a given organizational or institutional setting at a particular 
time. Take for example the response of many state-owned enterprise heads to efforts 
by the State Council under Premier Zhao Ziyang’s leadership to implement ‘tax-for-
profit’ reform during the 1980s.66 Many state-owned enterprise heads altered existing 
economic responsibility systems to make them look like tax-for-profit reforms, while 
also reclassifying or underreporting their profits in order to protect the proportion of 
earnings that their enterprises could retain.67 The nationwide implementation of this 
reform in 1984 prompted a 22-month decline in industrial state-owned enterprise 
profits.68 Focusing solely on the design of institutional arrangements and incentives 
risks ignoring the broad range of strategic responses to them at the organization level.  
While the CCP’s personnel management system seeks to motivate 
organizational leaders to implement central reform objectives, the exercise of political 
leadership can also have a dark side.69 Some organizational leaders may personally 
                                                
66 Tax-for-profit reform aimed to legalize enterprises’ economic responsibility to the state by 
substituting an income tax for profit remittance. 
67 Economic responsibility system reforms sought to clarify the rights, interests and responsibilities of 
state-owned enterprises vis-à-vis the state, through annual one-on-one negotiations with bureaus to 
establish enterprises’ specific targets, profit retention rates, and responsibility for shortfalls or losses.  
68 章迪诚 [Zhang Dicheng], ed., 《中国国有企业改革编年史, 1978-2005》[Chronicle of China’s 
State-owned Enterprise Reform] (Beijing: Zhongguo gongren chubanshe, 2006): 110. 
69 Corruption is not a focus of this study. For a recent analysis of corruption in China, see Minxin Pei, 
China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2016).  
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engage in or direct others to carry out rent-seeking and illicit activities such as asset 
stripping, embezzlement, bribery, or trading political favors. For example, Zhou 
Yongkang, former head of state-owned enterprise China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) and the Ministry of Public Security, was sentenced to life in 
prison in 2015 for offenses including bribery, abuse of power, and disclosure of state 
secrets. Jiang Jiemin, the former head of SASAC and associate of Zhou Yongkang at 
CNPC where he served as general manager and then chairman, was sentenced to 16 
years in prison in 2014 for crimes including bribery and abuse of power. The same 
decentralization of authority that creates space for the exercise of political leadership 
at the organization level also generates greater leeway for the heads of organizations to 
engage in illicit activity without effective monitoring and control by administrative 
superiors.  
   
Moving from Political Leaders to Political Leadership  
Existing research focuses primarily on individual political leaders in China and the 
relationships among them, not their actual exercise of political leadership at the 
organization level and its effects.70 The largest body of scholarship focuses on top 
national leaders at the apex of the political system. Such works often reconstruct and 
analyze the dynamics of elite competition and compromise during key historical 
episodes, such as the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen 
                                                
70 A notable exception is Wu 2005, who examines the leaders of central-level economic planning 
agencies in Taiwan to argue that whether a leader was a  “strongman” or a “weak chair” determined the 
degree to which these organs functioned as coordination mechanisms within the Taiwanese economic 
bureaucracy. Yongping Wu, A Political Explanation of Economic Growth: State Survival, Bureaucratic 
Politics, and Private Enterprises in the Making of Taiwan’s Economy, 1950-1985 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2005). 
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Square uprising in 1989.71 Another body of work investigates the networks between 
top Chinese leaders and political elites or between them and local leaders, linking 
competition among elite groups to outcomes such as economic policy-making, 
political promotion, and the future composition of the Party leadership.72 Others look 
at groups of Chinese leaders, such as the Central Committees of the CCP, and analyze 
changing trends in their members’ demographic characteristics, such as age, ethnicity, 
birthplace, education, and professional and family background.73 Still other analyses 
focus on elite contestation in particular policy areas, such as agriculture.74 These 
studies offer important insights into the factors that affect policy-making and political 
mobility across levels of government in China and the processes by which both occur. 
However, they leave important questions unanswered, such as why predictors of 
                                                
71 Frederick C. Teiwes, “The Study of Elite Political Conflict in the PRC: Politics Inside the ‘Black 
Box’” in Handbook of the Politics of China, ed., David S. G. Goodman (Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2015). Such works on the Great Leap Forward include: David Bachman, Bureaucracy, 
Economy, and Leadership in China: The Institutional Origins of the Great Leap Forward (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, China’s Road to Disaster: 
Mao, Central Politicians, and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward, 1955-
1959 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Dali L. Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural 
Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap Famine (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1996). On the Cultural Revolution: Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution: A Case Study (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980). On the Tiananmen 
Square uprising: Joseph Torigian, “Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion: Elite Power Struggles and the 
Fate of Three Revolutions,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016).  
72 Sebastian Heilmann and Lea Shih, “The Rise of Industrial Policy in China, 1978-2012” (Harvard-
Yenching Institute, 2013); Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Franziska Keller, “Networks of Power: An Informal Network 
among Chinese Communist Elites, 1982-2007,” APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper, accessed on 
August 1, 2017 at: SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2454603; Andrew J. Nathan, “A Factionalism 
Model for CCP Politics,” China Quarterly 53 (1973): 34-66; Victor C. Shih, Factions and Finance in 
China: Elite Conflict and Inflation (New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
73 Cheng Li and Lynn White, “The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: 
from Mobilizers to Managers,” Asian Survey 28 (1988): 371-399; Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the 
People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); Jun Zhang, Qi Zhang, and 
Zhikuo Liu, “The Political Logic of Partial Reform of China’s State-Owned Enterprises,” Asian 
Survey 57, no. 3 (2017): 395-415. 
74 Joseph Fewsmith, “Agricultural Crisis in China,” Problems of Communism 38, no. 6 (1988): 78-93; 
Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, Paradoxes of Post-Mao Rural Reform: Initial Steps Toward a 
New Chinese Countryside, 1976-1981 (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
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political promotion for officials in Party positions do not have the same effect for 
those in government positions, and vice versa.75 In summary, existing research does 
not tell us much about how the leaders involved in political competition and elite 
networks actually exercise political leadership within the particular government bodies, 
Party organs, or state-owned enterprises that they lead on a day-to-day basis.  
 Nor does most research on sub-national politics in China address political 
leadership at the organization level, although a handful of scholars do link political 
leadership with policy and developmental outcomes.76 Studies of local officials’ career 
trajectories and political budget cycles reveal the powerful institutional effects of the 
cadre management system; however, these analyses offer a limited view of local 
officials’ political behavior.77  Other works do engage political leadership at the sub-
national level but ultimately downplay it in order to reach broader generalizations 
                                                
75 For example, some scholars find evidence that economic performance matters most for government 
rather than Party positions and at lower levels of government. Eun Kyong Choi, “Patronage and 
Performance: Factors in the Political Mobility of Provincial Leaders in Post-Deng China,” The China 
Quarterly 212 (2012): 965-981; Pierre F. Landry, Xiaobo Lü, and Haiyan Duan, “Does Performance 
Matter? Evaluating Political Selection along the Chinese Administrative Ladder,” APSA 2014 Annual 
Meeting Paper, accessed on August 1, 2017 at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2452482. 
76 For example, Domenach 1996 analyzes the role of Wu Zhipu (吴芝圃) in the events of the Great 
Leap Forward in Henan province. Donaldson 2009 argues that individual provincial leaders are one 
factor explaining Guizhou and Yunnan provinces’ adoption of disparate economic strategies. Eaton and 
Kostka 2014 cite examples like Geng Yanbo (耿彦波), mayor of Datong in Shanxi province, to suggest 
that individual leaders can diffuse ideas and information across regions through their choices and 
actions. Shen and Tsai 2016 contend that “agent-centric factors,” including “motivated and capable 
local leadership” and “openness to new ideas” account for Suzhou, Wenzhou, and Dongguan cities’ 
divergent responses to the global financial crisis. Jean-Luc Domenach, The Origins of the Great Leap 
Forward: The Case of One Chinese Province (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); John A. 
Donaldson, “Why Do Similar Areas Adopt Different Developmental Strategies? A Study of Two 
Puzzling Chinese Provinces,” Journal of Contemporary China 60 (2009): 421-444; Sarah Eaton and 
Genia Kostka, “Authoritarian Environmentalism Undermined? Local Leaders’ Time Horizons and 
Environmental Policy Implementation in China,” The China Quarterly 218 (2014): 370-371; Xiaoxiao 
Shen and Kellee S. Tsai, “Institutional Adaptability in China: Local Developmental Models Under 
Changing Economic Conditions,” World Development 87 (2016): 107-127. 
77 Gang Guo, “China’s Local Political Budget Cycles,” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 3 
(2009): 621-632; Pierre F. Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Samantha A. Vortherms, “Disaggregating China’s Political Budget Cycles: 
‘Righting’ the U” (working paper, forthcoming).  
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about ‘local governments’ or ‘local leaders.’ Take for example the study by Marc 
Blecher and Vivienne Shue (2001) examining Xinji municipality’s adherence to the 
local developmental state model through its establishment of a fur and leather trading 
center. The article refers to “Xinji authorities” or “municipal officials” as the main 
protagonist, but it also describes how Mayor Bian Qunyou convened multiple 
meetings and forums to push for the trading center’s creation.78 The authors write that 
“schemes for setting up a more ambitious centre for the fur and leather trade in Xinji 
began to gel.”79 Yet it seems unlikely that agreement on such a bold project could 
have been reached spontaneously, given not only potential opposition to the proposal 
but also the large-scale project construction, urban land acquisition, and coordination 
among industry producers that it entailed. Could a fur and leather trading center have 
been established without Mayor Bian’s support—or if he had opposed it? Might 
another mayor have acted differently? Similarly, the work by Meg Rithmire (2015) on 
divergent local property rights arrangements in China’s northeast details the critical 
role of mayors—Bo Xilai in Dalian, Gong Benyan in Harbin, and Mi Fengyun in 
Changchun—but does not single out their influence in the processes of political 
bargaining and moral suasion between ‘state actors’ and ‘social actors’ that she 
describes.80 Existing scholarship on local politics in China has yet to fully engage 
questions of political leadership at the organization level, yet it is precisely this 
leadership that is responsible for both generating action plans and carrying them out. 
                                                
78 Marc Blecher and Vivienne Shue, “Into Leather: State-Led Development and the Private Sector in 
Xinji,” The China Quarterly 166 (2001): 372. 
79 Blecher and Shue 2001.  
80 Meg E. Rithmire, Land Bargains and Chinese Capitalism: The Politics of Property Rights under 
Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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Rethinking Policy Experimentation and Implementation 
Analysis of political leadership at the organization level advances existing scholarship 
in two areas particularly relevant to economic reform—policy experimentation and 
implementation. First, it suggests that the conventional ‘point to surface’ (由点到面, 
you dian dao mian) account of policy experimentation in China falls short in several 
ways.81 Analysis using the ‘point to surface’ framework often focuses on the politics 
of policy experimentation and implementation by which ‘dots’ are connected with the 
‘surface,’ overlooking the organizational-level processes of trial and error that occur 
within each of the ‘dots’ themselves. At the organization level, heads of organizations 
must first formulate and select among multiple strategies, build consensus for them, 
and endeavor to actually carry out their chosen strategy while potentially restructuring 
their organizations in tandem. Variation in organizations’ policy experimentation is 
integral to the ‘point to surface’ approach because it allows the relative success of 
different approaches to be compared. This variety results in significant part from 
political leadership; it does not derive axiomatically from organizations’ attributes, 
their environmental conditions, or past approaches.  
                                                
81 The point to surface approach entails a policy process in which successful individual experimental 
points (试点, shidian) are generalized as models and then implemented widely across units. It can occur 
in two ways: 1.) when local officials, enterprises, or even individuals initiate experimentation on the 
ground that administrative superiors subsequently formalize and potentially expand through pilot 
programs; 2.) when central or local governments first design and initiate pilot programs from the top 
down and select pilot participants via direct designation or selection from an applicant pool. Sebastian 
Heilmann, “From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China's Distinctive Policy 
Process,” The China Journal 59 (2008): 1-30. Others posit a tripartite ‘point to line to surface’ approach. 
For example, Hong Hu discusses an integrated ‘point, line, surface’ (点, 线, 面, dian, xian, mian) 
approach in enterprise reform experimentation and implementation. 洪虎 [Hong Hu], 《国有经济改革
与企业制度创新》[State-owned Enterprise Reform and Institutional Innovation] (Beijing: Zhonggong 
zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1999): 262.  
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 Second, incorporating political leadership also provides a fuller account of how 
policy implementation occurs and varies at the organization level. Institutions, 
resource endowments, and peer behavior may all shape the range of policy 
implementation approaches that organization heads deem possible or desirable; 
however, these factors do not determine which approaches are ultimately selected and 
how they are carried out. As Peter Nolan (1998) concludes in his study of state-owned 
enterprise Capital Iron and Steel Corporation (Shougang): “The contract 
[responsibility system] provided the possibility for dynamic, growth-oriented 
management behavior, but it did not ensure that this was how the Corporation would 
behave.”82 Instead, Nolan credits the “industrial entrepreneurship” of Shougang’s head, 
Zhou Guanwu (周冠五), for the company’s successful implementation of the contract 
responsibility system.83 Specifically, Zhou exercised political leadership at Shougang 
by redefining its organizational strategy and structure and leading employees in 
successive “battles” of technological upgrading. 84 Political leadership at the 
organization level helps to account for variation in policy implementation across units 
and over time, as different heads of similar organizations charged with carrying out 
                                                
82 Emphasis in original. The contract responsibility system required enterprises to negotiate with 
bureaus to formulate typically three to five year contracts on specific tax rates and profit-sharing 
arrangements. Peter Nolan, Indigenous Large Firms in China’s Economic Reform: The Case of 
Shougang Iron and Steel Corporation (London: Contemporary China Institute, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London, 1998): 42.  
83 Seiichiro Yonekura 1986 also cites the concept of “industrial entrepreneurship” to argue that 
Kawasaki Steel head Nishiyama Yataro, not the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, was 
responsible for Japan’s post-war embrace of integrated production in the steel industry. Seiichiro 
Yonekura, The Japanese Iron and Steel Industry, 1850-1990: Continuity and Discontinuity (London: 
Springer, 1994). 
84 Mr. Zhou advanced a strategy of comprehensive contracting down to the individual level, close 
coordination among work units, departments, and positions, and strict assessment. He also altered the 
company’s organizational structure by slashing the number of top-level managers and aggressively 
demoting or removing managers who failed to meet performance targets. Nolan 1998; Edward 
S. Steinfeld, Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-owned Industry (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
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the same policy may implement it in divergent ways, and the change of a head may 
cause even the same organization to significantly alter its implementation approach. 
Third, a political leadership approach helps to explain why organizations 
ignore, delay, or even subvert policy experimentation or implementation. Some 
contend that the essence of CCP-led rule is “integrated fragmentation,” in which the 
Party uses mechanisms like the cadre management system or leading small groups to 
achieve central goals despite confronting segregated xitong (系统, which are 
vertically-organized administrative hierarchies focused on particular issue areas), 
fragmented layers of subnational government, and competing interest groups.85 But 
these integrative mechanisms do not necessarily motivate officials to seek to realize 
central objectives—and studying political leadership at the organization level can help 
to explain why. Take for example the failure of the State Council’s 1994 national pilot 
scheme for developing a “modern enterprise system.”86 Most of the 100 pilot 
enterprises retained the “factory system” (工厂制, gongchang zhi) instead of adopting 
new forms of enterprise governance.87 Studying political leadership suggests that an 
important reason for this experiment’s failure lies at the organization level. Enterprise 
leaders preferred their limited gains in decision-making autonomy to proactive 
adoption of new governance mechanisms that would formally transfer decision-
                                                
85 Brødsgaard 2012; Li 2016. 
86 Jiang Zemin’s Report to the National Party Congress in October 1992 called for the establishment of 
a ‘modern enterprise system,’ defining its characteristics as: “clearly established property rights, well-
defined power and responsibility, separation of enterprise from government, and scientific 
management.” Jiang Zemin, Report to the National Party Congress, October 12, 1992. 
87 Predominant during the planned economy period, the factory system refers to the formal arrangement 
of enterprise governance in which the state rather than the enterprise and its leaders directed planning, 
production, and sales. Enterprises were in effect the “factories” of the state. On the results of the 1994 
“modern enterprise system” pilot scheme, see State Economic and Trade Commission: 《国有企业改
革与建立现代企业制度》 [State-owned Enterprise Reform and Establishing a Modern Enterprise 
System] (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2001): 24. 
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making authority from the state to the enterprise and thereby increase their personal 
responsibility for losses. Since the content of the center’s goal of establishing a 
“modern enterprise system” was still highly ambiguous and at that time had not yet 
been linked explicitly with corporate governance, organization heads were willing to 
take the risk that inaction and their companies’ potential failure as enterprise pilots 
could adversely affect their political futures. 
 Fourth, analysis of political leadership at the organization level expands the 
standard center-local framework for studying policy experimentation and 
implementation in China. Within China’s nested policy-making process, the center’s 
primary function is typically understood as policy-making, not policy experimentation 
and implementation. Research on policy experimentation and implementation is 
primarily situated at the sub-national level—provinces, municipalities, counties, or 
townships—where much of these activities indeed take place.88 However, central-level 
organizations and their leaders also possess bounded autonomy to engage in policy 
experimentation and implementation. Take for example the State Council’s launch of 
a central-level experimental pilot during the early 1980s on the development of 
‘general companies’ (总公司, zonggongsi)—large corporate entities linking multiple 
factories across provincial lines. It ultimately established approximately 120 ‘general 
                                                
88 See, for example: Sarah Eaton and Genia Kostka, “Authoritarian Environmentalism Undermined? 
Local Leaders’ Time Horizons and Environmental Policy Implementation in China,” The China 
Quarterly 218 (2014): 359-380; Philip S. Hsu, “Deconstructing Decentralization in China: Fiscal 
Incentive Versus Local Autonomy in Policy Implementation,” Journal of Contemporary China 13, no. 
40 (2004): 567-599; Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural 
China,” Comparative Politics 31, no. 2 (1999): 167-186; Jinghan Zeng, “Did Policy Experimentation in 
China Always Seek Efficiency? A Case Study of Wenzhou Financial Reform in 2012,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 24, no. 92 (2015): 338-356. 
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companies’ under the authority of 38 ministerial agencies.89 Such examples suggest 
that limited yet significant space exists for policy experimentation and implementation 
within the center itself.   
 Finally, examining political leadership at the organization level draws attention 
to informal everyday processes of policy experimentation and implementation. Heads 
of public sector organizations are constantly engaged in either maintaining or 
modifying existing strategies and organizational structures. While policy 
experimentation in China is often studied within the context of formal experimental 
schemes, informal everyday experimentation occurs widely outside of formal pilots. In 
some cases, everyday experimentation may precede formal policy pilots—an 
organization that achieved success through informal everyday experimentation may 
then be featured in a formal pilot where other organizations also participate and try out 
its approach. A famous example is Xiaogang village in Anhui province, where Yan 
Junchang (严俊昌) led a small group of peasants in clandestine experimentation with 
agricultural decollectivization before formal experimentation with the household 
responsibility system (包产到户, baochan daohu).90 After the initiative succeeded in 
dramatically boosting Xiaogang’s agricultural production, the village was then tapped 
                                                
89 Chen Li, China’s Centralized Industrial Order: Industrial Reform and the Rise of Centrally 
Controlled Big Business (New York: Routledge, 2014): 50.  
90 The household responsibility system in agriculture required households to meet fixed production 
quotas but permitted them to sell what they produced beyond the quota and retain a portion of the 
profits. Yan Junchang was the leader of Xiaogang’s production team (生产队, shengchan dui). For 
Yan’s recollections, see 《南方都市报》 [Southern Metropolis Daily], ed., 《为了不饿死，冒死“包
产到户”》 [In Order Not To Starve to Death, Risking Death “Household Responsibility System”], 
《中国改革开放三十年口述史》 [China’s Reform and Opening Up 30 Years Oral History] 
(Guangzhou: Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2008). For a narrative account of Xiaogang Village’s 
reform experience, see Chapters 1 and 2 in 陈桂棣 [Chen Guidi], 春桃 [Chun Tao] 《小岗村的故事》 
[The Story of Xiaogang Village] (Beijing: Huawen chubanshe, 2009).  
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to participate in a formal pilot program with other localities in Anhui and Sichuan; 
experimentation with household responsibility reform was later gradually expanded 
until it was implemented nationwide.  
Similarly, policy implementation efforts (or lack thereof) are an everyday 
process that occurs at the organization level. Yet studies of policy implementation 
often focus on assessing formal implementation outcomes after a given period of time. 
For example, a researcher might look at how many state-owned enterprises have 
restructured as limited liability companies or joint stock companies in the first year or 
five years after Jiang Zemin’s Report to the 1992 National Party Congress directed 
state-owned enterprises to restructure and the 1993 Company Law legalized these 
organizational forms. Such an approach helps to index the pace and extent of policy 
implementation, but it offers little insight into the process by which organizations 
actually implement particular policies and the incentives and constraints that may 
shape both their ability and willingness to do so.  
 
Obstacles to Studying Political Leadership in China 
The numerous practical obstacles to studying political leadership at the organization 
level in China are an important reason why such research remains scarce. First, the 
relative availability of information about top national leaders and their predominant 
influence on policy-making yield disproportionate scholarly focus on these individuals. 
Library shelves on both sides of the Pacific brim with titles on top leaders, such as: 
Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi 
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Jinping.91 In contrast, analyses of individual officials’ exercise of political leadership 
below the top level of national leaders are rare. They appear only infrequently in 
internal Party cadre study materials (干部材料, ganbu cailiao) or occasionally in the 
form of memoirs or volumes of collected works.92  
Another impediment to the study of political leadership at the organization 
level in China is the domestic intertwining of leadership studies with political ideology 
and its concomitant propaganda and policy functions. National leaders from Mao 
Zedong to Xi Jinping have themselves published volumes of writing on their thinking 
about China’s politics, economics and society. These works are obligatory reading for 
officials, to whom they are disseminated together with “important speeches” by top 
Chinese leaders for formal and informal study. Works of leadership thinking are 
sometimes even required reading for the general public, as was famously the case with 
Mao’s “Little Red Book.” The distinct leadership thought of every top leader since 
Mao is often referenced and in some cases even explicitly guides academic analysis of 
politics and the economy in China, beginning from Mao Zedong thought to Deng 
Xiaoping theory to Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents’ to Hu Jintao’s ‘Scientific 
                                                
91 On Mao Zedong: Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); 
逄先知 [Feng Xianzhi], 金冲及 [Jin Chongji],《毛泽东传》 [Biography of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2003). On Zhou Enlai: Chae-jin Lee, Zhou Enlai: The Early Years 
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994). On Chen Yun: David M. Bachman, Chen Yun and the 
Chinese Political System (Berkeley, CA: University of California Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 
1985); 杨明伟 [Yang Mingwei], 《晚年陈云》 [Chen Yun in His Later Years] (Beijing: Xiandai 
chubanshe, 2015). On Deng Xiaoping: Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). On Jiang Zemin: Bruce Gilley, 
Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China’s New Elite (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1998). On Hu Jintao: Kerry Brown, Hu Jintao: China’s Silent Ruler (Singapore: World Scientific, 
2012).  
92 See for example the journal《党建研究纵横谈》 [Party-Building Research Discussion] formerly 
published by the Central Organization Department’s Party-Building Research Institute. 
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Development and Harmonious Society’ and finally to Xi Jinping’s ‘Four 
Comprehensives.’  
  The CCP’s strong emphasis on collective leadership (集体领套, jiti lingdao) 
and collective decision-making (集体决策, jiti juece) also complicates research into 
organization-level political leadership in China.93 Each government or Party 
organization in China also has a leadership group (领导班子, lingdao banzi) 
comprising the top leader and a small number of leading officials. But in practice, 
while heads of public sector organizations work in concert with their leadership group, 
they exert predominant influence on decision-making, especially major decisions like 
those involving organizational strategy and structure. However, enduring emphasis on 
collective leadership and collective decision-making may limit researchers’ ability to 
identify how a single individual can disproportionately influence decision-making. 
Organization heads may be reluctant to discuss their own political leadership in such 
terms, while conversely subordinates may be overly eager to give them credit.94 
Finally, lack of available sources, as well as the politicized nature of some of 
the materials that are available, makes it difficult to study political leadership at the 
organization level in China. It is very hard for researchers to gain direct, repeated 
access to Party or government organizations—such as central ministries, local 
government organs, or state-owned enterprises—or to gather comprehensive 
quantitative or qualitative data about their internal operations, because these are 
                                                
93 Collective leadership involves the distribution of authority and functions among government and 
Party organs and their leaders. Collective decision-making refers to a decision-making process that 
stresses discussion and the reaching of consensus among all participants. 
94 This may especially be the case for interviews conducted by researchers from outside the 
organization or by non-Chinese researchers. 
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official bodies with closed operations that involve restricted if not classified 
information.95 Scholars have therefore relied heavily on analysis of decisions or 
policies enacted (or not enacted) by particular organizations and their leaders. Some 
insight into organizational leaders’ thinking or the politicking surrounding particular 
decisions and policies can be gained through official compendiums of their speeches 
and/or selected writings (选集, xuanji), records of interviews (访谈录, fangtan lu), or 
memoirs (回忆, huiyi) by them or by their close aides, all of which are typically 
published late in life. However, these materials are limited in scope, rarely engage in 
direct criticism or recount instances of conflict, and are often either compiled directly 
by official organs or subject to censors’ review, thereby further increasing the risk of 
potential bias.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed a political leadership approach to studying economic reform 
in China. It argues that heads of public sector organizations—government bodies, 
Party organs, and state-owned enterprises—possess bounded autonomy to influence 
reform policy experimentation and implementation. These individuals exercise 
political leadership in two main ways: by determining the specific strategies of the 
organizations that they lead, and by altering their structures. A political leadership 
                                                
95 A small number of scholars have been able to gain in-depth access to Chinese organizations; however, 
most have been market rather than government or Party organizations. They include: Amy Hanser, 
Service Encounters: Class, Gender, and the Market for Social Distinction in Urban China (Palo Alto, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Ellen Hertz, The Trading Crowd: An Ethnography of the 
Shanghai Stock Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Ching Kwan Lee, Gender and 
the South China Miracle: Two Worlds of Factory Women (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1998); Lu Zhang, Inside China's Automobile Factories (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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approach emphasizes choice within organizational and institutional constraints, instead 
of assuming that organizational and institutional constraints largely determine 
behavioral and policy outcomes. By focusing on the heads of organizations, a political 
leadership approach also highlights the hierarchies of influence that operate within and 
among organizations. Organizational and institutional constraints do not restrict all 
actors equally, and actors have varying abilities to maintain or to modify them.  
Research on China’s politics and economy needs to take heads of public sector 
organizations seriously as political leaders. “Political leadership” describes the 
functions that many of these individuals perform: engaging in experimentation, 
formulating strategies, restructuring their organizations, and influencing others to 
follow the directions that they set. However, scholars typically reserve this term for 
analysis of national leaders; it is rarely applied to officials below or even at the 
ministerial level. Yet even studies that address top officials typically focus on leaders 
as individuals (the biographical approach) or groups of political elites (the elite 
politics approach), rather than examining their actual exercise of leadership within the 
particular organizations they lead and its policy impact. Research on sub-national 
politics tends to either view organizational leaders as managers subordinate to 
administrative authorities or to de-emphasize their influence in order to reach broader 
conclusions about ‘local governments.’ 
Studying political leadership at the organization level advances extant research 
on reform policy experimentation and implementation in China in multiple ways. It 
suggests that political leadership is an important driver of variation in both policy 
experimentation and implementation. A political leadership approach can also help to 
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explain why some organizations ignore, delay, or subvert policy experimentation or 
implementation, even within the same institutional context. It expands the standard 
center-local framework for studying policy experimentation and implementation in 
China, by showing that central-level organizations and their leaders too possess 
limited yet significant space to engage in policy experimentation and implementation. 
Finally, it calls attention to organizational leaders’ role in catalyzing and guiding the 
informal everyday processes of policy experimentation and implementation that occur 
widely outside of formal pilots, and that in some cases even precede them.   
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Chapter 2 
Creating and Expanding Space for Political Leadership:  
Enterprise Reform Policies Since 1978 
 
This chapter describes how enterprise reform policies in China’s state-owned 
economy since 1978 first created and then expanded space for political leadership at 
the organization level. Over the past four decades, heads of state-owned enterprises 
have gone from managing production to determining how to restructure their 
organizations and promote their development in both domestic and international 
markets. After the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003, its heads too exercised political 
leadership by setting specific strategies to achieve the center’s goals for the state-
owned economy and by altering the organizational structure of the state-owned 
enterprises under its administration. Close analysis of enterprise reform policies 
illuminates the origins and changing contours of these officials’ bounded autonomy to 
exercise political leadership at the organization level. 
Focus here on central-level enterprise reform policies should not be read as 
corroboration of a strategic design perspective’s claim that economic reform is a top-
down process. Top national leaders and political elites’ choices about enterprise 
reform policies and experimentation did significantly shape both organizational 
change and the institutional evolution of state ownership. But the dynamics of 
organizational and institutional change extended much further than this. Enterprise 
reform policies initiated by top national leaders and the State Council also created and 
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expanded space for organization heads to influence policy experimentation and 
implementation. Organizational change wrought by these individuals’ political 
leadership also fed back into enterprise reform policies and influenced the institutional 
evolution of state ownership. The center provides the “initial trigger for the co-
evolution” between the micro and macro levels, but subsequent policy and 
institutional change then become an interactive process in which the heads of public 
sector organizations also play a significant role.96 
 In particular, this chapter highlights the series of enterprise reform policies 
behind the emergence of China’s “national champions”—the central state-owned 
enterprises that are the focus of this dissertation. Initial attempts to build large 
centrally-owned, multi-region and multi-production unit corporations began as early 
as 1981 with the State Council’s establishment of ‘general companies’ under central 
ministries. These efforts gained momentum with the launch of national-level pilots to 
develop large state-owned enterprise groups in 1991 and Jiang Zemin’s endorsement 
of a reform strategy of “grasping the large and releasing the small” in 1995. During 
the second half of the 1990s, the center sought to forge internationally competitive 
national firms through enterprise policies supporting their “going out” and partial 
public listing of assets on domestic and overseas stock exchanges. These efforts 
culminated with the creation of SASAC in 2003 as a government ownership agency 
responsible for administering a portfolio of central state-owned enterprises.   
 In the following discussion, I divide enterprise reforms since 1978 into four 
periods: the emergence and decline of ‘dual track’ economic reform (1978-1991), 
                                                
96 Barbara Krug and Hans Hendrischke, “Framing China: Transformation and Institutional Change 
through Co‐evolution,” Management and Organization Review 4, no. 1 (2008): 84. 
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establishment of a socialist market economy (1992-1994), retrenchment of state 
ownership in the “commanding heights” (1995-2001), and internationalization and 
consolidation of the state sector (2002-present). For each period, I first summarize key 
enterprise reform policies—their content, implementation, and results (Table 2.1). I 
then discuss how these enterprise reform policies affected space for organizational 
leaders in the state-owned economy to exercise political leadership. While this chapter 
is not the first to provide an overview of post-1978 enterprise reforms in China, it 
extends existing accounts by examining reform policies in the state-owned economy 
during the past decade and examining previously untapped source materials.97 The 
analysis uses qualitative data from elite interviews conducted in Beijing in 2016 and 
an extensive body of Chinese language sources, some of which have never been used 
before, including: official policy documents, government statistics, internal 
government journals, writings and memoirs of Chinese officials and economists, 
economic reform yearbooks, newly declassified U.S. State Department cables, and 
secondary sources.98 
                                                
97 Seminal works on economic reform in China’s state-owned economy give a comprehensive account 
of enterprise reform policies but end their analysis in 1993. Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: 
Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Susan L. Shirk, 
The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993). 
Two recent works that do examine state-owned enterprise reforms during the past decade do so from 
the perspectives of ideational and bureaucratic contestation, respectively. Sarah Eaton, The Advance of 
the State in Contemporary China: State-Market Relations in the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015); Chen Li, China’s Centralized Industrial Order: Industrial Reform and the Rise 
of Centrally Controlled Big Business (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
98 I gathered these sources in Beijing and Hong Kong during 24 months of dissertation fieldwork 
between 2013 and 2016 and supplemented them with additional materials from the Fairbank Center 
Collection of the Fung Library and the Harvard-Yenching Library in 2017.  
53 
Table 2.1:  Key Enterprise Reforms in China Since 1978 
 
 
Period 
 
 
Enterprise reforms (start dates) 
 
Emergence and decline of 
‘dual track’ economic 
reform 
(1978-1991) 
 
Expanding enterprise autonomy (1978) 
 
Economic responsibility system (1981) 
 
‘General companies’ (1981) 
 
Tax-for-profit (1983) 
 
Contract responsibility system (1987) 
 
Enterprise groups (1991) 
 
 
Establishment of a socialist 
market economy  
(1992-1994) 
 
 
Shareholding system restructuring (1992) 
 
Separating government from enterprises (1992) 
 
 
Retrenchment of state 
ownership in the 
“commanding heights”  
(1995-2001) 
 
 
Grasping the large and releasing the small (1995) 
 
Partial public listing of large industrial state-owned 
enterprise assets (1997) 
 
Internationalization and 
consolidation of the state 
sector 
(2002 on) 
 
 
Corporate governance (1999) 
 
“Going out” (2002) 
 
Creation of SASAC and central state-owned 
enterprises (2003) 
 
 
 
 
Emergence and Decline of ‘Dual Track’ Reform (1978-1991) 
Companies (公司, gongsi) did not exist in China at the start of the reform period. The 
state-owned economy consisted of groups of wholly state-owned and state-run 
factories (工厂, gongchang) embedded in the multi-level administrative hierarchies of 
particular industrial bureaus. These factories were not companies but rather production 
units: they had little decision-making authority for operations or responsibility for 
performance. Bureaus determined factories’ production methods, inventory levels, and 
product distribution; oversaw their daily operations; and participated in recruiting 
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managers and employees as well as their training, discipline, and housing allocation.99 
If a factory did not meet its production quota, the bureau would make up for it by 
drawing from other production units under its supervision. Only with the advent of 
market-oriented reforms in 1978 would state-owned factories begin their long journey 
toward becoming first “state-run enterprises” (国营企业, guoying qiye) and then 
“state-owned enterprises” (国有企业, guoyou qiye). 
 Early enterprise reform upheld the dominance of state ownership and the 
economic planning system, while simultaneously introducing market mechanisms into 
enterprises and granting them limited operational autonomy. This combination of plan 
and market is popularly known as China’s ‘dual track’ (双轨制, shuang gui zhi) 
approach to economic reform. However, the plan itself changed too in the ‘dual track’ 
approach. Central planning evolved from top-down mandates and administrative 
compulsion to bargaining between planning authorities and enterprises to determine 
contractual assignment of enterprise responsibility for production targets, and finally 
the replacement of administrative methods with indirect guidance using economic 
instruments such as taxes, interest rates, and credit allocation.100 The following 
sections summarize key early enterprise reforms: expansion of enterprise autonomy 
(1978), the economic responsibility system (1981), ‘general companies’ (1981), tax-
for-profit reforms (1983), the contract responsibility system (1987), and enterprise 
groups (1991).  
                                                
99 Lisa A. Keister, Chinese Business Groups: The Structure and Impact of Interfirm Relations during 
Economic Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 54. 
100 Donald Hay, Derek Morris, Guy Liu, and Shujie Yao, Economic Reform and State-Owned 
Enterprises in China: 1979-87 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 19. 
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Expanding Enterprise Autonomy (1978) 
Initial enterprise reforms sought to expand enterprise autonomy (kuoda qiye zizhu 
quan) by power-delegation and profit sharing (放权让利, fangquan rangli): granting 
state firms greater decision-making authority over their operations and permitting 
them to retain a percentage of their profits. Enterprises were granted limited autonomy 
over input sourcing, production, sales, investment, and compensation.101 Goods 
produced in excess of the central plan could be sold on the market and enterprises 
permitted to retain a fixed percentage of additional profits earned. Enterprises could 
then reinvest retained profits into infrastructure or equipment, or use them to 
incentivize employees through bonuses or service provision. In theory, granting 
enterprises more autonomy over operations and earnings would prompt them to 
become more responsive to market competition and to develop independent economic 
interests.  
In October 1978, Zhao Ziyang launched a pioneering pilot program to expand 
the operational autonomy of six state-owned factories in Sichuan province. Following 
its success, the Sichuan government expanded the program to 100 industrial 
enterprises and 40 commercial enterprises in January 1979, and then again to 417 
industrial enterprises and 250 commercial enterprises in 1980.102 In addition, six 
central ministries and commissions—including the State Economic Commission and 
                                                
101 For example, the state authorized enterprises to modify central plans regarding product types and 
variety if they did not meet market needs. 邵宁 [Shao Ning]: 《国有企业改革实录》 [The Reform of 
State-owned Enterprises in Memoir] (Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 2014): 10-11. 
102 王海波 [Wang Haibo], ed.,《工业经济史》[Industrial Economics History] (Beijing: Jingji guanli 
chubanshe, 1986): 436. 
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the Ministry of Finance—chose eight enterprises in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai to 
pilot enterprise autonomy reforms starting in May 1979.103  
The State Council quickly expanded enterprise autonomy pilots nationwide. 
On July 13, 1979, the State Council released “Several Provisions on Expanding the 
Autonomy of State-owned Industrial Enterprises” together with four other policy 
documents—its first set of policy directives on state-owned enterprise reform.104 With 
these policy directives, the State Council expanded enterprise autonomy reforms to 
1,590 industrial enterprises in 26 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous 
regions.105 As the reform achieved initial success, the State Council further expanded 
enterprise autonomy reforms in June 1980 to more than 6,600 state-owned enterprises 
nationwide (constituting approximately 16% of all state-owned industrial enterprises). 
With 5,777 pilot enterprises reporting from 28 provinces, municipalities, and 
autonomous regions, in 1980 these enterprises achieved increases of 6.9% in the value 
of state-owned assets, 11.8% in profits, and 7.4% in remitted profits compared to the 
previous year.106  
                                                
103 These pilot enterprises included Shougang Iron and Steel [首都钢铁], Shanghai Diesel Engine 
Factory [上海柴油机厂], Tianjin Bicycle Factory [天津自行车厂], and Sichuan Ningjiang Machine 
Tool Plant [四川宁江机床厂]. See also Justin Yifu Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li, State-owned Enterprise 
Reform in China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2001): 53. 
104 State Council:《关于扩大国营工业企业经营管理自主权的若干规定》 [Several Provisions on 
Enlarging the Autonomy of State- owned Industrial Enterprises], July 13, 1979; State Council:《关于
国营企业实行利润留成的规定》 [Provisions on Implementing the Retention of Profits of State-
owned Enterprises], July 13, 1979; State Council: 《关于开征国营企业固定资产税的暂行规定》 
[Interim Provisions on Administering Fixed Assets Tax on State-owned Enterprises], July 13, 1979; 
State Council: 《关于提高国营工业企业固定资产折旧率和改进折旧费使用办法的暂行规定》
[Interim Provisions on Measures to Improve the Depreciation Rate of Fixed Assets of State-owned 
Industrial Enterprises and the Use of Depreciation Fees], July 13, 1979; State Council: 《关于国营工
业企业实行流动资产全额信贷的暂行规定》 [Interim Provisions on State-owned Industrial 
Enterprises’ Implementation of Full Credit of Current Assets], July 13, 1979. 
105 Wang 1986: 437. 
106 Wang 1986: 438. 
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However, mounting fiscal deficits and inflation throughout 1980 raised fears 
among conservatives in the top leadership and dampened enthusiasm for enterprise 
autonomy reforms.107 China experienced historically unprecedented fiscal deficits of 
17 billion RMB in 1979 and 12.1 billion RMB in 1980, while the consumer price 
index rose 1.9% in 1979 and then soared 6% in 1980.108 As fears rose among some in 
China’s top leadership that the economy was out of control, Chen Yun led calls to 
readjust the national economy (调整国民经济, tiaozheng guomin jingji) by reviving 
centralized economic planning. In December 1980, the Central Work Conference—led 
by Chen Yun—announced plans for a “clearheaded” and “healthy” adjustment of the 
national economy” beginning in 1981.109 However, enterprise autonomy reforms 
would soon reemerge in a different form. 
 
Economic Responsibility System (1981) 
Economic responsibility system (经济责任制, jingji zeren zhi) reforms sought to 
further clarify the rights, interests, and responsibilities of state-owned enterprises vis-
à-vis the state. They required enterprises to negotiate individually with government 
bureaus on an annual basis to establish specific targets, profit retention rates, and 
responsibility for shortfalls or losses.110 Economic responsibility reforms also aimed to 
                                                
107 For discussion of problems specific to the reforms, see Naughton 1995: 103-105.   
108 章迪诚 [Zhang Dicheng], ed., 《中国国有企业改革编年史, 1978-2005》[Chronicle of China’s 
State-owned Enterprise Reform] (Beijing: Zhongguo gongren chubanshe, 2006): 61. 
109 陈云 [Chen Yun]: 《经济形势与经验教训》[Economic Situation and Lessons Learned], speech at 
the Central Work Conference, December 16, 1980. 
110 The state implemented three main types of power-delegation and profit-sharing arrangements: 1.) 
‘profit retention’ (利润留成, lirun liucheng) arrangements, which permitted enterprises to retain a 
significant percentage of profits (typically not more than 40%) for goods produced and sold above 
planned targets; 2.) ‘profit and loss’ (盈亏包干, yingkui baogan) arrangements, which allowed 
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specify the rights, interests, and responsibilities of state-owned enterprises vis-à-vis 
their employees. Enterprises now needed to make comprehensive budgets taking into 
account factors like input and equipment costs, planned sales volumes and revenues, 
liabilities, and employee compensation and benefits. They also had to clarify position 
responsibilities and performance assessment standards and to devise remuneration 
systems linking employee compensation with individual and enterprise 
performance.111 These changes strengthened incentives for enterprise heads to make 
profit-oriented investment decisions and boosted employee productivity and efficiency. 
However, enterprises at the same time pressed vigorously for reductions in their output 
plan targets and/or price increases for their outputs.112 
Changes in China’s top economic leadership at the beginning of the 1980s 
enabled widespread implementation of economic responsibility system reforms. In 
1980, Zhao Ziyang took over leadership of the Economic Leading Group from Chen 
Yun, who formally retired. In April 1981, the State Council-organized “National 
Industry and Transportation Work Conference” in Shanghai proposed implementing 
the economic responsibility system in industrial enterprises. Subsequent policy 
documents released in October and November 1981 clarified the content and 
                                                                                                                                       
enterprises to retain profits above a certain amount but also mandated they take responsibility for 
shortfalls or losses above a fixed amount; 3.) ‘tax-for-profit, self-responsibility for profit and loss’ (以
税代利、自负盈亏, yi shui dai li, zifu yingkui) arrangements, which substituted taxes for profit 
remittance, allowed partial profit retention, and required enterprises assume full responsibility for losses. 
The majority of enterprises adopted ‘profit and loss’ arrangements. Shao 2014: 14-15.  
111 For discussion of the different types of remuneration systems developed, see Shao 2014: 15. 
112 The two-tiered system of market and plan also incentivized agents to divert goods from plan to 
market to obtain the ‘rents’ embodied in the goods due to administrative controls. William Byrd, “The 
Market Mechanism and Economic Reforms in Chinese Industry” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University, 1987): 432. 
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principles of the reforms.113 Between 1981 and 1982, more than 30,000 state-owned 
industrial enterprises nationwide (constituting approximately 80% of all state-owned 
industrial enterprises) implemented enterprise responsibility reforms.114  
Economic responsibility reforms initially succeeded in reducing debt and 
increasing productivity, but their shortcomings soon became apparent. After the first 
year of nationwide implementation, the national fiscal deficit decreased from 12.7 
billion RMB in 1980 to 2.5 billion RMB in 1981.115 But the state’s fiscal revenues 
(enterprise revenues plus tax revenues) increased only gradually—from 1.16 billion 
RMB in 1980 to 1.18 billion RMB in 1981 and finally to 1.21 billion RMB in 1982—
while enterprise profit retention rates rose steadily during this period.116 This was 
primarily because enterprise heads exploited the information asymmetries inherent in 
their one-on-one bargaining with the state, while significant latitude for adjustment 
weakened the reform’s intended incentive effects.117  
 
‘General Companies’ (1981)  
Experimentation with the establishment of ‘general companies’ (总公司, zonggongsi) 
marked the Chinese leadership’s first effort to develop large industrial conglomerates 
                                                
113  State Council: 《关于实行工业生产经济责任制若干问题的意见》 [Opinions on Several Issues 
Concerning Implementation of the Economic Responsibility System for Industrial Production], October 
29, 1981; State Council: 《关于实行工业生产经济责任制若干问题的暂行规定》 [Interim 
Provisions on Several Issues Concerning Implementation of the Economic Responsibility System for 
Industrial Production], November 11, 1981. 
114 Wang 1986: 442. 
115 Zhang 2006: 63. 
116 Multiple years of China Statistical Yearbook, as cited in Yijia Jing, “Creative Incrementalism: 
Governance Reforms in China Since 1978,” Chinese Political Science Review 2, no. 1 (2017): 56-68.  
117 For example, enterprise heads strategically exploited this information asymmetry by underreporting 
profits or concealing enterprise capabilities in order to negotiate for lower production targets.  
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during the reform era.118 The center envisioned that ‘general companies’—large 
corporate entities linking multiple factories across provincial lines—would not only 
amalgamate the assets and employees of separate production units, but also their 
supply networks, affiliated training facilities, and relevant industry research and 
design institutes. Beginning in 1978, Chinese policymakers advocated importing 
advanced technology from abroad and closely studied the examples of foreign 
multinationals from the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. However, the 
primary aim of ‘general company’ development, like that of state ownership, remained 
domestic development after the lost decade of the Cultural Revolution. 
‘General companies’ achieved initial success before foundering on resistance 
from multiple fronts. By the end of 1982, the State Council had established 
approximately 120 nationwide industrial ‘general companies’ under the authority of 
38 ministerial agencies.119 However, local governments were reluctant to give up the 
control and revenues from local production units that were to be combined into the 
new ‘general companies.’ And local production units themselves, many of which had 
distinct interests and region-based identities, were unenthusiastic about being 
integrated into a unitary general company, subject to the authority of a distant 
company headquarters. Moreover, as the decade went on, the structure and operation 
of ‘general companies’ appeared increasingly incongruent with Premier Zhao Ziyang’s 
                                                
118 It revived the aim of the short-lived ‘corporate trust’ (托拉斯, tuolasi) experiments that Liu Shaoqi, 
Bo Yibo, and Deng Xiaoping pioneered in the early 1960s. In this earlier pilot, 12 centrally controlled 
corporate trusts were established in 1964, including 12 nationwide pilot enterprises and 3 regional pilot 
enterprises. After foundering on opposition from local governments and local enterprises, the outbreak 
of the Cultural Revolution abruptly ended experimentation. Li 2014: 47.  
119 Two of them—China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China Shipbuilding Industrial 
Corporation—held full ministerial rank. Li 2014: 50.  
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policy emphasis on decentralizing authority to local governments and individual 
production units.120        
 
Tax-for-profit (1983)   
Tax-for-profit (利改税, li gai shui) reform substituted an income tax for state-owned 
enterprises’ profit remittance in an effort to legalize enterprises’ economic 
responsibility to the state while making them more accountable for both profits and 
losses.121 The State Council carried out the reform in two main stages.122 The first 
stage in April 1983 mandated that state-owned enterprises pay a flat income tax of 
approximately 55% of their profit target. 123 The second stage of the reform began in 
September 1984 when the State Council released a policy document calling for 
nationwide implementation of tax-for-profit reforms; the Decisions of the Third 
Plenum the following month affirmed the reform’s widespread implementation.124  
However, the hasty implementation of tax-for-profit reform ended in failure—
after its initiation, state-owned enterprise profits declined for 22 consecutive 
                                                
120 Li 2014: 51-52. 
121 The State Council also had two broader aspirations for tax-for-profit reform. First, tax-for-profit 
reform was to be enacted together with producer goods price adjustments, so that uniform tax rates 
could be imposed across industries and a standardized, impartial tax system could begin to develop. It 
also envisioned that the tax-for-profit reform would serve as the foundation for a new system of 
dividing central-local revenues, in which some taxes would be designated as ‘central revenues’ and 
some as ‘local revenues.’ Naughton 1995: 183. 
122 The earliest efforts began in 1980 with a trial group of 10 state-owned enterprises (later expanded to 
400) in three provinces—Shanghai, Sichuan and Guangxi. Hays et al 1994: 23. 
123 In addition, a small number of more profitable state firms were also required to pay an additional 
“adjustment tax” (调节税, tiaojie shui): an additional variable percentage of their after-tax profits. State 
Council: 《关于国营企业利改税试行办法》 [On Trial Measures for Tax Reform of State-owned 
Enterprises], April 24, 1983. 
124 See State Council:《关于在国营企业推行‘利改税’第二步改革的报告》 [Report on Carrying Out 
Tax-for-Profit Reform in State-owned Enterprises Reform Phase Two], September 18, 1984. Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China: 《中共中央关于经济体制改革的决定》 [Decision of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Economic Reform], October 21, 1984. 
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months.125 Substituting taxes for profit could not replace the need for price reform: 
enterprises’ profitability derived from pricing, not just from efficiency. Moreover, 
profitability was an inappropriate yardstick to measure the performance of state-
owned enterprises that were public utilities or education, health, or transportation 
providers. Enterprise implementation was slow and often superficial, as enterprise 
heads altered previous economic responsibility systems to make them look like tax-
for-profit reforms or underreported profits in order to protect retained earnings. 
Clashes among divergent interests also weakened the tax-for-profit reforms ultimately 
implemented. Some opposed increasing enterprises’ economic burdens (the State 
Economic Commission and local officials), while others wanted to ensure central 
government revenues (the Ministry of Finance).126 Struggle to formulate tax-for-profit 
reforms also reflected the top-level split between Premier Zhao Ziyang (who 
advocated tax-for-profit reform) and Communist Party of China General Secretary Hu 
Yaobang (who favored a contracting approach).127 When tax-for-profit reform ended 
in failure, enthusiasm began to stir again for a profit contracting approach to enterprise 
reform.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
125 Zhang 2006: 110. 
126 More than 20 drafts of plans for the second stage of tax-for-profit reforms were prepared during 
1984, reflecting the intense bargaining during its formulation. Naughton 1995: 184. 
127 Shirk 1993: 246. For a summary of the politics behind the formulation of the tax-for-profit reform, 
see Chapter 12, “Building Bureaucratic Consensus: Formulating the Tax-for-Profit Policy, 1983-1984,” 
Shirk 1993. 
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Contract Responsibility System (1987) 
Contract responsibility system (承包责任制, chengbao zeren zhi) reform was the final 
major enterprise reform effort before the political and economic turmoil of 1989.128 It 
differed from the previous economic responsibility system reform because bureaus 
negotiated contracts with specific tax rates and profit-sharing arrangements with 
individual enterprises on a longer-term basis (typically three to five years) instead of 
every year. Enterprise heads had more risk because they had to formulate longer-term 
strategic plans and confront market changes, like increased input costs, without the 
possibility of bargaining every year to modify contract targets. If an enterprise failed 
to meet its targets, its managers would now literally pay the price by losing their jobs 
and even security deposits of their own money.129 However, enterprise heads also 
enjoyed more potential reward, because they gained autonomy over medium-term 
enterprise operations and allocation of profits generated ‘above the plan.’   
The Chinese leadership identified widespread implementation of the contract 
responsibility system as the top reform priority for 1987.130 By the end of that year, 
more than 78% of all industrial enterprises in the central plan had implemented the 
                                                
128 The contract responsibility system had varied forms united by a shared set of principles: contracting 
for a fixed base amount, ensuring the turning over of profits, permitting enterprises to retain excess 
profit, and requiring them to cover any shortages themselves (包死基数, 确保上交, 超收多留, 欠收自
补, baosi jishu, quebao shangjiao, chaoshou duoliu, qianshou zibu). State Economic Commission, State 
Economic Restructuring Commission: 《关于深化企业改革，完善承包经营责任制的意见》
[Opinions on Deepening Enterprise Reform and Refining the Contract Responsibility System], August 
28, 1987. 
129 According to the World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted between 1991 and 1992, approximately 
20% of contract signatories in state-owned enterprises reported committing collateral, with an average 
payment of 14,258 RMB. Gary H. Jefferson and Inderjit Singh, Enterprise Reform in China: Ownership, 
Transition, and Performance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998): 54. See also Theodore 
Groves, Yongmiao Hong, John McMillan, and Barry Naughton, “China’s Evolving Managerial Labor 
Market,” Journal of Political Economy 103, no. 4 (1995): 879. 
130 《政府工作报告(1987年)》[Government Work Report (1987)], March 25, 1987. 
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contract responsibility system, including 82% of all medium and large state-owned 
enterprises.131 Combined profits and taxes for industrial enterprises in the national 
budget reached 36.9 billion RMB by the end of 1988, equivalent to the total amount of 
industrial enterprises’ profits and taxes for the entire six years between 1981 and 
1986.132 However, the problems of moral hazard and soft budget constraint persisted, 
because managers in the state-owned economy assumed responsibility for gains but 
not for losses. At the same time, government agencies grew frustrated as state-owned 
enterprise leaders’ information asymmetry and low baselines locked in at contract 
signing meant that many contracts ended up being highly favorable to enterprises.  
 
Enterprise Groups (1991) 
Following the economic and political turmoil of 1989, China sought to revive the 
state-owned economy by promoting the development of state-owned enterprise groups 
(企业集团, qiye jituan). Like ‘general companies,’ enterprise groups were also large 
multi-region, multi-production unit corporate entities.133 But enterprise groups started 
from large production units (which constituted the ‘core enterprises’ of a given 
enterprise group) at a lower level of the production system under central ministries, 
rather than originating from central ministry headquarters or even directly from the 
State Council itself.134 Beyond the reform’s myriad economic objectives, Chinese 
leaders embraced enterprise groups as a strategic solution to the political dilemma of 
                                                
131 Zhang 2006: 177. 
132 Ibid. 
133 A business group comprises a coalition of separate enterprise units, each an independent legal entity, 
connected through varying legal, economic, and social ties, and typically spanning multiple industries. 
See Keister 2000: 26-29. 
134 Li 2014: 64. 
65 
economic reform: how to maintain social stability and state control over the economy 
while advancing economic development.135  
Enterprise group reform began in earnest with a national-level pilot in 
December 1991 but was not expanded more widely until later in the decade.136 That 
month, “Announcement of Guidance on the Selection of a Batch of Large Enterprise 
Groups for Experimental Pilots” named 55 pilot enterprises under 12 different central 
industrial ministries.137 The State Council oversaw enterprise group reforms while the 
Chinese Communist Party’s Central Organization Department appointed their top 
leaders.138  However, multiple problems beset pilot enterprise groups: weak economic 
performance and even losses, lack of cohesion between the holding company and 
                                                
135 See Chapter 2, “The Ideas Behind the Advance of the State,” Eaton 2015. These economic 
objectives included: improving the performance of the state-owned economy and enterprises alike by 
creating economies of scale and specialization to cut costs and boost competitiveness; pooling scarce 
labor and capital resources among member enterprises to develop new technology and products; 
protecting member enterprises from competition by creating larger industry players; reducing pressure 
on state banks and potential employee layoffs by merging struggling state-owned enterprises with 
stronger performers; and making government macro-economic adjustment more effective. 洪虎 [Hong 
Hu], 《国有经济改革与企业制度创新》[State-owned Enterprise Reform and Institutional Innovation] 
(Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1999); Keister 2000.  
136 These efforts followed a decade of informal experimentation and discussion about enterprise groups. 
See State Council:《关于推动经济联合的暂行规定》 [Provisional Regulations Regarding the 
Promotion of Economic Alliances], July 1, 1980; State Council: 《关于进一步推动横向经济联合若
干问题的规定》[Regulations Regarding a Few Issues Related to the Further Promotion of Lateral 
Economic Alliances], March 23, 1986; State Council: 《关于深化企业改革增强企业活力的若干规
定》[Several Provisions on Deepening Enterprise Reform and Strengthening Enterprise Vitality], 
December 5, 1986; State Economic Restructuring Commission and the National Committee on 
Economic Alliances: 《关于组建和发展企业集团的几点意见》 [A Few Ideas Regarding the 
Establishment and Development of Business Groups], December 16, 1987. 
137 The State Council later expanded the number of pilot enterprises to 56 with the removal of East Coal 
Group [东煤集团] and the addition of China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group [中国广东核电集团] 
and China Gezhouba Water Conservancy and Hydropower Engineering Group [中国葛洲坝水利水电
工程集团].  
138 In 1994, the Central Organization Department accorded top leaders in 31 of the pilot enterprises the 
equivalent of vice-ministerial rank, reflecting these firms’ growing political as well as economic 
importance. For a list of these firms, see Central Organization Department, Ministry of Personnel: 《关
于部分国家试点企业集团主要领导成员享有副部级政治待遇问题的通知》, [Notice on the Vice-
Ministerial Political Treatment of the Top Leaders of Some National Pilot Enterprise Groups], 
November 30, 1994. 
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member companies, and continued government interference in enterprise groups’ 
investment and capital raising activities.139 Enterprise group reform would not achieve 
a major breakthrough until it became intertwined with and ultimately subsumed in the 
strategy of “grasping the large and letting go of the small,” discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
Creating Space for Political Leadership at the Organization Level  
These early enterprise reforms created new—but still very limited—space for state-
owned enterprise heads to exercise political leadership at the organization level. For 
the first time, state-owned enterprise heads could influence reform experimentation 
and implementation. They did this by bargaining directly with bureaus to set 
production targets and later profit-sharing agreements for their enterprises and by 
exploiting information asymmetries to their advantage during these negotiations.140 
Once enterprise heads reached agreements with bureaus, they took on greater 
responsibility for enterprise operations—from purchasing matters to personnel 
decisions to strategic planning to employee remuneration schemes—and for the 
allocation of retained profits. In addition, enterprise heads could shape the structure of 
their organizations by developing new positions and departments to carry out new 
tasks—like budget-making, marketing, distribution, and strategic planning—or by 
                                                
139 陈清泰 [Chen Qingtai]: 《抓住当前深化企业改革的有利时机, 进一步推动企业集团试点工作》 
[Seize the Current Opportunity to Deepen Enterprise Reform, Further Promote Enterprise Group Pilot 
Work] in《我国企业集团试点的政策与实践》[China’s Enterprise Group Pilots Policies and Practice] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1995): 12. 
140 For one of the few comparative empirical analyses of contract negotiation under the contract 
responsibility system and enterprise heads’ role in their implementation through strategic decision-
making, see Chapters 5 and 6 in Derong Chen, Chinese Firms between Hierarchy and Market: The 
Contract Management Responsibility System in China (London: Springer, 1994). 
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clarifying the roles and responsibilities of existing departments and positions. 
Government bureaus’ declining influence also boosted enterprise heads’ authority 
within their own organizations. As John Child (1996) writes: “Under the new 
conditions, directors have more opportunities to centralize decisions to themselves, 
perhaps in the desire to secure a more unified approach, or because they may not trust 
the capabilities of subordinates, or simply due to the fact that they now bear a more 
exposed personal responsibility for their enterprise’s performance.”141 
 However, government bureaus’ continued involvement in state-owned 
enterprise affairs constrained enterprise heads’ nascent space for political leadership at 
the organization level. Bureaus continued to control state-owned enterprises’ access to 
finance, markets, and material inputs, perpetuating state-owned enterprises’ 
dependency on higher administrative authorities despite the formal expansion of 
enterprise autonomy.142 In what some colloquially termed “the mother-in-law 
problem,” bureaus also exerted influence over enterprise affairs through their authority 
to regulate enterprise operations and product quality, grant administrative approvals, 
and provide what was in effect obligatory guidance on production matters and 
organizational restructuring. Max H. Boisot (1987) even uses the concept of 
“industrial feudalism” to suggest that provincial and municipal authorities during the 
early reform period continued to tightly control state-owned enterprises within their 
jurisdictions.143 According to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys conducted between 
                                                
141 John Child, Management in China During the Age of Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996): 87. 
142 Ibid: 26-27. 
143 Max H. Boisot, “Industrial Feudalism and Enterprise Reform: Could the Chinese Use Some More 
Bureaucracy?” in Management Reforms in China, ed. Malcolm Warner (London: Frances Pinter, 1987): 
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1991 and 1992, only 29% of the state-owned enterprises polled reported having 
complete autonomy to set their own production plans.144 Many enterprise heads were 
reluctant to attempt to shake off bureau influence because government bureaus 
controlled their salaries and/or had appointed them to their positions.145  
   
Establishment of a Socialist Market Economy (1992-1994) 
At the 14th Party Congress in October 1992, Jiang Zemin formally set the 
establishment and refinement of a socialist market economy system (社会主义市场经
济, shehui zhuyi shichang jingji) as the goal of China’s future reform efforts.146 This 
concept affirmed that diverse economic components could co-exist (多种经济成分并
存, duo zhong jingji chengfen bingcun) while upholding the continued dominance of 
state ownership (公有制为主体, gongyou zhi wei zhuti). It was a major breakthrough 
because it authorized and legitimized initial diversification of state-owned enterprises’ 
ownership rights. It also suggested that state ownership could be embodied in different 
organizational forms at the firm level, such as wholly state-owned limited liability 
companies or majority state-owned shareholding companies, and that a single state-
owned enterprise might pass through multiple organizational forms during the process 
of corporatization.  
                                                                                                                                       
217-237. See also Max H. Boisot and John Child, “The Iron Law of Fiefs: Bureaucratic Failure and the 
Problem of Governance in the Chinese Economic Reforms,” Administrative Science Quarterly 33, no. 4 
(1988): 507-527.  
144 Jefferson and Singh 1998: 44. 
145 According to the World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted between 1991 and 1992, 92.8% of the 
heads of the 889 state-owned enterprises in the sample were appointed by their supervisory agency. 
Jefferson and Singh 1998: 49. 
146 Jiang Zemin, Report to the National Party Congress, October 12, 1992.  
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 Reform to China’s state-owned enterprises during the socialist market 
economy period aimed to establish a “modern enterprise system” (现代企业制度, 
xiandai qiye zhidu) through shareholding system restructuring (股份制改组, gufen zhi 
gaizu) and separating government from enterprises (政企分开, zhengqi fenkai). Initial 
restrictions on partial public listing of state-owned assets gave way to limited embrace 
of stock markets as a important means of financing enterprise development and 
reducing burdens on state-owned banks. Concurrent efforts to separate government 
from enterprises sought to formalize the separation of ownership and control rights, 
although government and Party influence on the largest industrial enterprises remained 
strong.  
 
Shareholding System Restructuring (1992) 
Jiang Zemin’s 1992 Report defined the characteristics of a ‘modern enterprise system’ 
as: “clearly established property rights, well-defined power and responsibility, 
separation of enterprise from government, and scientific management.”147 It kicked off 
a process of shareholding system restructuring (股份制改组, gufen zhi gaizu) reform 
in which state-owned enterprises were to reorganize into limited liability companies or 
shareholding companies.148 Unlike earlier shareholding system reforms in which stock 
was issued primarily to employees and other enterprises, the new reform encouraged 
                                                
147 Ibid. 
148 For an explanation of the differences between limited liability companies and shareholding 
companies’ capital registration requirements, authority structures, and share liquidity, see Lin and Zhu 
2001: 310-311. 
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some state-owned enterprises to publicly issue shares on domestic stock markets.149 
China’s top leaders hoped that shareholding system restructuring would constrain 
government intervention in state-owned enterprises, improve their market performance, 
reduce debt burdens by creating a new channel to raise capital, and transform the 
government’s previously unlimited liability into limited liability.150  
The State Council launched comprehensive enterprise shareholding reform 
efforts in May 1992 with directives detailing the procedures for enterprises to 
restructure and issue stock.151 By the end of 1992, there were nearly 3,700 
shareholding system reform pilot enterprises nationwide, including 69 publicly listed 
enterprises.152 The number of enterprises publicly listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges rose steadily, reaching 185 at the end of 1993, 291 at the 
end of 1994, and 334 at the end of 1995.153 The State Council also signaled in 1994 
that ownership rights for China’s largest industrial enterprises would be diversified, 
when it selected three general corporations under central government ministries to 
                                                
149 Of the 3,800 enterprises that had issued stocks as of 1988, 85% issued stock to their own employees, 
13.5% sold stock to other enterprises and 1.5% sold stock to the open market. Naughton 1995: 219. For 
discussion of early enterprise shareholding reforms, see 王梦奎: [Wang Mengkui], 邢俊芳 [Xing 
Junfang] 《关于股份制问题》 [On the Issue of Shareholding] (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 
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150 彭强 [Peng Qiang]:《全民所有制企业改组为国家独资有限公司的设想》[Thoughts on 
Reorganization of Ownership by the Whole People into Wholly State-owned Limited Liability 
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151 State Economic Restructuring Commission, State Economic Commission, Ministry of Finance, 
People’s Bank of China, State Council (Production Office): 《股份制企业试点办法》 [Enterprise 
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公司规范意见》 [Opinions on Standardizing Shareholding Companies], 《有限责任公司规范意见》 
[Opinions on Standardizing Limited Liability Companies], May 11, 1992. 
152 Zhang 2006: 305.  
153 Ibid: 371, 406. 
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pilot experimental restructuring as state holding companies (国家控股公司, guojia 
konggu gongsi).154  
However, shareholding reform faced multiple obstacles. State-owned 
enterprises that publicly issued stock faced a plethora of practical problems, from 
determining the market value of their assets to securing professional services in 
China’s fledgling accounting and legal sectors. They also faced the risks of mounting 
speculation and weak government oversight of domestic stock exchanges.155 Moreover, 
much shareholding system restructuring occurred in name only: enterprises reported 
that they had reorganized in order to fulfill reform requirements without actually 
making any fundamental changes to firm management or operations. Such enterprises 
became popularly known as turn-card enterprises (翻牌公司, fanpai gongsi) for their 
superficial adoption of new organizational forms. Experimentation with large-scale 
state holding companies also floundered, as central ministries persisted in using 
administrative methods to control the pilot enterprises.156  
 
 
                                                
154 These companies were China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), Aviation Industry Corporation 
of China (AVIC), and China Nonferrous Metals Industry Group. Zhang 2006: 371, 430. 
155 As senior economist Wu Jinglian wrote: “…In the initial period, accounting firms, law firms and 
other organizations are not yet sound, rules for stock issuance and circulation are incomplete, 
supervision and management is not strict, causing China’s shareholding reform pilots to fail to achieve 
the desired results. Not only have they not served their function, on the contrary they have for some 
time caused a speculative atmosphere in financial markets and the occurrence of an economic “bubble.” 
吴敬琏 [Wu Jinglian]:《大中型企业改革：建立现代企业制度》[Reform of Large and Medium-
sized Enterprises: Establishing a Modern Enterprise System] (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1993). 
156 In 1996, the State Council sought to revive lagging reforms by reaffirming the autonomy of the three 
pilot enterprises’ holding companies to manage and delegate authority to their member enterprises; 
establishing procedures safeguarding their ability to reinvest their operational income without 
administrative interference; and granting them greater control rights with regard to investment, capital 
raising, and other matters. Zhang 2006: 430-431. 
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Separating Government from Enterprises (1992)  
The separation of government from enterprises (政企分开, zhengqi fenkai) was a core 
element of the ‘modern enterprise system.’ It aimed to formalize the separation of 
ownership and control rights, by removing enterprise functions from government and 
curbing administrative interference in enterprise affairs. However, the Chinese 
leadership did not initially equate this principle with corporate governance (公司治理, 
gongsi zhili).157 Neither Jiang Zemin’s 1992 Report nor the 1993 Decisions mentioned 
corporate governance.158 Early drafts of the 1993 Decisions originally included 
corporate governance; however, it was ultimately omitted from the final version due to 
internal debate.159 Introducing corporate governance institutions in state-owned 
enterprises raised the sensitive political issues of personnel selection authority and the 
relationship between existing Party committees and boards of directors.160  
Initial efforts to develop a ‘modern enterprise system’ by separating 
government from enterprises therefore focused on the adoption of new forms of 
corporate organization, rather than corporate governance. However, the first national 
pilot scheme to develop a ‘modern enterprise system’ along these lines in 1994 ended 
                                                
157 In an influential 1993 article “On Corporatization,” economists Wu Jinglian and Qian Yingyi had 
explicitly linked the concepts of a ‘modern enterprise system’ and ‘corporate governance, contending 
that corporate governance constituted the heart of the concept of a ‘modern enterprise system.’ 吴敬琏 
[Wu Jinglian], 钱颖一 [Qian Yingyi]: 《关于公司化》 [On Corporatization], 《经济日报》 [The 
Economic Daily], August 24, 1993. 
158 The Chinese term initially used for corporate governance was “法人治理结构, faren zhili jiegou”; 
later it was commonly referred to as “公司治理制度”, gongsi zhili zhidu” or “公司制度, gongsi zhidu.” 
Neither of these terms appeared in the 1993 Third Plenum Decisions.   
159 The same was true of the 1997 15th NPC report. Interview with participant in the drafting process, 
Beijing, June 2017. 
160 For discussion of the Party’s role in ‘modern enterprises’ and specific methods proposed to ensure 
the Party committee’s continued participation and influence in enterprise decision-making, see Central 
Organization Department (Party-Building Research Institute), 《党建研究纵横谈》 [Party-Building 
Research Discussion] (1993): 139-153. 
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in disappointment.161 Most of the 100 pilot enterprises reorganized themselves as 
wholly state-owned enterprise groups (国有独资企业集团, guoyou duzi qiye jituan) 
and kept the “factory system” (工厂制, gongchang zhi) method of enterprise 
governance.162 An internal review conducted one year later concluded that not a single 
pilot enterprise met the assessment standards. “It was a change of form but not of 
substance (换汤不换药, huan tang bu huan yao),” recalled a retired official who 
participated in assessing the pilot enterprises.163 The State Economic and Trade 
Commission formally attributed the pilot’s failure to six factors: absence of a central-
level system for managing state-owned assets, lack of diversified channels to raise 
capital, contradictions between the cadre management system and modern enterprise 
system, limited public listing of state-owned assets, nascent social welfare system, and 
limited fiscal resources to support the costs of reform.164  
 
 
 
                                                
161 Zhu Rongji and other leading officials outlined plans for this pilot scheme at the “National Working 
Conference for Experiments in Establishing a Modern Enterprise System” in November 1994. Li Peng 
authorized the State Economic and Trade Commission to lead the pilots. The State System 
Restructuring Commission was granted a secondary role and allocated authority for 30 of the 100 
enterprises selected to participate in it.  
162 The remaining firms restructured as stock companies (股份有限公司, gufen youxian gongsi) or 
limited liability companies (有限责任公司, youxian zeren gongsi). State Economic and Trade 
Commission: 《国有企业改革与建立现代企业制度》 [State-owned Enterprise Reform and 
Establishing a Modern Enterprise System] (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2001): 24.  
163 Interview, Beijing, June 2016.  
164 State Economic and Trade Commission (Enterprise Reform Division): 《国有企业改革与建立现代
企业制度》[State-owned Enterprise Reform and Establishing a Modern Enterprise System] (Beijing: 
Falü chubanshe, 1999): 31-32. For the State System Restructuring Commission’s assessment, see 邹东
涛 [Zou Dongtao], 张晓文 [Zhang Xiaowen]: 《试点企业印证了改革的难度》 [Pilot Enterprises 
Prove the Difficulty of Reform], 《改革内参》 [Internal Reference Materials on Reform], 24 (1998): 
15-17. 
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Creating Space for Political Leadership at the Organization Level 
State-owned enterprise heads’ space for political leadership during this period 
expanded from the operational management of production (生产经营自主权, 
shengchan jingying zizhu quan) to include greater control over the operational 
management of state-owned assets (资产经营权, zichan jingying quan)—their sale, 
lease, and transfer—and to a limited extent also the operational management of state-
owned capital.165 The 1992 “Regulations on the Transformation of Operational 
Mechanisms of Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People” issued by the 
State Council was a milestone: it legally authorized state-owned enterprise heads to 
exercise decision-making rights across a wide range of 14 areas, including: production, 
product and labor prices, imports and exports, investments, asset allocation (sale, 
mortgage and transfer), and joint ventures and mergers.166  
Newly empowered enterprise heads restructured their firms and formulated 
specific strategies to realize reform objectives, under rising pressure from official 
expectations and markets alike. Take for instance Chen Zhongbiao (陈忠表), the 
general manager of China Ocean Shipping, one of the pilot firms in the development 
                                                
165 See for example the granting of greater asset management autonomy to seven pilot enterprises in 
1992. National State Assets Administration Bureau, State Planning Commission, State Council 
Economic and Trade Office:《关于国家试点企业集团国有资产授权经营的实施办法（暂行）》
[Temporary Measures for the Implementation of State Enterprise Group Pilots State-owned Assets 
Operational Authority], September 11, 1992. China Textile Machinery Industry Group [中国纺织机械
工业集团] was later added as an eighth pilot enterprise.  
166 State Council: 《全民所有制工业企业转换经营机制条例》 [Regulations on Transformation of 
the Operational Mechanisms of Industrial Enterprises Owned By the Whole People], July 23, 1992. For 
a summary of internal debates during the drafting process, see State System Restructuring Commission 
(Policy and Regulation Division): 《关于制定《全民所有制工业企业转换经营机制暂行条例》内
部讨论情况》[Circumstances of the Internal Discussion about Drafting “Regulations on 
Transformation of the Operational Mechanisms of Internal Enterprises Owned by the Whole People], 
《内部参考》[Internal Reference Materials] 7 (1992): 18-24. 
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of large state-owned enterprise groups. Under Chen’s leadership, China Ocean 
Shipping reduced the holding company’s layers of management and cut its original 
personnel allocation of 700 employees to 300, while also establishing a finance 
company within the state-owned business group and new member companies in 
international trade, real estate, and tourism. In 1993, Chen proposed an overseas 
expansion strategy of “feeding yourself” (自己养活自己, ziji yanghuo ziji) that called 
for the establishment of five new member companies focused on business in Europe, 
North America, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore and the transformation of China 
Ocean Shipping’s existing overseas representative offices into semi-autonomous 
wholly-owned member companies (联营公司, lianying gongsi).167 As Lisa Keister 
and Randy Hodson (2009) observed of this period: “Managers were aware that 
enterprise closures were likely to become more common with time, and many 
responded by ascertaining firm strengths and adopting appropriate, but limited, 
innovations.”168 
 Enterprise heads’ growing space to make choices about organizational 
strategies and structure was also evidenced by their ability to resist or delay 
implementing new enterprise reforms. Take for example the appearance of “turn-card” 
enterprises after 1992. State-owned enterprise heads responded to the center’s 
shareholding system reforms by reporting that their enterprises had restructured as 
limited liability companies or shareholding companies—without in fact making 
                                                
167 See China Ocean Shipping: 《转换经营机制，大力开展多元化和国际化经营》[Transforming 
Operational Mechanisms, Vigorously Carrying Out Operational Diversification and Internationalization] 
in State Economic and Trade Commission 1995: 103-110.  
168 Lisa A. Keister and Randy Hodson, “Ownership and Innovation During Economic Development: 
Corporate Ownership and Strategy Formation in China,” Work and Organizations in China After 30 
Years of Transition, ed. Lisa A. Keister (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2009): 136. 
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fundamental changes to firm management or operations. While this may have derived 
in part from lack of knowledge and experience concerning the specific steps that 
shareholding system restructuring actually entailed, many enterprise heads shied from 
taking responsibility for the perceived economic and political risks of these novel 
organizational forms. Instead of a “partial reform equilibrium,” in which those who 
benefit in the short term attempt to stall continued reform, the initial uncertainty and 
ambiguity about what the “socialist market economy” concept entailed for state-
owned enterprises meant that neither “winners” nor “losers” were immediately 
clear.169 
 
Retrenchment of State Ownership in the “Commanding Heights” (1995-2001) 
Enterprise reforms during this period concentrated state ownership in a core group of 
large state-owned enterprises in strategically important industries. Far-reaching 
restructuring of the State Council in 1998 formed a new group of “centrally-controlled 
enterprises” (中管企业, zhong guan qiye). China’s top leaders charged this incipient 
‘national team’ with an explicit mandate to help China “catch up” at home and abroad, 
and they supported them to publicly list assets on domestic and overseas stock 
exchanges.170 At the same time, the State Council during the premiership of Zhu 
Rongji (1998-2003) massively downsized the state-owned economy by allowing 
                                                
169 Joel Hellman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-Communist Transitions,” 
World Politics 50 (1998): 203-234. 
170 周明生 [Zhou Mingsheng]: 《资本经营何以雷声大雨点小——杨瑞龙教授访谈录》 
[Operational Management of Capital: How The Thunder is Large and the Rain is Small—Record of 
Interview with Professor Yang Ruilong], 《改革内参》[Internal Reference Materials on Reform] 8 
(1998): 13-15.  
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thousands of small- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises to be bought up or to 
go bankrupt.  
 
Grasping the Large, Releasing the Small (1995) 
The strategy of “grasping the large, releasing the small” (抓大放小, zhua da fang xiao) 
was a critical fork in the road of China’s state-owned enterprise reform.171 First 
articulated by Jiang Zemin and Vice Premier Wu Bangguo in 1995, it aimed to 
consolidate state-owned assets into a select group of larger and more profitable 
companies that would dominate strategically important industries, while selling off 
inefficient smaller firms or allowing them to go bankrupt. It envisioned that China’s 
sprawling state-owned sector would retreat and retrench itself at the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy. Both economic and political considerations motivated this 
strategy. Proponents contended that ‘key’ state-owned enterprises could be revitalized 
and strengthened to bolster fiscal stability and promote national development.172 
Retaining and strengthening a small group of ‘key’ enterprises in strategically 
important industries was also a politically attractive compromise. It ensured that the 
state would continue to own and control a significant portion of Chinese industry, 
                                                
171 This study focuses on the state’s “grasping” of large enterprises. For an overview of the state’s 
“releasing” of small enterprises and its social impact, see Xiaobo Hu, “The State, Enterprises, and 
Society in Post-Deng China: Impact of the New Round of SOE [State-owned Enterprise] 
Reform,” Asian Survey 40, no. 4 (2000): 641-657.   
172 As an internal study group of the State Economic Planning Commission on “The Role of the 
Government under Market Economy Conditions” observed: “An important motivation for some 
countries early on to establish state-owned enterprises was to use these enterprises’ profits to guarantee 
the state’s fiscal revenues.” 周富祥 [Zhou Fuxiang], 石康 [Shi Kang]: 《国有企业不能全面退出竞争
性行业》 [State-owned Enterprises Cannot Fully Exit Competitive Industries], 《内部参阅》 [Internal 
Consultative Readings] 3 (1998): 12.   
78 
while allowing the restructuring, privatization, and bankruptcy of smaller and 
struggling state-owned firms to proceed. 
The first task of “grasping the large” was to determine which and how many 
enterprises to grasp. In 1994, the State Council selected an initial group of 100 large- 
and medium-size industrial enterprises.173 In April 1995, Wu Bangguo proposed 
expanding this to 300 “important enterprises” (重点企业, zhongdian qiye), drawn 
from a larger group of 1,000 “priority enterprises” chosen by the State Economic and 
Trade Commission earlier that year.174 In 1997, the State Council expanded the group 
of “important enterprises” to 512 state firms.175 This new grouping largely included 
the previous 100 important large- and medium-size industrial enterprises as well as 
most of the large enterprise group pilot firms, now numbering 120.176 The 1998 
restructuring of the State Council created a last and critical batch of large state-owned 
enterprises to join the emerging ‘national team.’177 It separated 530 large non-financial 
enterprises from 50 central government agencies; these enterprises were ultimately 
consolidated into 159 firms, of which 96 were made centrally-controlled 
                                                
173 This group included 28 super-large firms, 67 large firms, and five medium-size firms. Dylan 
Sutherland, China’s Large Enterprises and the Challenge of Late Industrialisation (New York: 
Routledge, 2003): 152.  
174 Of these 1,000 firms, 878 were industrial enterprises. The assets of these 300 firms constituted 
46.4% of the total assets of industrial enterprises within the national budget, 52% of their total sales 
revenue, and 67% of their profits. 吴邦国 [Wu Bangguo]: 《吴邦国同志在全国企业改革试点工作经
验交流会上的讲话》 [Speech by Comrade Wu Bangguo at the National Enterprise Reform Pilot Work 
Experience Sharing Meeting], October 9, 1995, in State Economic and Trade Commission (Enterprise 
Division):《建立现代企业制度试点工作手册》 [Establishing a Modern Enterprise System Pilot 
Work Handbook] (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1996): 39. 
175 This grouping of 512 firms was later expanded to 520.  
176 In 1997, the State Council expanded the number of large enterprise group pilot firms from 56 to 120. 
State Council,  State Economic and Trade Commission, State System Restructuring Commission: 《关
于深化大型企业集团试点工作的意见》 [Suggestions on Deepening Large Enterprise Group Pilot 
Work], April 29, 1997.   
177 Restructuring of the State Council reduced the number of ministries from 40 to 29, cut its personnel 
by one half, and transferred more than 200 government functions to enterprises, social intermediaries, 
and localities. 《政府工作报告(1999年)》[Government Work Report (1999)], March 5, 1999. 
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enterprises.178 In the process, it took the ‘general corporations’ formed beginning in 
the 1980s and broke them up into multiple state-owned enterprises along geographic 
or product/vertical industry lines.179 Administrative authority for these enterprises was 
given to the Central Work Committee for Large Enterprises (中央大型企业工作委员
会, zhongyang daxing qiye gongzuo weiyuanhui).180  
The second task of “grasping the large” was to designate which sectors 
constituted the ‘commanding heights’ to which the state should retreat. The sectors 
represented by the 56 large enterprise group pilot firms in 1991 suggested that these 
industries were likely to include electricity, defense, basic materials, heavy industry, 
and airlines.181 The second batch of 64 large enterprise group pilot firms selected in 
1997 roughly doubled the number of enterprises in steel, automobiles, chemicals, and 
electronics.182 But the clearest demarcation of the ‘commanding heights’ came in 1999, 
when the Fourth Plenum adopted a separate policy document stating that state 
                                                
178 These centrally-controlled enterprises included Baosteel, Anshan Steel, China Shipping Group, 
China Ocean Shipping Group, China Minmetals Corporation, Sinochem, and China State Construction 
Engineering Corporation. Out of the 159 firms, the remaining 63 enterprises were transferred to 
provincial governments. Li 2014: 71-72.  
179 For example, the State Council divided the State Electricity Company (of the former Ministry of 
Electricity) into the State Grid Corporation of China and the China Southern Power Grid Corporation 
according to asset location along the country’s north-south divide. It split China Nonferrous Metals 
Industry Corporation (of the former Nonferrous Metals Bureau of the Ministry of Nonferrous Metals) 
by metals type into China Copper and Lead Group Corporation, China Aluminum Group Corporation, 
and China Rare Earth Metals Group Corporation. Although these enterprises formally became separate 
entities, the State Council and its commissions continued to exercise administrative control over them 
and interfere in their operations, investment, and planning. 刘小玄 [Liu Xiaoxuan], ed., 《中国企业发
展报告 1990 ～ 2000 年》 [Report on Chinese Enterprise Development, 1990-2000] (Beijing: Shehui 
kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2001). 
180 This Committee, together with the State Economic and Trade Commission and the Ministry of 
Personnel, formed an internal working group to oversee these firms. Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, State Council General Office: 《关于中央党政机关与所办经济实体和管
理直属企业脱钩有关问题的通知》 [Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning the Decoupling of 
Economic Entities and the Management of Directly-Owned Enterprises from Central Party and 
Government Organs], November 8, 1998. 
181 Sutherland 2003: 50.  
182 Ibid: 50-51. 
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ownership should maintain the “dominant position” (支配地位, zhipei diwei) in 
“important industries and key areas” (重要行业和关键领域, zhongyao hangye he 
guanjian lingyu). It specified three important industries (sectors relating to national 
security, natural monopolies, and public goods or services provision) and one key area 
(high and emerging technology industries)—as well as “backbone enterprises in 
important industries” (重要产业中的骨干企业, zhongyao chanye zhong de gugan 
qiye).183 This showed top leaders’ commitment to building a team of ‘national 
champions’: a small group of globally competitive large state-owned enterprises. 
 
Partial Public Listing of Large Industrial State-owned Enterprise Assets (1997) 
Political support, economic exigency, and international enthusiasm combined to 
accelerate the partial public listing of large industrial state-owned enterprise assets on 
domestic and overseas stock exchanges.184 In March 1999, the State Economic and 
Trade Commission reported that 30% of 7,680 large and medium state-owned 
enterprises were operating at a loss and one third of the 512 key large state-owned 
enterprises made losses during the first half of 1998.185 Moreover, state-owned 
companies accounted for an estimated 90% of all non-performing loans held by state-
                                                
183 Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: 《中共中央关于国有企业改革和发展若干
重大问题的决定》[The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Major 
Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises], September 22, 1999.   
184 The China Securities Regulatory Commission began to review and approve central state-owned 
companies as listing candidates for overseas IPOs in 1993, with 23 firms approved by December 1996; 
however, their actual public listing lagged behind because few were attractive candidates for investment. 
Carl Walter and Fraser Howie, Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China’s 
Extraordinary Rise (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2012): 177.  
185 China Statistical Yearbook.   
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owned banks by 1999.186 During the first half of 1999, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji 
acted in concert to dispel the looming spectre of economic crisis. Jiang Zemin 
personally chaired regional meetings across China on state-owned enterprise reform 
and development in Chengdu, Wuhan, Xi’an, Qingdao, and Liaoning.187 On June 7, 
Zhu Rongji held an internal meeting with the heads of 15 major state-owned 
enterprises and ordered them to “restructure and go to market at any cost” by year’s 
end. Within days, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a multi-
million dollar contract for the largest-ever audit conducted by a foreign auditing 
company in China, in preparation for public listing of core production and business 
assets.188 International investors also played a key role in the restructuring of state-
owned assets for public listing.189 By the end of 2000, CNPC subsidiary PetroChina 
carried out a dual IPO on the Hong Kong and New York stock markets, and Sinopec 
completed a triple IPO on the Hong Kong, New York, and London stock markets. 
                                                
186 Ibid.   
187《江泽民在成都主持召开四省市国有企业改革和发展座谈会》[Jiang Zemin Holds a Symposium 
in Chengdu on Reform and Development of State-owned Enterprises in Four Provinces and Cities], 
《人民日报》 [People’s Daily], April 23, 1999; 《江泽民在武汉主持召开六省区国有企业改革和发
展座谈会 [Jiang Zemin Holds a Symposium in Wuhan on Reform and Development of State-owned 
Enterprises in Six Provinces and Autonomous Regions], 《人民日报》 [People’s Daily], May 31, 1999; 
《江泽民主持召开西北五省区国有企业改革和发展座谈会》[Jiang Zemin Holds a Symposium on 
the Reform and Development of State-owned Enterprises in Five Provinces and Autonomous Regions 
in Northwest China], 《人民日报》 [People’s Daily], June 18, 1999; 《江泽民主持召开华东七省市
国有企业改革和发展座谈会》[Jiang Zemin Holds a Symposium on the Reform and Development of 
State-owned Enterprises in Seven Provinces and Cities in East China], 《人民日报》 [People’s Daily], 
June 27, 1999; 《江泽民主持八省区市国企改革和发展座谈会》[Jiang Zemin Holds a Symposium 
on the Reform and Development of State-owned Enterprises in Eight Provinces and Cities], 《人民日
报》 [People’s Daily], August 13, 1999; 《江泽民主持八省区市国企改革和发展座谈会》, 《人民
日报》 [People’s Daily], August 13, 1999. 
188 Cable from U.S. Embassy in Beijing, June 1999, declassified (in part) at author’s request on April 6, 
2016.  
189 Describing China Mobile’s IPO as “God’s work by Goldman Sachs,” Carl Walter and Fraser Howie 
write: “International markets introduced Chinese companies to world-class investment bankers, lawyers, 
and accountants and brought their legal and financial technologies—the entire panoply of corporate 
finance, legal and accounting concepts, and treatments that underpin international financial markets—to 
bear on China’s SOE [state-owned enterprise] reform effort.” Walter and Howie 2012: 177. 
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Other ‘national champions’ followed suit, including: China Unicom (2000), China 
National Offshore Oil (2001), and Aluminum Corporation of China (2001).190  
 
Corporate Governance (1999) 
Chinese leaders turned back to corporate governance after organizational restructuring 
alone failed to transform the performance of the 100 enterprises in the 1994 “modern 
enterprise system” pilot. The term “corporate governance” appeared in an official 
document for the first time in 1999. That year, the “Decisions of the Communist Party 
of China Central Committee on Several Major Issues Concerning the Reform and 
Development of State-owned Enterprises” mandated that all restructured state-owned 
enterprises (改制公司, gaizhi gongsi) must establish “an effective corporate 
governance structure” (有效的法人治理结构, youxiao de faren zhili jiegou).191 By the 
turn of the century, the Chinese government had come to consider corporate 
governance as an essential component of a ‘modern enterprise system.’192 However, 
corporate governance remained a peripheral reform priority for the largest state-owned 
industrial firms.  
 Yet despite belated official embrace of corporate governance, early reforms 
had limited actual impact because they still involved changes in form but not function. 
                                                
190 Walter and Howie 2012: 183. 
191 Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 1999. Corporate governance in China was 
synonymous with the “new three committees” (新三会, xin san hui): the board of directors, the 
supervisory committee, and the shareholders meeting. The “old three committees” (老三会, lao san hui) 
referred to the Party committee, workers representative assembly, and workers union. 
192 A study by the State Economic and Trade Commission stated: “Only on the basis of standardized 
corporate governance and genuine transformation of operational mechanisms can a modern enterprise 
system truly be built and real reform results achieved.” State Economic and Trade Commission 1999: 
32-33. 
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As Zhang Delin (2008) describes this phenomenon: “It was rather like drawing a tiger 
with a cat as a model; they were not able to fathom the true meaning of the principle 
and structure of corporate governance—that is, the principle of separation and balance 
of power—or to adapt it to the enterprises that they were reforming.”193 Moreover, in 
most large state-owned enterprise groups, only the publicly listed subsidiaries 
established boards of directors—not the unlisted holding companies that held their 
controlling shares and administered the bulk of (unlisted) state-owned assets. In 
addition, administrative bureaus and government officials at multiple levels continued 
to routinely intervene in and extract profits from state firms.194 Boards of directors’ 
influence on managerial decision-making in state-owned enterprises therefore 
remained circumscribed in practice. 
 
Creating Space for Political Leadership at the Organization Level 
State-owned enterprise heads’ space for political leadership expanded during this 
period; however, it did not exhibit uniform growth. Overall, state-owned enterprise 
heads gained space for political leadership because of the green light given to 
“strategic restructuring” of the state-owned economy and of individual firms within it. 
While the massive downsizing of the state sector under Zhu Rongji was a central-level 
strategy, much of the decision-making that drove it occurred at the firm level, as 
individual enterprises and their heads decided how many employees to lay off and 
                                                
193 Zhang Delin, “Reform of State-owned Enterprises: A Three Year Disconnect from Difficulties Leads 
to System Innovation,” China in the Wake of Asia’s Financial Crisis, ed., Wang Mengkui (New York: 
Routledge, 2008): 147. 
194 Edward S. Steinfeld, Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-owned Industry (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
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when, which assets to lease or sell, or which firms to acquire. Under state supervision, 
enterprise heads were permitted to select part of their enterprises’ assets and apply for 
public listing in order to access new sources of capital; they then had considerable 
latitude to determine how to invest this capital in equipment and technology upgrading 
or in other areas. State-owned enterprises at all levels pushed for expanded rights to 
manage capital (资本经营, ziben jingying) despite practical constraints.195 Finally, 
some enterprises and their managers formalized and expanded their control rights vis-
à-vis the state through corporate governance development.   
In addition, the State Council encouraged enterprise heads to take 
responsibility for formulating the specific strategies for their firms’ development and 
restructuring. In a 1995 speech, Wu Bangguo explained: “This development strategy 
should be realistic, accurately identifying one’s own position in both domestic and 
international markets, getting clear about one’s advantages—a realistic development 
strategy is particularly important for enterprise groups. It must solve internal stock 
adjustment, enabling resources to flow in the direction of development and good 
efficiency.”196 Enterprise leaders now navigated between the state and markets to chart 
a comprehensive, long-term development path for their organizations, moving beyond 
the bargaining relationship with bureaus and the short-term responses to market 
pressures that had characterized the earlier reform period.  
                                                
195 Zhou 1998: 13-15. 
196 吴邦国 [Wu Bangguo]: 《吴邦国同志在与参加国家试点企业集团工作会议代表座谈时的讲
话》 [Speech by Comrade Wu Bangguo to Representatives Attending the Work Meeting on Enterprise 
Group National Pilots] in State Economic and Trade Commission (Enterprise Division): 《我国企业集
团试点的政策与实践》 [China’s Enterprise Group Pilots’ Policies and Practice] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
jingji chubanshe, 1995): 5.   
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However, the space for political leadership did not expand unequivocally for 
the heads of the largest industrial enterprises. On the one hand, these individuals 
gained greater autonomy within the overall administrative hierarchy. The 1998 State 
Council restructuring abolished the State Assets Administration Bureau (国有资产管
理局, guoyou zichan guanli ju), the central-level government body previously 
responsible for overseeing state-owned assets.197 The State Council restructuring also 
formally cut some state-owned enterprises loose from the central ministries in which 
they had been embedded. In addition, the domains over which enterprise heads could 
exercise political leadership increased in tandem with the growing size and scope of 
state-owned business groups. On the other hand, the lack of a single central-level 
organization responsible for state-owned enterprise oversight and reform ushered in 
the “five dragons ruling the waters” (五龙治水, wu long zhi shui) period, in which 
multiple government and Party organizations charged with various responsibilities for 
state-owned enterprise affairs continued to interfere in their operations.  
 Moreover, some state-owned enterprise heads struggled to exercise political 
leadership at the organization level even though they possessed greater space to do so. 
A classified report in 1999 about a World Bank training project in China observed that 
Chinese state-owned company managers found it difficult to delegate authority, to 
make strategic rather than tactical decisions, and to use inductive reasoning to flexibly 
respond to rapidly changing market conditions.198 The report cited obstacles including 
                                                
197 The State Assets Administration Bureau was set up in 1988 under the Ministry of Finance. Similar 
agencies were established earlier at provincial and municipal levels. 
198 The report attributed this to state-owned company managers’ education and practices during the 
command economy era, in which they strictly employed standard operating procedures, hierarchical 
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state-owned enterprise leaders’ fear of losing their authority and the resources for 
patronage it conferred, as well as the perceived risk of being held accountable for 
decisions delegated to subordinates. “SOEs [state-owned enterprises] need managers 
able to provide strategic leadership on market-oriented production in a changing 
environment, while delegating operational decision-making authority to subordinates,” 
the report stated, concluding that state-owned company managers “need a fundamental 
change in their belief and cognitive systems.”199 In summary, the World Bank report 
underscores the point that enterprise heads did not always act to exercise political 
leadership through proactive choices about organizational strategy and structure, even 
if they enjoyed greater autonomy to do so. 
 
Internationalization and Consolidation of the State Sector (2002 On) 
Deepening of two interrelated trends distinguish post-2002 developments. The first 
trend is the internationalization of state-owned enterprises’ operations, assets, and 
capital. The 16th National Party Congress in November 2002 formalized a “going out 
policy” as a major measure marking a new official stage of China’s reform and 
opening movement. Under the auspices of this policy, the Chinese government has 
provided firms—especially state-owned enterprises—with a wide range of economic, 
political, and administrative support to pursue overseas expansion. The second trend is 
the consolidation of state-owned assets and authority for their administration. The Hu 
Jintao administration’s creation of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
                                                                                                                                       
chains of command, and deductive reasoning to respond to central plan directives and expected 
performance criteria. U.S. Department of State Cable from Shenyang Consulate, February 1999, 
declassified (in part) at the author’s request on March 30, 2016. 
199 Ibid. 
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Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003 consolidated central authority, because 
it ended the “five dragons ruling the waters” period during which authority for 
administering state-owned assets was fragmented among multiple government and 
Party agencies.200 It also created the possibility for further consolidation of state-
owned assets, through government-directed mergers of the central state-owned 
enterprises under SASAC’s administration.   
“Going Out” (2002) 
The 16th National Party Congress in November 2002 announced the policy of “going 
out” (走出去, zou chuqu) as a “major measure taken in a new stage of China’s reform 
and opening movement.”201 Top Chinese leaders had proposed an economic strategy 
of “going out” as early as 1998 for a small group of high-performing state-owned 
enterprises, encouraging them to set up factories in Africa, Central Asia, the Middle 
East, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.202 However, formal adoption of the “going 
out” policy in 2002 differed from these early statements because it proposed a 
comprehensive, long-term global expansion strategy outlining a fundamental shift in 
economic orientation—from the internationalizing domestic economy toward world 
markets—for all Chinese enterprises. It marked a new phase in enterprise reform in 
which the state actively encouraged enterprises to engage in non-financial and 
financial overseas direct investment, cross-border mergers and acquisitions, joint 
                                                
200 This study focuses on the central-level SASAC, created as a special agency of the State Council to 
represent the state’s ownership rights and administer a portfolio of central state-owned enterprises. 
SASAC was originally given responsibility for administering 196 central state-owned enterprises; 
however, their number shrank to 189 due to restructuring by the time SASAC began operations in 2003. 
201 Jiang Zemin, Report to the National Party Congress, November 8, 2002. 
202 Jiang Zemin: 《做好国内经济工作，增强承受和抵御风险的能力》 [Doing Domestic Economic 
Work Well, Strengthening the Ability to Withstand and Resist Risks], February 26, 1998. 
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ventures overseas with foreign firms, and establishment of foreign affiliates 
(subsidiary companies registered overseas) through measures from targeted loans to 
liberalization of regulations and administrative rules.203  
 The “going out” policy has catalyzed ongoing growth in Chinese enterprises’ 
investments, revenues, assets, and numbers of employees abroad. Between 2002 and 
2015, China’s non-financial outward direct investment grew at an average annual rate 
of 33.6%.204 In 2015, China became a net capital exporter when its enterprises’ total 
overseas direct investment surpassed total foreign direct investment for the first 
time.205 China’s central state-owned enterprises now operate in 185 countries and 
regions worldwide, with total overseas assets of $725.6 billion and 346,000 employees 
abroad.206 At the organization level, the “going out” policy has impelled the heads of 
large state-owned enterprises to develop strategies specifically targeting overseas 
expansion and to adapt their organizational structures at home (for example, by 
reorganizing headquarters departments originally set up along product lines into 
departments organized by geographic region) and abroad (for example, by establishing 
new offices abroad to manage existing operations and develop future business). 
 
 
                                                
203 The state’s previous efforts to liberalize and foster cross-border economic activities had primarily 
involved foreign direct investment into China, domestic joint ventures and joint research and 
development initiatives between foreign and Chinese firms, public listing of Chinese enterprise assets 
on stock exchanges in China and abroad, and support for Chinese firms’ exports. 
204 Ministry of Commerce: “Official of the Department of Outward Investment and Economic 
Cooperation of the Ministry of Commerce Comments on China’s Outward Investment and Economic 
Cooperation in 2015,” January 18, 2016. Accessed on August 1, 2017 at: 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201602/20160201251488.shtml. 
205 “China Now a Net Capital Exporter,” Xinhua News, January 21, 2015. 
206 Yunbi Zhang, “Nation Will Fine-Tune SOE [State-owned Enterprise] Management Abroad,” China 
Daily, March 22, 2017. 
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Creation of SASAC and Central State-owned Enterprises (2003)  
The establishment of SASAC and its portfolio of central state-owned enterprises in 
2003 vested authority for the administration of state-owned assets in a powerful new 
government body.207 SASAC was granted full ministerial rank and a relatively large 
personnel allocation of 555 staff.208 Its mandate to “manage assets, people, and 
affairs” (管资产，管人，管事, guan zichan, guan ren, guan shi) gave it significant 
formal authority over individual enterprises, even though it was not authorized to 
intervene in their daily operations. SASAC’s establishment also created a new type of 
state firm: central state-owned enterprises (中央国有企业, zhongyang guoyou qiye, 
commonly abbreviated as 央企, yangqi). They included both the former ‘general 
companies’ set up under central ministry headquarters and later broken up by the 1998 
State Council restructuring, as well as the former large enterprise group pilots that 
originated from lower levels of the former ministry-coordinated production system. Of 
these central state-owned enterprises, 55 were initially designated core ‘important 
backbone’ (重要骨干, zhongyao gugan) enterprises and accorded the equivalent of 
vice-ministerial rank; the Central Organization Department appointed their heads and 
they were termed “enterprises managed directly by the center” (直管企业, zhiguan 
qiye).209 Although both the core and non-core central state-owned enterprises operated 
                                                
207 The 1998 State Council restructuring had abolished the State Assets Administration Bureau, the 
central-level agency previously responsible for administering state-owned assets, prompting a plethora 
of organizations to assume responsibility for various aspects of state-owned enterprise affairs. 
208 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?” 
The China Quarterly 211 (2012): 630. 
209 These top leadership positions are the Party committee secretary (党委书记, dangwei shuji), general 
manager (总经理, zongjingli), and chair of the board of directors (董事长, dongshizhang), if one exists. 
The remaining central state-owned enterprises were granted the equivalent of department-level rank. 
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in a range of sectors, the core enterprises were concentrated in industries including 
defense, energy, airlines, and telecommunications, while the non-core enterprises 
included numerous independent research and design institutes.210 Finally, SASAC’s 
establishment created the possibility for government-directed asset consolidation (资
产整合, zichan zhenghe). The number of SASAC-administered central state-owned 
enterprises has decreased from 189 in 2003 to 101 and continues to fall; most firms 
that ‘disappeared’ were merged into (并入, bingru) existing central state-owned 
enterprises.211  
 
Creating Space for Political Leadership at the Organization Level 
The directors of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) emerged as an important new group of organizational leaders in the state-
owned economy upon SASAC’s creation in 2003.212 Because SASAC was set up to 
serve as a government ownership agency, not merely an administrative department 
charged with managing state-owned assets (like the former State Assets 
Administration Bureau), its leaders became central actors in the state’s exercise of 
                                                                                                                                       
SASAC appointed their heads in consultation with the Central Organization Department and they were 
considered enterprises whose management was entrusted (托管企业, tuoguan qiye) to SASAC. 
210 These independent research and design institutes included: 煤炭科学研究总院 [Coal Science 
Research Institute], 机械科学研究院 [Institute of Mechanical Science and Technology], 钢铁研究总
院 [China Iron and Steel Research Institute], 冶金自动化研究设计院 [Institute of Metallurgical 
Automation Research], 中国建筑材料科学研究院 [China Building Materials Science Institute], 电信
科学技术研究院 [Telecommunications Science and Technology Research Institute], 中国医疗卫生器
材进出口公司 [China Medical and Health Equipment Import and Export Corporation], and 中国建筑
设计研究院 [China Architectural Design and Research Institute].  
211 The number of central state-owned enterprises administered by SASAC was 101 as of July 2017.  
212 This study focuses on the directors of SASAC (国资委主任, guoziwei zhuren) rather than the Party 
Secretaries of SASAC (国资委党委书记, guoziwei dangwei shuji), because they possess primary 
decision-making authority for the organization’s affairs.   
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ownership as well as control rights. SASAC’s full ministerial rank and relatively large 
personnel allocation reflected the authority vested in it and its directors to guide future 
state-owned enterprise reform experimentation and implementation—indeed, it was 
given this rank and personnel resources precisely so that it would be able to do this. 
SASAC’s newness as an organization gave its heads considerable latitude to design 
and alter its organizational structure. They also had significant autonomy to determine 
the specific strategies that SASAC took to achieve its objectives: preserving and 
increasing the value of state assets, making central state-owned enterprises 
internationally competitive, and promoting the development of a modern enterprise 
system.  
However, SASAC and its directors do not operate in a vacuum; they also 
interface with other organizations regarding state-owned enterprise reform. First, 
SASAC directors interact regularly with top State Council leaders, in particular the 
Vice Premier responsible for overseeing state-owned enterprise reform. The Central 
Organization Department (COD) also exerts important influence on state-owned 
enterprise reform, particularly in the domains of company governance and Party-
building within state-owned enterprises. The COD’s authority to either directly select 
or to advise on the selection of the heads of central state-owned enterprises constitutes 
another mechanism of its influence.213 Since 2003, the COD has moved beyond 
exercising influence through personnel control to weighing in on other matters, in 
particular corporate governance and the designation of different levels of industry 
strategic importance. Finally, the Central Committee for Discipline and Inspection 
                                                
213 Chen Li, “Holding ‘China Inc.’ Together: The CCP and The Rise of China’s Yangqi,” The China 
Quarterly 228 (2016): 927-949. 
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(CCDI) has emerged as a player in state-owned enterprise affairs with the launch of 
the Xi Jinping administration’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign. These 
organizations’ engagement in matters related to state-owned enterprise reform does 
not formally reduce SASAC directors’ space for political leadership; however, they 
are other actors that SASAC heads must navigate around or bargain with during 
reform policy experimentation and implementation. 
 The heads of central state-owned enterprises are enjoying perhaps their 
greatest space for political leadership during the reform era. Like SASAC directors, 
they possess significant autonomy to determine specific strategies to achieve central 
reform goals—preserving and increasing the value of state-owned assets and building 
globally-competitive national champions—and to restructure their enterprises in order 
to do so. The geographic orientation and scope of central state-owned enterprise 
heads’ political leadership has also expanded dramatically. As a growing proportion of 
revenue for many central state-owned enterprises now comes from international rather 
than domestic markets, overseas expansion is becoming a more important factor in 
their heads’ strategies and in how they structure their firms. Finally, central state-
owned enterprise heads’ vice-ministerial or department-level rank provides additional 
impetus for them to act as political leaders rather than merely as administrative 
managers. Włodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski (1991) argue that state-owned 
enterprise heads can never act as more than managers because they do not have the 
“material foundation of responsibility” for enterprise performance.214 However, it can 
be argued that central state-owned enterprise heads do possess a “political foundation 
                                                
214 Włodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski, From Marx to the Market: Socialism in Search of an 
Economic System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991): 138. 
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of responsibility,” because they have the possibility for political promotion both 
within and beyond state-owned industry. The political consequences for central state-
owned enterprise heads’ performance—and especially the prospect of political gain—
are an additional incentive for them to engage in political leadership rather than simply 
administrative activities.  
Four main factors contributed to the expansion of central state-owned 
enterprise heads’ space for political leadership during the present phase. The first is 
the relative reduction of state interference in individual enterprise affairs. Despite 
SASAC’s ministerial rank and relatively large personnel allocation, it lacks the 
capacity to manage or even to effectively monitor central state-owned enterprises at 
the organization level. Each central state-owned enterprise is itself typically a large 
enterprise group comprising myriad legal entities. SASAC relies primarily on 
personnel appointment, administrative directives, information reporting, and periodic 
on-site inspections by its supervisory board; however, these are indirect and 
incomplete methods of control. Second, steady overall growth in central state-owned 
enterprises’ size (assets) and revenues since 2003 has boosted their economic and 
political influence—and that of their heads. Third, the average leadership tenures of 
central state-owned enterprise heads have lengthened since 2003, as have the numbers 
of years they worked previously in their firms. Leadership tenures in the core central 
state-owned enterprises lengthened from an average of 3.9 years for top leaders 
serving in 2003 to 5.5 years in 2012, while work experience in one’s firm rose from an 
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average of 7.6 years for top leaders serving in 2003 to 13.1 years in 2012.215 These 
trends have contributed to a phenomenon of central state-owned enterprises becoming 
like small kingdoms, in which the “number-one leader” (一把手, yi ba shou) exerts 
predominant influence on organizational strategies and structure. Fourth, ties to 
powerful political elites have also expanded space for political leadership for a select 
few central state-owned enterprise leaders.216  
 
 
Conclusion 
Enterprise reform policies since 1978 have created and increased space for state-
owned enterprise heads and SASAC directors to exercise political leadership at the 
organization level. During the period of ‘dual track’ economic reform, state-owned 
enterprise heads gained new space to not only manage production but also to influence 
reform policy experimentation and implementation. They could negotiate with bureaus 
on the specific targets for their enterprises, determine the specific means by which to 
achieve them, and reshape their organizations to carry out new tasks like budget-
making, strategic planning, and marketing and distribution. However, bureaus’ 
continued involvement in enterprise affairs—together with their control over access to 
finance, markets, and material inputs—constrained nascent space for political 
leadership at the organization level.  
                                                
215 Here I define leadership tenure as the total number of years that an individual serves in one or more 
of the top three leadership roles at a particular core central state-owned company: Party committee 
secretary, general manager, and chair of the board of directors, if one exists. It includes both joint 
appointments (in which a single individual held one or more top leadership roles simultaneously) and 
consecutive top leadership roles (if a single individual served consecutively in different top leadership 
roles or combinations of those roles). Wendy Leutert, “The Political Mobility of China’s Central State-
owned Enterprise Leaders,” The China Quarterly (forthcoming).  
216 Such cases include well-known examples like Zhou Yongkang (周永康), the former head of China 
National Petroleum Corporation.   
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After the establishment of a “socialist market economy” in 1992, enterprise 
heads’ greater autonomy over production matters expanded to encompass the 
management of both state-owned assets and state-owned capital. Their space for 
political leadership grew as they took up new responsibilities for restructuring their 
organizations as limited liability companies or shareholding companies, and 
formulating development strategies for domestic and in some cases even international 
markets. Enterprise heads’ growing influence was evident not only in their efforts to 
implement new enterprise reforms, but in some cases also in their attempts to resist or 
delay them. The emergence of “turn-card” enterprises after 1992, for example, 
underscores the growing space for political leadership at the organization level.  
With the retrenchment of state ownership in the ‘commanding heights’ of the 
economy beginning in 1995, enterprise heads gained more space to exercise political 
leadership by determining specifically how to reform and restructure their 
organizations. This was particularly true for heads of small and medium state-owned 
enterprises which survived Premier Zhu Rongji’s overhaul of the state sector. This was 
also true for large state-owned enterprise groups. The State Council could move them 
in and out of national pilots and groupings of “important enterprises,” and in some 
cases even combine them at will—as it did for some in the 1998 State Council 
restructuring. However, their heads—not the State Council—were responsible for 
altering their organizational structures as they expanded across regions and 
incorporated smaller local firms. Heads of large state-owned enterprise groups also 
formulated their strategies for expansion in domestic and international markets. 
However, government agencies’ interference in enterprise affairs persisted, especially 
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after the 1998 State Council restructuring gave a plethora of state agencies 
responsibility for various aspects of state-owned enterprise affairs.  
Since 2003, the directors of SASAC have emerged as an important new group 
of organizational leaders. These individuals exercise political leadership by 
determining the specific strategies to achieve the center’s goals for the state-owned 
economy, and by altering the organizational structure of the central state-owned 
enterprises under SASAC’s administration. However, other government and Party 
bodies’ participation in state-owned enterprise affairs constrains SASAC directors’ 
space for political leadership on matters such as personnel appointment. In contrast, 
heads of the largest state firms have enjoyed their greatest space yet for political 
leadership during the reform era. This is due primarily to central state-owned 
enterprises’ growing size and global operations, overall reduction in state interference 
in their affairs, and core central state-owned enterprise heads’ lengthening leadership 
tenures and years of work in their firms. Table 2.2 below summarizes the changing 
space for political leadership in China’s state-owned economy since 1978. 
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Table 2.2:  Space for Political Leadership in China’s State-owned Economy Since 
1978 
 
 
 
Period 
 
 
Space for political leadership at the organization level 
 
Emergence and decline 
of ‘dual track’ 
economic reform 
(1978-1991) 
 
State-owned enterprise heads acquire new space to not 
only manage production but also to influence policy 
experimentation and implementation  
 
Establishment of a 
socialist market 
economy  
(1992-1994) 
 
State-owned enterprise heads’ space for political 
leadership grows as they take up new responsibilities for 
carrying out organizational restructuring and formulating 
development strategies 
 
 
Retrenchment of state 
ownership in the 
“commanding heights” 
(1995-2001) 
 
State-owned enterprise heads’ scope for influence 
expands further to encompass both state-owned capital and 
state-owned assets; its orientation becomes increasingly 
international 
 
 
Internationalization 
and consolidation of 
the state sector 
(2002 on) 
 
Heads of the largest state-owned enterprises gain their 
greatest space yet for political leadership due to: 
enterprises’ growing size and global operations, reduction 
in state interference, and their lengthening enterprise and 
leadership tenures 
 
SASAC heads exercise political leadership by 
determining specific strategies to achieve the center’s 
goals for the state-owned economy, and by altering the 
organizational structure of the enterprises under its 
administration; however, other government and Party 
bodies constrain their space for political leadership 
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Chapter 3 
 
Economic Reform through Political Leadership  
in a Central State-owned Enterprise 
 
From the outside, the headquarters of China Building Company in southwest Beijing 
looks just like that of any other Chinese multinational corporation.217 Two glass and 
steel office buildings tower above the adjacent restaurants, shops, and low-rise brick 
apartment buildings. Security guards monitor the flow of vehicles and people through 
automatic gates as they enter the office compound. Two flagpoles flying the company 
and national flags frame the entrance, while a long line of expensive foreign cars—
Audis, Mercedes, and the occasional Maserati—wait for executives and visiting senior 
dignitaries. Once through a glass revolving door, more security guards and reception 
staff dot a massive marble lobby featuring outsized works of art—carved jade, 
sculptures, and paintings. A throng of employees fills the lobby at the start of the 
workday; they stand watching news and commercials on TV screens while waiting for 
one of the three elevators to arrive. After exiting the elevator on the appropriate floor, 
employees walk to their departments past flickering electronic signboards displaying 
company and national news and other information. 
 Employees begin their workday by changing into the work uniform that is 
mandatory for most: a navy blue business suit with a collared shirt and formal shoes. 
Some also wear a gold lapel pin featuring the China Building Company logo. Many 
arrive before the official start of the workday at 8:30 AM to eat breakfast in the 
                                                
217 The company and individual names used in this chapter are pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of 
study participants. See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the case study research design and data. 
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company cafeteria and prepare tea or coffee. They work in large open rooms scattered 
with potted plants, in cubicles just tall enough to look over while sitting. Glassed-in 
offices for department heads border the corners of the rooms. Each desk has its own 
company-issued computer and telephone, but each department shares a single printer. 
Employees make phone calls with overseas clients in English, French, and Spanish to 
discuss projects, while others use the Chinese software program QQ to chat with 
colleagues about internal approvals for an upcoming tender. There are almost always 
several desks empty in each office, as staff travel for business in China or overseas, for 
days or even weeks at a time.  
At 10 AM—and again later in the day at 3 PM—several minutes of 
calisthenics set to brass band music blares automatically through the company’s 
loudspeakers. Most employees ignore it, although a few go out to the hallway for 
some light exercise and stretching. Before the cafeteria opens for lunch at 11:30 AM, 
employees take the stairs down early to line up, past scattered cigarette butts and a 
lingering odor of smoke that silently mock the “no smoking” signs. In the cafeteria, 
employees eat buffet-style meals together from metal trays amid loud television news. 
After lunch it is time for “mid-day rest.” Employees return to the department, turn off 
the lights, and nap with their heads down on their desks; some even recline fully on 
company-issued folding cots. Lights are switched back on around 1 PM, and it is back 
to work. Around 4:50 PM, those with newborn or young children are already trickling 
out of the office. At 5 PM, the workday formally ends. By 6 PM, only the company 
leadership, ambitious junior employees keen to rise through the ranks, and a handful 
of employees living in on-site company housing remain.               
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 These glimpses of the workplace at China Building Company hardly appear to 
match a strategic design perspective’s claim that top national leaders shape the reform 
process. Top national leaders and their policies are certainly present here—excerpts 
from an important new speech by Xi Jinping appear on electronic signboards in the 
corridors, and the Party Committee Work Affairs Department regularly convenes 
Party members to study national leaders’ speeches and central government policies. 
But political propaganda and education do not equate with control of organizational or 
individual behavior. While office bookshelves bristle with yellow-bound volumes of 
Xi Jinping’s speeches and writing, employees’ personal book collections show greater 
diversity; works in one desktop collection span Karl Marx’s Capital, Hillary Clinton’s 
Living History, and Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man. To be 
sure, the center sets the goals that state-owned enterprises must achieve, the most 
important of which are: 1.) preserving and increasing the value of state assets; and 2.) 
becoming internationally competitive firms. Through the cadre management system, 
the center seeks to incentivize state-owned enterprise heads by linking their political 
promotion with achievement of these goals. Incentives and constraints imposed by the 
center are real, but they are not determinative.  
Daily work life in China Building Company also underscores the reality that 
economic reform and globalization are increasingly intertwined. The operations of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises and the changes that their heads make to 
organizational strategies and structures now involve personnel, assets, and capital 
around the world—and they can profoundly affect the local communities and 
environments in the countries where they operate. Enterprises heads must pay as much 
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attention to their company’s position in international markets as they do to the latest 
official documents (公文, gongwen) from SASAC. Their speeches blend the policy 
buzzwords of top national and SASAC leadership with discussions of the latest 
Fortune Global 500 rankings and warnings about possible political turmoil and trade 
protectionism overseas. Preserving and increasing the value of state-owned assets for 
many central state-owned companies now hinges on their leaders’ abilities to expand 
business beyond China’s borders in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, 
North America, and Europe. A strategic design perspective’s focus on policy-making, 
institutional design, and political competition in Beijing downplays the increasingly 
global context—and content—of economic reform.  
 However, this is not to say that economic reform is a process of bottom-up, 
organic transformation. Central state-owned enterprise heads do not possess authority 
to make major changes to their companies’ organizational structure or operations, such 
as mergers with other central state-owned enterprises, large-scale layoffs, appointment 
of top company leadership positions, or establishment of board of directors. Within 
China Building Company, vertical responsibility and authority relationships shape 
company operations and individual employees’ behavior alike. Vertical responsibility 
relationships are embodied in the sub-contracting relationships that knit the various 
layers of the enterprise together from the top down. China Building Company receives 
annual targets from SASAC and apportions them to its member companies, which in 
turn allocate them down to individual employees. Vertical authority relationships are 
evident in myriad ways, from the print-outs of the chairman’s annual work plan on 
employees’ desks, to the dense telephone trees showing department and staff 
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hierarchies pinned to their cubicles, to the supervisor approvals requisite for company 
matters large and small. Both China Building Company’s leadership and its employees 
operate within distinct hierarchical domains of authority.    
In this chapter, I argue that political leadership at the organization level is a 
critical factor shaping central state-owned enterprises’ economic reform. Enterprise 
heads possess bounded autonomy to determine the specific strategies by which to 
respond to the center’s two main objectives for economic reform of central state-
owned enterprises: preserving and increasing the value of state assets and becoming 
internationally competitive firms. They also have bounded autonomy to alter 
organizational structure: changing existing authority relations; creating, modifying or 
abolishing intra-company entities; and reallocating assets, personnel and capital.  
Enterprise heads’ exercise of political leadership impacts central state-owned 
enterprises’ economic reform, defined as an increase in the level of marketization of 
their global expansion efforts, expansion in the influence of market-oriented actors 
relative to that of administrative actors within the firm, and how these intra-firm 
entities conceptualize their relationship to international markets. Global expansion 
efforts refer to how intra-firm entities plan, enter, and act in markets outside of China. 
Broadly speaking, these efforts may be either market-oriented (decentralized) or 
administrative (centralized). I focus on global expansion efforts because many central 
state-owned enterprises’ overseas business constitutes a significant percentage of their 
revenues; in some cases, it has already exceeded earnings from the domestic 
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market.218 Particularly for central state-owned enterprises in industries suffering from 
overcapacity or slowing domestic growth, markets abroad are their primary target. 
Expansion in the influence of market-oriented actors within the firm relative to that of 
administrative actors reflects the extent to which market-oriented actors can act 
autonomously at a given time. Finally, I examine whether intra-firm entities’ 
conceptualization of their relationship to international markets is market-oriented or 
administrative in nature. This is an important measure of economic reform because it 
reflects both their interpretations of their environment as well as ideas about how it 
should be ordered. I select these three indicators because they capture important 
aspects of the process of economic reform and data was available to assess them.219  
  
Origins, Organizational Structure, and Key Intra-firm Entities of China Building 
Company 
SASAC formed China Building Company in 2011 by merging two existing central 
state-owned companies: Sino-Construction and Sino-Engineering (see Figure 3.1). 
The merger had two main objectives. Its first objective was vertical industry 
integration. This was to be achieved by combining Sino-Construction’s construction 
capacity with Sino-Engineering’s engineering expertise to create a single, vertically-
integrated industry conglomerate. Its second and related objective was to build a 
global industry leader through this vertical integration and by increasing the new 
                                                
218 This was the case for China Building Company:  the value of contracts for its overseas projects 
exceeded the value of its domestic contracts in 2012. China Building Company Yearbook: 2012-2014 
(Beijing, 2015). 
219 There are other indicators of economic reform at the company level beyond the three I study here, 
such as changes in the specific proportion of the company’s assets that were publicly listed on the stock 
market or variation in the relative amounts and types of state support that it received (for example, 
preferential financing from state-owned policy banks); however, I did not have access to such data. 
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company’s size and resources: assets, capital, employees, and client networks.220 Last 
but not least, the merger also aimed to boost the company’s international profile. As 
an employee working in China Building Company’s holding company explained: “If 
you put the similar state-owned assets together then you will have … a brand, a name 
with international recognition.”221 
 
Figure 3.1: Organizational Structure Before Creation of China Building Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
220 These two objectives are common for government-directed mergers of central state-owned 
companies in China. Recent similar examples include the merger of China Power Investment 
Corporation with State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (2015) and the merger of China North 
Rail (CNR) Corporation Limited with China South Rail (CSR) Corporation Limited (2014). 
221 Sino-Construction International department employee, Beijing, October 2014. 
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Figure 3.2: Post-Merger Organizational Structure of China Building Company, During 
Mr. Chen’s Chairmanship 
 
 
* Sino-Construction was retained in name only after the merger. 
 
 
China Building Company (Holding Company) 
China Building Company, the holding company for the state-owned business group of 
the same name, functioned primarily as an administrative overseer.222 The holding 
company had five main functions: leading, control, service, assessment, and rewards 
and discipline.223 It supervised member companies’ management and commercial 
operations through administrative methods (for example, requiring approvals for 
company and commercial matters) and personnel (for example, dispatching holding 
company employees to be based in overseas offices).  
                                                
222 China Building Company employees emphasized that the holding company was a purely 
administrative organization, not a commercial one engaged in business operations. China Building 
Company employee, Beijing, October 2014. 
223 In Chinese: leading (引领, yinling),  control (管控, guankong), assessment (评价, pingjia), service 
(服务, fuwu), and rewards and discipline (奖惩, jiangcheng).   
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Sino-Construction International 
Sino-Construction established Sino-Construction International in 2004 as a marketing, 
investment, and management platform for overseas business. From initial projects and 
overseas offices in Asia—in Nepal, Malaysia, and Pakistan—Sino-Construction 
International expanded rapidly into Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and 
Europe. From 18 offices in 17 countries in 2004, it expanded to 113 offices in 85 
countries by the end of 2014. It increased overseas contracts from nearly 50 signed in 
2004 to more than 500 signed in 2015.224 Its business lines included clean energy 
plants, large-scale transportation projects, and municipal works like stadiums and 
water treatment facilities.  
 
Engineering Bureaus 
China Building Company had 16 engineering bureaus with offices across China.225 
The engineering bureaus did the actual project construction. Before China Building 
Company’s establishment in 2011, the engineering bureaus were subsidiaries of Sino-
Construction International; post-merger, they became subsidiaries of China Building 
Company with administrative rank just one-half rank below Sino-Construction 
International. The engineering bureaus varied significantly in terms of their number of 
employees, assets, capital, revenues, and portfolios of domestic and overseas projects. 
                                                
224 “Sino-Construction International: 10 Years of Development Overseas,” exhibition in company lobby; 
company document. 
225 This organizational structure was a legacy of Sino-Construction’s early history, in which the 
engineering bureaus carried out infrastructure projects in different parts of China to advance national 
industrialization. Many individuals in a given engineering bureau still hailed from the localities in 
which they were based.  
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Sino-Engineering and Sino-Engineering International 
Sino-Engineering was the second of the two central state-owned companies merged to 
create China Building Company in 2011. Sino-Engineering ranked among the top 
engineering design firms in China, and it held the majority of domestic market share. 
Sino-Engineering established Sino-Engineering International in 2007 as a flagship 
subsidiary responsible for expanding and managing overseas business. Sino-
Engineering International’s particular expertise was renewable and clean energy 
projects, such as solar and wind power. Sino-Engineering and Sino-Engineering 
International each had their own separate offices in Beijing. 
 
Design Institutes 
Sino-Engineering also had eight design institutes that were responsible for project 
engineering design and planning. Like the engineering bureaus, the design institutes 
had offices located across China. In addition to executing engineering designs, 
feasibility studies, and economic assessments for China Building Company’s projects 
at home and overseas, the design institutes also participated in developing new 
engineering technologies, setting national industry standards, and carrying out macro-
level policy research. 
 
Vertical Responsibility and Authority Relationships 
The chairmen of China Building Company exercise political leadership within internal 
organizational hierarchies characterized by vertical responsibility and authority 
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relationships. Sub-contracting relationships based on annual targets assigned by 
SASAC knit the multiple levels of the company together, from the holding company 
down to individual personnel. As employees worked to achieve these targets, vertical 
authority relationships structured their interactions and work on a day-to-day basis. 
These vertical authority relationships operated through a top-down system of 
administrative approvals and through official document flows. 
Just as subcontracting defines the relationship between individual central state-
owned enterprises and SASAC, it also generates relationships of responsibility among 
intra-firm entities.226 SASAC sets annual targets for China Building Company—the 
most important being the total value of contracts signed during a given year—based on 
the previous year’s performance and other factors.227 The holding company of China 
Building Company then broke this total target down into smaller targets and 
apportioned them to member companies, which in turn allocated them among their 
departments responsible for sales and production. Meeting—or preferably, 
exceeding—the SASAC targets is essential for the heads of central state-owned 
enterprises to be promoted. Likewise, member companies and their departments must 
meet these targets in order for their staff to receive annual bonuses and in order for 
their heads to be appraised favorably within the enterprise.  
The subcontracting relationships between China Building Company and its 
member companies are formalized in contracts between the China Building Company 
                                                
226 These subcontracting relationships are analogous to those that exist between the center and local 
governments in China. 周黎安 [Zhou Li-an]:《转型中的地方政府:官员激励与治理》 [Local 
Government in Transition: Official Incentives and Governance] (Shanghai: Gezhi chubanshe, 2008).  
227 Other specific targets for central state-owned enterprise performance mandated by SASAC pertain to 
operational revenue, profits, economic value added (EVA), and percentage of state-owned assets 
preserved (国有资产保值增值率, guoyou zichan baozhi zengzhi lv). 
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leadership and the heads of its member companies and their departments. While the 
most important contract concerns annual performance targets, other contracts are also 
signed regarding issues such as Party building work, production safety, and anti-
corruption efforts. Signed and stamped with the company seal, these contracts were 
compiled, printed and distributed internally in a booklet titled “Work Tasks and 
Responsibilities.” As an employee of Sino-Construction International observed: “We 
all have targets, going down even below the level of what you have observed with the 
departments signing contracts with the holding company. Within each department 
responsible for the markets of a particular geographic region, the targets go down to 
different country groups and then even goals for each person, defined as a specific 
dollar amount.”228 Weekly updates tracking regional departments’ progress in meeting 
their allocated targets were circulated electronically among employees, posted in 
individual departments in hard copy, and displayed on electronic signboards in the 
corridors on each floor of the office. These updates explicitly and publicly ranked 
departments against one another on the basis of their progress in reaching allocated 
targets.  
In parallel with these vertical responsibility relationships, vertical authority 
relationships structure employee interactions and work on a day-to-day basis. 
Employees addressed anyone with the position of department vice-manager or 
manager and above by both their name and their official title. For example, a manager 
surnamed “Zhang” should be addressed as “Manager Zhang” (张总, Zhang zong, short 
for 张总经理, Zhang zongjingli). Employees explained that in a telephone call with a 
                                                
228 Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, September 2014. 
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higher-ranked superior, the lower-ranked person must never hang up the call first. In 
meetings, one was to refrain from speaking unless a superior solicited views from 
attendees. “I have learned to say less unless I am invited to speak,” an employee of 
Sino-Construction International confided, adding: “Leaders don’t like talk and not 
action.”229 Large, highly detailed telephone trees adorned nearly every work cubicle, 
giving the names and contact information for the personnel of all headquarters 
departments of Sino-Construction International. These telephone trees clearly detailed 
how individuals within each department were organized and ranked relative to one 
another.230 
From the chairman of China Building Company down to the lowest-ranking 
employees, internal approvals are the everyday substance of vertical authority 
relationships. The company referred to this practice as “signature and reporting” (签报, 
qianbao) and considered it a critical means to “seek leaders’ guidance and report on 
work, update on the situation, answer queries and solve problems.”231 Approvals 
ranged from informal oral approvals from a single individual to formal written 
approvals requiring the signatures of as many as six people, and they were requisite 
for company matters both large and small. For example, the head of Sino-Construction 
International signed off on everything from multi-million dollar investments to travel 
plans for individual senior employees. At one meeting I attended, ten minutes were 
spent discussing the addition of a single word to a header on the company’s online 
profile; it was ultimately decided that the head of Sino-Construction International 
                                                
229 Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, March 2014. 
230 For example, the telephone trees listed the employees for each department by the work groups to 
which they belonged and noted the leaders of the work groups. 
231 Company document, February 2015. 
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needed to approve the change.232 Despite the inefficiencies generated by the high 
frequency and scope of issues requiring executive approval, company leaders were 
loath to relinquish this authority. As a department manager observed: “What leaders 
can influence most in the company is the delegation of power. … One [of a company’s 
leaders] could absolutely release power of approvals and then just evaluate [outcomes] 
with criteria.”233  
 Subordinates’ desire to avoid risk further reinforced the vertical exercise of 
authority within China Building Company. In the absence of obtaining approval from 
superiors, following standard operating procedures (流程, liucheng) was a key method 
of risk avoidance. Employees shied from acting without permission or clear guidelines, 
as this would entail their taking responsibility and subsequently being held 
accountable for the outcome. It was better to do nothing than to act and make a 
mistake. As one employee complained: “Nobody wants to take responsibility. … The 
result is that people are frozen and focus only on very precise areas of their 
responsibility.”234 On a day-to-day basis, employees worked within vertical authority 
relationships. As one shared: “We don’t try to understand the whole picture. Better to 
think simply and focus on your own part within the larger company.”235 Obtaining 
approval from superiors and, in its absence, adhering to standard operating procedures 
were key elements in the vertical authority relationships that characterized China 
Building Company’s operations. 
                                                
232 Sino-Construction International meeting, Beijing, April 2014. 
233 Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, February 2015 (English). 
234 Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, February 2014 (English). 
235 Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, April 2014 (English).  
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 Official documents (公文, gongwen) were another routine administrative 
practice through which vertical authority relationships within China Building 
Company were constructed and maintained. Various entities within the company—
from the holding company to member companies to their individual departments—
would release official documents addressing a range of internal matters. Following a 
standard internal approvals process between the intra-firm entity issuing the official 
document and multiple administrative superiors, official documents were then 
distributed electronically through the company’s internal network. Company leaders 
used official documents to ensure compliance because each receiving department was 
required to sign them and attest that they had carried out its content. Official 
documents sought to guide subordinates’ behavior on a range of topics, from 
implementation of company work plans, to safety guidelines, to use of official 
company cars. Each official document was ranked on a three-level scale of 
importance—ordinary, urgent, and extremely urgent—with a corresponding 
processing time.236 The company evaluated intra-firm entities on official document 
management and quality as part of their annual performance assessment; it threatened 
criticism by public circular (通报批评, tongbao piping) of any entities with poor 
performance and any individuals who held up their processing.237  
 
 
 
                                                
236 The rules for processing times were ten days for official documents designated as “ordinary,” five 
days for those designated as “urgent,” and three days for those designated as “extremely urgent.” 
Company document, December 2014.  
237 Company document, December 2014. 
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Case 1: Mr. Chen’s Chairmanship 
Political Leadership 
Mr. Aiwen Chen was the first chairman of China Building Company. Since Sino-
Construction was the larger of the two firms merged to create China Building 
Company in 2011, its chairman (Mr. Chen) became the new company’s chairman. 
Born in the early 1950s, Mr. Chen did not have an engineering background; he held a 
graduate degree from the Central Party School and later earned an executive MBA 
degree from a leading Chinese university. He build his career in one of the company’s 
engineering bureaus over a period of decades, advancing from a technician to deputy 
chief, to deputy director, to assistant director and deputy chief economist, and finally 
to deputy director and chief economist. He impressed employees as down-to-earth and 
approachable but occasionally temperamental.238  
Mr. Chen advocated a market-oriented, bottom-up strategy for China Building 
Company’s development. In his first speech as chairman, he articulated an ambitious 
vision of “big enterprise group, big public works, big market, big brand.”239 To 
achieve this, he proposed the strategy of “prioritize the international, coordinate with 
the domestic.” Mr. Chen’s strategy gave member companies, especially engineering 
bureaus, a leading role in “going out” to develop overseas markets and thereby 
strengthening themselves through international competition. He said: “First, we need 
to reform the international marketing model from the original way of a single legal 
person signing [contracts] and centralized marketing to a new system, a new model 
                                                
238 I was struck to see that Mr. Chen ate regularly in the cafeteria reserved for general employees, not in 
the separate cafeteria designated for company leaders.  
239 Speech by Mr. Chen at China Building Company’s first meeting of cadres, September 2011. 
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that organically combines Sino-Construction International conducting centralized 
marketing together with member companies that meet conditions engaging in 
autonomous marketing. … Relying on the platform of Sino-Construction International 
to develop 84 countries, is it possible to do so deeply, excellently, and widely?”240 Mr. 
Chen warned that if China Building Company did not adopt this new approach, then 
“we will still have the situation of Sino-Engineering International getting projects and 
delegating them to the engineering bureaus for construction, and we will lose this 
development opportunity.”241  
Markets were paramount in determining both organizational strategy and 
structure for Mr. Chen. He contended: “We should recognize that market demand 
decides strategy, strategy decides organizational structure, resource allocation, 
management models, operational mechanisms, and business procedures.”242 Mr. Chen 
stated: “The main task of member companies is to respond to market demands and, 
expressing their function as market actors, to do everything possible to guarantee 
markets, guarantee contracts, guarantee development.”243 He ordered “the devolution 
of international business management and daily operations to the front,” with 
headquarters to retain authority for major operational decisions and major risk control, 
encouraging “those [member] companies to autonomously develop international 
business” and serve as “model vanguard troops.”244 Instead of viewing member 
                                                
240 Speech by Mr. Chen at the Sino-Construction International 2013 work meeting and 4th annual 
meeting of employee representatives, February 2013. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Speech by Mr. Chen at the China Building Company 2012 mid-year work meeting, July 2012. 
243 Speech by Mr. Chen at China Building Company’s first meeting of cadres, September 2011. 
244 Speech by Mr. Chen at the China Building Company 2012 mid-year work meeting, July 2012. 
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companies as subservient entities, he emphasized their autonomy, rights, and 
responsibilities.245  
Mr. Chen also modified China Building Company’s organizational structure by 
changing existing authority relations and allocations of assets and personnel. The most 
significant change to China Building Company’s organizational structure during Mr. 
Chen’s leadership was an increase in the administrative rank of the engineering 
bureaus. The engineering bureaus went from being subsidiaries of Sino-Construction 
International to become subsidiaries of China Building Company under its direct 
authority—just one-half administrative rank below Sino-Construction International 
itself (see Figure 3.2 above). For the first time, Mr. Chen granted the engineering 
bureaus authority to carry out “autonomous marketing” (自主营销, zizhu yingxiao) for 
most overseas markets, with the ultimate goal of “autonomous operations” (自主经营, 
zizhu jingying). Of the 16 engineering bureaus, 14 were assigned country markets 
abroad; Sino-Construction International retained centralized marketing authority for 
only a single region. He affirmed the engineering bureaus’ market autonomy by 
authorizing them to sign contracts in their own name for projects with a contract value 
of $50 million or below. At the same time, he emphasized the “Four Unifies”: “unify 
brand management,” “unify market distribution and sales,” “unify regulatory 
compliance,” and “unify risk prevention.”246 Through these organizational changes 
                                                
245 As Mr. Chen asserted: “According to laws and regulations and the company charter, member 
companies enjoy effective corporate governance rights and full operational autonomy; they are 
independent actors in market competition responsible for profits and losses, and they independently 
assume legal responsibilities.” Speech by Mr. Chen at China Building Company’s first meeting of 
cadres, September 2011. 
246 Chen’s speeches and annual company work plans throughout his leadership tenure featured the 
“Four Unifies.”  
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and his bottom-up strategy, Mr. Chen aimed to transform the member companies of 
China Building Company from what he described as dispersed “small ships” setting 
sail into a massive “aircraft carrier.”247  
 
Global Expansion Efforts 
Mr. Chen’s political leadership—his bottom-up strategy and changes to organizational 
structure to boost engineering companies’ market autonomy—yielded market-oriented 
global expansion efforts. Engineering bureaus led the charge overseas, with financial, 
administrative, and personnel support from the holding company.248 For example, the 
First Engineering Bureau went from having one international project under 
construction in 2011 to having five international projects under construction in 
2013.249 The Eighth Engineering Bureau more than doubled its number of newly 
signed international contracts from nine in 2012 to 22 in 2013.250 International 
expansion might have been an imperative for China Building Company, but the 
decentralized nature and particular form of its global expansion efforts were not 
inevitable. For example, China Building Company could have retained the original 
division of labor between Sino-Construction International and the engineering bureaus, 
in which the former led international business development and the latter carried out 
project construction with minimal market autonomy. Or it might have supported the 
                                                
247 Mr. Chen used the “small ships” and “aircraft carrier” metaphors in an op-ed in a major Chinese 
state-owned newspaper in 2009.  
248 Some engineering bureaus had previous experience with international assistance projects (援外项目, 
yuan wai xiangmu) as early as the 1960s and began to participate in commercial projects overseas 
beginning in the late 1980s; however, prior to the merger they did this under the direction of Sino-
Construction as its subsidiaries and therefore had limited market autonomy.  
249 Sino-Engineering Company Yearbook: 2012 (Beijing, 2012); Sino-Engineering Company Yearbook: 
2014 (Beijing, 2015). 
250 Ibid. 
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largest and most internationally experienced engineering bureaus to specialize in 
overseas markets, instead of supporting all engineering bureaus to “go out”—
including those with little experience in overseas markets. Within several year’s time, 
China Building Company’s global expansion efforts came to appear less like an 
aircraft carrier steaming forward than a competition among sailboats tacking their own 
ways toward shifting winds of market opportunity.  
 
Shifts in Influence Among Intra-firm Entities 
Mr. Chen’s political leadership transformed the balance of power among intra-firm 
entities by boosting the influence of market-oriented actors, especially the engineering 
bureaus. His strategy and changes to organizational structure increased the engineering 
bureaus’ autonomy both in international markets and relative to Sino-Construction 
International. Newly empowered to “go out” and no longer subsidiaries of Sino-
Construction International, the engineering bureaus increasingly felt that the holding 
company was now the entity to which they should turn, not only for project approvals 
but also for relationship and information resources. As an engineering bureau manager 
related: “Before Sino-Construction International had a lot of power. It was them that 
issued official seals and signatures, that had capital. Everything they said went. … But 
now we don’t need them anymore.”251 Sino-Construction International keenly felt its 
decreased authority over the engineering bureaus. When I requested leave to travel 
outside of Beijing to visit an engineering bureau, my department supervisor joked with 
an undertone of frustration: “Why do you want to go visit them? They are trying to 
                                                
251 Engineering bureau employee, Tianjin, February 2015. 
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take our food away and eat it!”252 Another Sino-Construction International employee 
expressed irritation that when some of the engineering bureaus met with current or 
prospective clients, they passed out introduction pamphlets about their own bureaus 
rather than those about China Building Company as a whole.253  
However, Mr. Chen’s political leadership did not have a major impact on the 
influence and interactions of all intra-firm entities. Employees of Sino-Engineering 
and Sino-Engineering International still worked separately at different office buildings 
in Beijing, separate from China Building Company’s headquarters. Their cooperation 
with Sino-Construction International remained limited to specific projects, just as it 
had been before the merger and creation of China Building Company.254  
 
Intra-firm Entities’ Conceptualization of Relationship to International Markets 
During Mr. Chen’s chairmanship, intra-firm entities conceptualized their relationship 
to international markets using the concepts “front party” (前方, qian fang) and “back 
party” (后方, hou fang) (see Table 3.1 below). Their logic was simple: the “front 
party” included all workers based overseas, who were mostly engineering bureau 
employees, while the “back party” included all employees based in China, both in 
Beijing and in the engineering bureaus and design institutes located across the country. 
Employees at China Building Company’s offices in Beijing often referred to the “front 
party” and the “back party” in conversations with one another and in their telephone 
                                                
252 Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, January 2015. 
253 Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, May 2014.  
254 Prior to the merger and establishment of China Building Company, Sino-Construction International 
contracted with the design institutes of Sino-Engineering for engineering designs for some of their bids 
and projects, and Sino-Engineering International contracted with the engineering bureaus for overseas 
project construction. 
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and written communications with coworkers overseas. This binary conceptualization 
originated organically as China Building Company expanded abroad. It reflected the 
emergence of a market-oriented way of thinking in which intra-firm entities reoriented 
their understanding of how they related to one another as the result of profound 
changes in their operating environments. Specifically, they were pivoting from the 
domestic market, in which China Building Company enjoyed direct government 
support through state-funded infrastructure projects, toward a new “front” in an 
intense battle for international market share against established foreign rivals like 
Bechtel and Hyundai, as well as other Chinese firms.255 With regard to China Building 
Company’s domestic operations, intra-firm entities distinguished only between those 
“on-site” at a project (在现场, zai xianchang) and those who were not. They did not 
use the concepts “front party” and “back party,” because no distinct, external 
international markets “front” existed at that time.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
255 Prior to the initiation of market-oriented reforms in 1978, the Chinese government assigned 
contractors construction work; there was neither a competitive market for construction projects nor a 
formal relationship between “contractor” and “client.” Ping Lan, “Management in the Chinese 
Construction Industry,” China’s Managerial Revolution, ed. Malcolm Warner (London: Frank Cass, 
1999): 94-118. 
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Table 3.1: Mr. Chen’s Chairmanship: Intra-firm Entities’ Conceptualization of 
Relationship to International Markets  
 
 
Party 
 
Actors 
 
 
Functions 
 
‘Front’ 
 
• Engineering bureaus 
(primary) 
 
• Sino-Construction 
International and Sino-
Engineering International 
staff based overseas 
 
 
• Marketing 
 
• Project construction and 
supervision 
 
 
‘Back’ 
 
• Holding company 
 
• Sino-Construction 
International and Sino-
Engineering International 
staff based in China  
 
• Design institutes  
 
 
• Marketing support 
 
• Project financing 
 
• Engineering and design 
 
• Administration (accounting, 
human resources) 
 
 
Case 2: Mr. Wu’s Chairmanship 
Political Leadership 
In January 2015, China Building Company announced that Mr. Aiwen Wu would 
become the new chairman, because Mr. Chen had reached the mandatory retirement 
age of 60. Mr. Wu’s appointment was expected; he was already second in command as 
the Party Secretary and general manager of China Building Company. Moreover, Mr. 
Wu had previously served as the chairman of Sino-Engineering—the other central 
state-owned company merged with Sino-Construction in 2011 to create China 
Building Company. At the time of the 2011 merger, because Sino-Construction was 
the larger of the two companies, SASAC tapped its leader—Mr. Chen—to head the 
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newly created conglomerate. However, it was widely acknowledged, even during Mr. 
Chen’s leadership tenure, that Mr. Wu was the “heir apparent.”256 
Mr. Wu differed from Mr. Chen in his educational background, professional 
experience, and leadership style. Born in the late 1950s, Mr. Wu held a master’s 
degree in engineering from a leading government research institution. Before joining 
Sino-Engineering, he served in multiple roles conducting surveying, engineering 
design, and planning for a government ministry, working at both provincial and 
central levels. He also served as vice-president of one of the most prestigious 
engineering design institutes in China, and regularly published articles in leading 
industry magazines. Mr. Wu impressed employees as an intellectual and relatively 
reserved, and he was known for embellishing his speeches with literary sayings. 
Mr. Wu exercised political leadership through the same methods as Mr. Chen: 
determining specific strategies for China Building Company’s development and 
modifying its organizational structure. After assuming leadership, he wasted little time 
distinguishing himself from his predecessor with a new strategy for the company’s 
development. Mr. Wu proposed a two-part strategy: “planning and design come first, 
technology leads.” This strategy reflected Mr. Wu’s ambition to sequence, standardize, 
and control the company’s development, while at the same time increasing its 
prioritization of engineering and technological expertise. To Mr. Chen’s “4 Unifies,” 
Mr. Wu quickly added a fifth—“unify strategic design”—and put it in first place.257 
Mr. Wu envisioned that a single chain of command—originating from company 
                                                
256 Former Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, May 2016. 
257 Mr. Chen’s “Four Unifies” were: “unify brand management,” “unify market distribution and sales,” 
“unify regulatory compliance,” and “unify risk prevention.” Company document. 
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headquarters—would direct international business, instead of “many guns firing at a 
single bird.”258 Mr. Wu’s new development strategy aimed to rectify what an internal 
summary of the company’s work in 2015 listed as its problems: “many actors engaged 
in market operations, scattered resources for international business, and internal 
duplication and competition.”259 
 Mr. Wu also carried out major changes to organizational structure. In 2016, he 
presided over the largest internal restructuring of China Building Company since its 
establishment: the creation of China Building Company International (CBC 
International).260 Its stated aim was twofold: 1.) to increase the company’s 
competitiveness by deepening the vertical industry integration that had originally 
motivated China Building Company’s own establishment; and 2.) to consolidate the 
enterprise group’s resources for international business. Specifically, CBC International 
amalgamated three entities: Sino-Construction International, Sino-Engineering 
International, and the Overseas Business Department (see Figure 3.3).261 CBC 
International became the sole entity authorized to control all of China Building 
                                                
258 China Building Company 2016 Work Plan. 
259 Company document, March 2016. 
260 While discussions about the creation of CBC International had begun several years prior, Mr. Wu 
determined many of its central aspects amid intense internal debate, including its formal organizational 
structure and the appointment of key personnel. For example, an employee noted that the numbers and 
authority of Sino-Engineering employees in CBC International were both significantly greater than in 
early discussions during Mr. Chen’s leadership term. Former Sino-Construction International employee, 
Beijing, May 2016. 
261 The Overseas Business Department was a department with highest authority for the coordination of 
company affairs related to international business, such as: implementing operational planning and 
targets; guiding member companies’ international projects; facilitating project bidding and contract 
negotiations and signing; and formulating the company’s management rules for international work. 
After the establishment of China Building Company in 2011 and prior to the creation of CBC 
International in 2016, the Overseas Business Department was part of the holding company. Sino-
Construction International: Chronicle of Organizational Structure (1950-2011) (Beijing, 2013). 
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Company’s overseas business and to manage all of its offices abroad.262 In short, the 
creation of CBC International represented both the consolidation of physical assets as 
well as the “soft centralization” of organizational authority for international 
business.263   
 
Figure 3.3: Organizational Structure of China Building Company, During Mr. Wu’s 
Chairmanship  
 
 
(*The design institutes were placed directly under the holding company’s 
administration in 2014) 
 
 
Global Expansion Efforts 
Mr. Wu’s political leadership significantly decreased the level of marketization of 
global expansion efforts within just one year. Previously, Mr. Chen had empowered 
engineering bureaus to “go all out,” literally and figuratively, to develop various 
                                                
262 Company document, March 2016. 
263 Andrew C. Mertha, “China’s ‘Soft’ Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations,” The 
China Quarterly 184 (2005): 791-810. 
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country markets overseas. In contrast, global expansion efforts under Mr. Wu’s 
leadership became increasingly administrative, as the holding company directed them 
from the top down through CBC International. When I asked a CBC International 
employee in May 2016 which overseas markets a particular engineering bureau was 
responsible for, he reprimanded: “We don’t talk about the country markets of 
engineering bureaus anymore.”264As an engineering bureau manager described the 
change in China Building Company’s global expansion efforts: “Under Mr. Chen, the 
engineering bureaus played a guiding role, [it was their work that] propelled design. 
Under Mr. Wu, now design plays a guiding role and design propels the engineering 
bureaus.”265 As an example of this, employees described a proposal to dispatch 
engineering teams from Sino-Engineering to tour foreign countries and recommend 
possible infrastructure projects to their governments, instead of foreign governments 
putting forward particular projects for potential cooperation based on their own 
national development plans.266 An internal summary of the company’s work in 2015 
touted its drafting of such a development plan for a province in Pakistan and noted that 
similar efforts were ongoing for multiple other countries.267  
 
Shifts in Influence Among Intra-firm Entities 
Mr. Wu’s political leadership also reshaped the balance of power among intra-firm 
entities. Administrative actors within the firm—the holding company, Sino-
                                                
264 CBC International employee (former Sino-Construction International and engineering bureau 
employee), Beijing, May 2016. 
265 Engineering bureau employee, Tianjin, June 2016. 
266 CBC International employee (former Sino-Construction International employee), Beijing, May 2016.  
267 Company document, March 2016. 
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Engineering, and design institutes—gained influence, while market-oriented actors—
the former Sino-Construction International and especially the engineering bureaus—
lost influence. Under Mr. Wu, the holding company acted quickly to restrain the 
engineering bureaus’ market autonomy. As an engineering bureau manager bemoaned: 
“In the beginning we found our own projects and made our own contacts, we could 
develop spontaneously. … Our room for development now is being greatly limited. 
For everything we must listen to the holding company. We are being controlled to 
death.”268 Mr. Wu’s strategy of “planning and design come first, technology leads” 
inverted the prioritization that Mr. Chen previously granted to the engineering bureaus 
and instead implicitly accorded it to Sino-Engineering and the design institutes. While 
the competitive relationship among engineering bureaus remained, it was now 
subordinated to their struggles for autonomy relative to the holding company.  
Sino-Construction International too lost out, because its combination with 
Sino-Engineering International in the newly created CBC International weakened its 
autonomous influence. Mr. Wu tapped Sino-Engineering International’s offices as the 
temporary headquarters of CBC International and transferred most of Sino-
Construction International’s staff there. Amidst tensions during what employees of the 
former Sino-Construction International and Sino-Engineering International both 
described as a “period of mutual adjustment” (磨合期, mohe qi), they began to work 
together in the same place on the same projects for the first time. But instead of the 
newly-formed CBC International becoming a larger and more influential 
counterweight to the holding company, Mr. Wu made clear it would remain 
                                                
268 Engineering bureau employee, Tianjin, June 2016. 
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subordinate to the holding company’s direction. As a former Sino-Construction 
International employee complained: “Before we had the authority to make project-
level decisions, but now we are being treated basically as a marketing department with 
some of the previous authority we had for project-level decisions now being moved to 
the holding company level.”269 
 In contrast, Sino-Engineering and the design institutes felt their position was 
ascendant. A Sino-Engineering employee emphasized that “design takes the lead” (设
计是龙头, sheji shi longtou), contending that the role of design was more important 
than project construction and moreover that each should take its own place: “Design is 
design, and construction is construction.”270 This separation of roles and the implicit 
hierarchy accorded to them clearly put Sino-Engineering and the design institutes in 
the most advantageous position under Mr. Wu’s leadership. Another employee 
described the new hierarchy among China Building Company’s various intra-firm 
entities even more directly: “The position of the design institutes is the highest—they 
put forward the thinking (提思想, ti sixiang). Next is CBC International, they are 
responsible for implementation. And next is the engineering bureaus, they do the 
actual work.”271 
 
Intra-firm Entities’ Conceptualization of Relationship to International Markets 
Mr. Wu’s political leadership also partially changed how intra-firm entities 
conceptualized their relationship to international markets (see Table 3.2). While those 
                                                
269 CBC International employee (former Sino-Construction International employee), Beijing, May 2016. 
270 Sino-Engineering employee, Beijing, June 2016. 
271 CBC International employee (former Sino-Engineering employee), Beijing, June 2016. 
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physically overseas remained the “front party,” back in China employees of the newly-
created CBC International now officially described themselves as a “middle party” (中
方, zhong fang) or a “middle-back platform” (中后台, zhong hou tai). This “middle 
party” was responsible for a range of market-serving functions distinct from the purely 
administrative duties of the “back party,” such as technical design and assisting clients 
with project financing from Chinese financial institutions. As a CBC International 
employee described: “The ‘front party’ is the core of overseas expansion, the ‘middle 
party’ is the tool to advance market opening, and the back party provides its necessary 
logistics guarantee.”272  
From the outside, it might appear that the emergence of the concept of a 
“middle party” indicated greater decentralization, because a portion of the “back 
party” had moved toward the market. But in fact this shift too showed the 
recentralization of authority wrought by Mr. Wu’s strategy of “planning and design 
come first, technology leads” and internal organizational changes caused by CBC 
International’s establishment.273 Administrative superiors imposed the concept of 
“middle party”; employees did not come up with it themselves. This was evidenced by 
the suddenness with which the term appeared and the confusion among employees 
about the entities it included and their specific functions.274 Some persisted in using 
                                                
272 CBC International employee (former Sino-Construction International employee), Beijing, May 2016. 
273 The creation of CBC International also involved the establishment of four new technology 
departments responsible for developing and applying technological expertise relevant to the company’s 
various business lines.  
274 I listed “front party,” “middle party,” and “back party” and asked respondents to first fill in the intra-
firm entities they comprised, their specific functions, and then explain their relationship in an 
anonymous questionnaire that I distributed to a convenience sample of CBC International employees 
three months after its creation. Employee-provided definitions of the functions of the “middle party” 
ranged from project planning to project management to technical support to “doing what is necessary” 
to coordinate market development and support the “front party.” More tellingly, several respondents 
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the old binary way of thinking, simply combining the “middle party” and “back party” 
together. For example, one employee explained metaphorically: “the front party fights 
battles and the middle and back parties support it by foraging for food and grass” (前
方打仗，中后方粮草支持, qian fang dazhang, zhong hou fang liangcao zhichi).275 
 
Table 3.2: Mr. Wu’s Chairmanship: Intra-firm Entities’ Conceptualization of 
Relationship to International Markets 
 
 
Party 
 
Actors 
 
 
Functions 
 
 
‘Front’ 
 
• Engineering bureaus 
 
• CBC International staff based 
overseas 
 
• Project construction 
and supervision 
 
• Marketing support 
 
 
‘Middle’ 
 
• CBC International staff based in 
China (*including former Sino-
Construction International and Sino-
Engineering International staff)  
 
• Design institutes 
 
 
• Marketing 
 
• Project financing 
 
• Engineering and 
design 
 
‘Back’ 
 
• Holding company 
 
• Administration 
(accounting, human 
resources) 
 
 
 
Putting Political Leadership into Action: Five Tactics 
Both chairmen’s political leadership—their choices about organizational strategy and 
structure—created different sets of winners and losers within China Building 
Company. As Mr. Chen himself observed: “Reform and innovation will inevitably 
break up the existing configuration of interests. … For a company this means that a 
                                                                                                                                       
defined “front party” and “back party” but left “middle party” blank. Author’s “Research 
Questionnaire,” June 2016.  
275 CBC International employee, written response to author’s “Research Questionnaire,” June 2016. 
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top-down force at the company level is needed to break resistance and advance reform 
and innovation, to adjust production relations, and to stimulate new vitality.”276 How 
specifically do heads of public sector organizations in China overcome potential 
internal resistance in order to carry out their preferred agendas and generate 
organizational change? China Building Company’s experience of economic reform 
suggests they use multiple tactics, including: personnel ploys, emphasis on material 
and status gains, invocation of external threats, underscoring of administrative 
superiors’ directives, and appeals to personal duty and morality. Different organization 
heads may employ several of the same tactics, even if their political leadership—the 
choices they make about organizational strategy and structure—varies widely.  
 Personnel ploys occur when an organizational leader appoints his allies to key 
leadership posts.277 These formal micro-level moves reshape informal networks of 
patronage relationships, in which allies exchange their allegiance to the organizational 
leader in return for tangible and/or intangible individual benefits.278 Personnel ploys 
can bolster an organizational leader’s influence because they break up existing 
                                                
276 Speech by Mr. Chen at Sino-Construction International’s 2011 mid-year work meeting, August 2011. 
277 Such alliances may be based on multiple factors, such as shared work or educational experiences, 
regional identities, professional identities, gender, and/or family ties. For example, imagine a case in 
which the head of a central state-owned enterprise and his ally both originated from the same province 
in China and worked there together as engineers in the same engineering bureau. 
278 On other forms of clientelism, such as prebends and tribute, see Nicolas van de Walle, “Meet the 
New Boss, Same As the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa,” Patrons, Clients 
and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, eds. Herbert Kitschelt 
and Steven I. Wilkinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 50-67. On patronage 
relationships in China, see Farh et al 1998, Hillman 2014, Paik and Baum 2014, and Walder 1988. 
Jiing-Lih Farh, Anne S. Tsui, Katherine Xin, and Bor-Shiuan Cheng, “The Influence of Relational 
Demography and Guanxi: The Chinese Case,” Organization Science 9, no. 4 (1998): 471-488; Ben 
Hillman, Patronage and Power: Local State Networks and Party-State Resilience in Rural China (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); Wooyeal Paik and Richard Baum, “Clientelism with 
Chinese Characteristics: Local Patronage Networks in Post-Reform China,” Political Science 
Quarterly 129, no. 4 (2014): 675-702; Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-traditionalism: Work and 
Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988). 
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patterns of influence while simultaneously building a network of allies through which 
he can affect decision-making, shape resource allocation, coordinate intra-
organizational units’ behavior, and obtain information.279 In China Building Company, 
personnel ploys entailed the chairman posting his allies—either close personal 
contacts or those who belonged to the same company he led before the merger—to top 
positions in key departments and member companies.280 Take for example Mr. Wu’s 
moves after becoming chairman. He appointed a former executive of Sino-
Engineering International to head the regional department of the newly created CBC 
International that had the largest revenues—even though that individual had far less 
experience in that region than his peers at Sino-Engineering International. In CBC 
International’s reconstituted Investment Department, he created a new requirement 
that 50% of its employees come from Sino-Engineering, even though Sino-
Engineering had accounted for less than 40% of China Building Company’s total 
assets, revenues, profits, and personnel at the time of the 2011 merger.281  
 However, organizational leaders’ ability to carry out personnel ploys is not 
without limits. Internal backlash may result if an organizational leader’s appointments 
of allies are perceived as violating norms for professional advancement or if the 
individuals he appoints are viewed as unqualified for their posts. Organizational 
                                                
279 On how the development of patronage networks impacts the exercise of power and its 
institutionalization within the state, see Catherine Boone, Merchant Capital and the Roots of State 
Power in Senegal: 1930-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
280 For Mr. Chen, this meant employees of Sino-Construction. For Mr. Wu, this meant employees of 
Sino-Engineering. 
281 Moreover, Sino-Engineering accounted for a much smaller, albeit quickly increasing, portion of the 
company’s overall international business. In 2015, Sino-Engineering International had 12 new contracts 
for overseas projects with a total contract value of approximately $5 billion, far less than Sino-
Construction International’s 115 new contracts for overseas projects with a total contract value of 
approximately $11 billion. Company document.  
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leaders are also constrained in their ability to displace the employees appointed by 
their predecessors. In state-owned enterprises and other public sector organizations in 
China, it is extremely difficult to demote or to fire employees, especially those in 
senior positions.282 This explains why in CBC International, the number of vice 
presidents (副总经理, fu zongjingli) reached an astounding 27 by the spring of 
2016.283 Finally, central state-owned enterprises like China Construction Company 
that have experienced mergers are subject to heightened levels of oversight by SASAC 
during and immediately following the merger. Mediation by SASAC or even 
disciplinary consequences are possible if personnel ploys are excessive or engender 
internal discord. These factors constrained the ability of central state-owned enterprise 
heads like Mr. Chen and Mr. Wu to appoint allies to key leadership posts within the 
firm.   
 Organization heads also seek to advance their leadership agendas by 
emphasizing their organizations’ material and status gains, both actual and potential. 
This works to boost internal support because organizational success benefits 
individuals’ material self-interest as well as their sense of self-worth. Such appeals 
also legitimate an organization head’s political leadership by highlighting the progress 
already achieved during his tenure and by suggesting that subordinates’ short-term 
allegiance and effort will earn future rewards. Both chairmen of China Building 
Company vowed that their development strategies and changes to organizational 
structure would bring future company and employee prosperity. For example, Mr. 
                                                
282 Instead of firing employees, state-owned companies will typically transfer them, wait until they 
retire, or attempt to get them to quit on their own by limiting their existing authority and/or 
opportunities for future promotion. 
283 CBC International employee, Beijing, March 2016. 
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Chen promised that his new strategy for the company’s development “would produce 
a surge effect [井喷式的效应, jingpen shi de xiaoying], by adjusting production 
relations it will release productive forces.”284  
Organization heads may also emphasize gains in organizational status to justify 
their particular choices about organizational strategy and structure. Official 
recognition by administrative superiors for achievements in a particular area is one 
important type of gain in organizational status. For example, Mr. Chen highlighted 
that SASAC awarded China Building Company the “Outstanding Enterprise 
Performance Prize” (业绩优秀企业奖, yeji youxiu qiye jiang) and an annual “A 
grade” evaluation under his leadership.285 Gains in organizational status also include 
increases in domestic or international rankings. For example, Mr. Wu emphasized 
China Building Company’s rapid advancement in the Fortune Global 500 rankings 
during his tenure as chairman. The company jumped 60 ranks in 2015, the first year of 
Mr. Wu’s chairmanship, and again rose more than 50 ranks in 2016. Mr. Wu cited 
these organizational status gains in the first sentence of a speech recapping the 
company’s work in 2016 as evidence of its “remarkable production and operation 
results” and “steadily rising global influence” under his leadership.286 
                                                
284 Speech by Mr. Chen at the Sino-Construction International 2013 work meeting and annual meeting 
of employee representatives, February 2013. 
285 Speech by Mr. Chen at China Building Company’s 2014 work meeting, February 2014. Other 
special prizes that SASAC awards to central state-owned enterprises are the “Technology and 
Innovation Enterprise Prize” (科技创新企业奖, keji chuangxin qiye jiang), the “Managerial Advances 
Enterprise Prize” (管理进步企业奖, guanli jinbu qiye jiang), and the “Outstanding Energy Saving and 
Emissions Reductions Enterprise Prize” (节能减排优秀企业奖, jieneng jianpai youxiu qiye jiang). 
SASAC: 《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》 [Interim Measures for Operational 
Performance Assessment of Central State-owned Enterprise Principals], December 28, 2009. 
286 Speech by Mr. Wu reviewing the company’s important work in 2016, January 2017.  
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 However, material or status gains that directly impact actors within an 
organization may have greater influence on their behavior than material or status gains 
for the organization as a whole. Variation in employees’ degree of personal 
identification with the organization also mediates the extent to which organizational 
achievements affect their individual behavior. During the Maoist era, cellular work 
units (单位, danwei) functioned as the basic building blocks of economic production, 
political mobilization, and social life; they provided workers with lifetime 
employment, social solidarity, and a stable, recognized status.287 In contrast, 
employees of China Building Company, especially junior personnel, now hold a far 
more conditional and transactional view of their relationship with their place of 
employment. As one employee explained: “Now Sino-Construction International is 
not a work unit [单位, danwei]. It is a company [公司, gongsi] only. I contribute my 
work and time and I get a salary—this is the deal.”288 Immediate, individual material 
benefits—salaries, bonuses, and fringe benefits—were of greater concern to many 
employees than overall gains in the company’s performance or organizational 
status.289 When I asked a Sino-Construction International Employee privately what 
motivated his efforts to achieve the company’s ambitious annual targets, he answered: 
                                                
287 Work units during the Mao era provided workers with numerous welfare benefits in addition to 
lifetime employment, including: food, housing, healthcare, childcare, education, and pensions. Xiaobo 
Lu and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).  
288 Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, February 2015.  
289 Sino-Construction International employees continued to receive many fringe benefits in addition to 
their salaries. They included: company-issued work uniforms, shoes, and ties for men; dry cleaning 
credits; cell phone credits; bookstore gift cards; gift cards for the movies; union-issued credits to 
purchase vegetables and a gift box of meats for Chinese New Year. The company’s cafeteria also 
provided three subsidized meals a day, ranging in cost from approximately $1-3.50. 
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“Both my individual interests and our department’s pride. But mostly my individual 
interests.”290  
   Organization heads may also invoke external threats to mobilize internal 
support. Painting a picture of external threats benefits organizational leaders because it 
promotes internal unity and raises the costs for any actors who might seek to oppose or 
delay carrying out their leadership agendas.291 These external threats may be political, 
social, or economic in nature, and they may be either domestic or international. For 
example, the chairmen of China Building Company frequently invoked rising 
competition, declining demand, and economic slowdown in overseas and domestic 
markets as a serious threat that demanded concerted action by the company and its 
employees to address. Some employees appeared to agree that such external threats 
made the implementation of enterprise heads’ leadership agendas imperative. As an 
employee described the logic behind the creation of CBC International several weeks 
after its establishment under Mr. Wu’s leadership: “If our company does not undertake 
these changes and be better positioned in the overseas markets, then other [Chinese] 
companies will do so and our company will lose this historical opportunity.”292      
 However, organizational leaders’ invocation of external threats may have 
varying impact on actors within the organization, depending on their perceptions of 
particular threats’ relevance and immediacy. For example, a central state-owned 
                                                
290 Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, September 2014. 
291 This is similar to national leaders’ strategic use of perceived international threats to mobilize 
domestic resources and support in order to advance particular political or economic agendas. Thomas 
J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American 
Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Tianbiao Zhu, “Consistent 
Threat, Political-Economic Institutions, and Northeast Asian Developmentalism,” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Cornell University, 2000). 
292 CBC International employee (former holding company employee), Beijing, April 2016. 
135 
enterprise leader’s emphasis on increasing international market competition may be 
less effective in galvanizing administrative actors within the firm compared to those 
carrying out market-oriented functions. Invocation of external threats may also have 
less impact on junior employees compared to those in mid-career and senior posts, 
because any failure on their part to respond successfully to external threats is 
ultimately their superiors’ responsibility. In order for the invocation of external threats 
to be effective as a tactic, organizational leaders must therefore tailor the threats they 
invoke so that subordinates perceive them as both relevant and immediate.  
 Organization heads also underscore administrative superiors’ directives in 
order to advance their own leadership agendas. This approach is effective because 
administrative superiors’ legal authority exceeds that of any potentially opposing 
entities within an organization, thereby increasing the costs of opposition. Moreover, 
since subordinates often lack information about organization heads’ communications 
with administrative superiors, this information asymmetry creates limited space for 
organization heads to selectively frame administrative superiors’ directives, 
implementation approaches, and their consequences.293  
Organization heads use administrative superiors’ directives in two main ways. 
First, they may invoke administrative superiors’ mandates in broad terms to bolster 
their own authority and quell potential resistance. For example, Mr. Chen emphasized 
that the 2011 merger was a decision of the State Council, and he urged managers to 
“guarantee completion of the task assigned to the organization and resolutely 
                                                
293 Mitchell P. Smith, “The Commission Made Me Do It: The European Commission as a Strategic 
Asset in Domestic Politics,” At the Heart of the Union, ed., Neill Nugent (London: Palgrave Macmillan 
UK, 1997): 167-186.  
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implement the overall requirements of SASAC’s Party Committee for participant 
companies during the reorganization period: ‘no chaos in thinking, no disruption in 
production, no dispersal of the team, no loss of state assets, and protection of corporate 
and social stability.’”294 Second, organization heads may argue that their strategy or 
organizational changes will advance administrative superiors’ mandates or even 
national policies and are therefore both justified and advisable. For example, Mr. Wu 
linked his strategy of “planning and design comes first, technology leads” and the 
associated practice of directly drafting development plans for potential clients in other 
localities with the Xi Jinping administration’s “One Belt, One Road” and other 
central-level initiatives. Under Mr. Wu’s leadership, the 2016 Work Plan charged the 
company with “on the basis of deeply researching and closely following ‘One Belt 
One Road,’ international industrial capacity cooperation [国际产能合作, guoji 
channeng hezuo], and other national strategies ... continuing to actively participate in 
other countries’ development planning and research.295 Existing concepts of “state 
framing” or “policy entrepreneurship” do not capture this type of discursive practice, 
because it is neither mere repetition of the official line nor an attempt to change the 
substance of existing policies.296 Instead, it shows how officials in China can be 
                                                
294 Speech by Mr. Chen at Sino-Construction International’s 2011 meeting on operations and 
management work, April 2011. 
295 Company document, March 2016. 
296 On the concepts of “state framing” and “policy entrepreneurship,” see Chapter 1, “China’s Hydraulic 
Society?” in Andrew C. Mertha, China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Andrew C. Mertha, “‘Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0’: Political 
Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process,” The China Quarterly 200 (2009): 995-1012.  
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simultaneously subject to state authority while also strategically appropriating it to 
minimize opposition and mobilize support within their own organizational domains.297  
 However, while emphasis on administrative superiors’ directives might help to 
secure overall compliance from subordinates, it offers less leverage in addressing the 
myriad practical challenges of carrying out specific strategies or changes to 
organizational structure. For example, while China Building Company employees 
recognized that SASAC mandated the 2011 merger, this did not minimize the impact 
that they perceived it had on their daily lives and professional futures. One employee 
expressed frustration at having had to work in four different departments in the span of 
two years and experiencing stalled professional advancement post-merger. “In theory 
we are supposed to move up one level every year,” she explained, “but I have been at 
the company for five years and my level hasn’t changed.”298 In addition, some entities 
or individuals within an organization may delay or even resist its leader’s political 
leadership agenda—even if he invokes administrative superiors’ directives—by 
arguing that the timing or conditions are not yet right to carry it out.  
Finally, organizational leaders may appeal to personal duty and morality in 
order to bolster support from subordinates.299 Such appeals enhance subordinates’ 
                                                
297 Weldes 1996 highlights the crucial role of elite manipulation by showing how elite-generated 
associative chains combine to produce contextually specific and contingent representations of the world. 
Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 
(1996): 275-318. 
298 Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, November 2017. There were more than 50 
different administrative levels within the company. Each level had a fixed based salary, starting at about 
3,500 RMB (approximately $600) per month, and advancement was linked with both performance and 
seniority. 
299 In contrast to Weber’s claim that the rationalization and routinization of behavior in organizations 
constrains and ultimately negates such “meaning making” by charismatic leaders, others argue that 
leaders’ importance as a source of organizational values in fact facilitates coordination and efficiency in 
modern organizations. Joel M. Podolny, Rakesh Khurana, and Marya Hill-Popper, “Revisiting the 
Meaning of Leadership,” Research in Organizational Behavior 26 (2004): 1-36; Max Weber, 
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sense of self-worth and personal commitment by connecting their self-concepts and 
individual behavior with the realization of important shared values.300 In China 
Building Company, organizational leaders’ appeals to personal duty and morality 
included but also went beyond the requisite Party slogans of the time concerning 
individual integrity. For example, Mr. Chen emphasized employees’ sense of duty and 
responsibility and admonished them to put the company’s interests first despite 
organizational change. He told employees: “As the saying goes, people have self-
awareness, and with self-awareness it is possible to be rational and equitable when 
judging gains and losses, to avoid being impetuous and irrationally feel 
underappreciated, and to rationally and pragmatically face change. I believe that most 
comrades have this type of basic quality—and also should have this type of 
quality.”301 In a similar vein, Mr. Wu called upon employees to cultivate a mindset of 
personal striving, an “attitude of always being on the road” (永远在路上的心态, 
yongyuan zai lushang de xintai) and to create an environment of positive public 
discourse for the company’s reform and development.302  
 Yet the changing relationship between public sector organizations in China and 
their employees, particularly junior employees, means that personal considerations and 
material interest may exert greatest influence on employees’ thinking and behavior—
even if individuals remain reluctant to acknowledge this openly. Balancing company 
                                                                                                                                       
“Bureaucracy,” From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills 
(New York: Routledge, 2009 [1946]): 232-235. 
300 Boas Shamir, Robert J. House, and Michael B. Arthur, “The Motivational Effects of Charismatic 
Leadership: A Self-concept Based Theory,” Organization Science 4, no. 4 (1993): 577-594. 
301 Speech by Mr. Chen at Sino-Construction International meeting for all headquarters employees, 
December 2011. 
302 Speech by Mr. Wu at China Building Company’s 2017 work meeting, January 2017.  
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and personal interests can create particularly acute dilemmas for junior employees. For 
example, not all personnel are willing to spend years or even decades working 
overseas in often difficult locations.303 One employee resigned within weeks of the 
company assigning him to a project in central Africa, because he was not willing to 
spend the next several years apart from his spouse and soon-to-be-born child.304 It is 
becoming increasingly common for officials and employees of state-owned enterprises 
who work “within the system” (体制内, tizhi nei), to quit their jobs and cross over into 
private sector employment with domestic and even international companies.305   
 
Alternative Explanations 
Beyond political leadership, several alternative explanations can be advanced to 
account for the variation over time in China Building Company’s economic reform. 
From a strategic design perspective, one might question whether the changes that 
occurred between 2011 and 2016 reflected intervention by external actors, namely 
administrative superiors, rather than the political leadership of Mr. Chen and Mr. Wu. 
Such an argument would suggest that Mr. Chen and Mr. Wu were proxies or agents of 
outside principals, who either dispatched them to lead the company in order to realize 
their interests and agendas, or to deliberately change course from Mr. Chen’s initial 
leadership.  
                                                
303 Some of China Building Company’s project sites are so remote that they can only be reached by 
helicopter or plane, or so dangerous that they are fenced in and protected by local military. One senior 
manager described years spent working on such a project in Pakistan at the beginning of his career. 
Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, February 2015. 
304 Sino-Construction International employee, Beijing, December 2014. 
305 This “system” also comprises other public sector organizations beyond state-owned enterprises, such 
as government departments, Party organs, research institutes, and universities.  
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However, the circumstances of both Mr. Chen and Mr. Wu’s appointments 
suggest that this was not the case. Prior to the merger and creation of China Building 
Company in 2011, Mr. Chen had already served as the head of Sino-Construction 
since 2006. He became the chairman of the newly formed conglomerate because he 
was already the head of Sino-Construction and it was the larger of the two firms in 
terms of its assets, revenues, profits, and personnel. Mr. Wu later took over as 
chairman in 2015 because Mr. Chen had reached the mandatory retirement age of 60, 
and because he had already been serving as the second in command at China Building 
Company since its founding.306 The appointments of both Mr. Chen and Mr. Wu 
reflected existing bureaucratic rules, not external intervention. Moreover, there is no 
evidence available to suggest that either of the two chairmen acted as the proxies of 
external actors during their tenures. Both men rose to positions of leadership after 
spending their entire careers working in the construction industry; unlike some other 
heads of central state-owned enterprises, they were not appointed from outside 
positions in central or local government.307   
 One might also suggest that another type of top-down strategic design shaped 
China Building Company’s economic reform: major changes in policy by its 
administrative superiors (SASAC and the State Council). For example, perhaps 
SASAC issued a directive ordering central state-owned enterprises to recentralize 
holding companies’ authority over global expansion efforts, or the State Council 
                                                
306 The mandatory retirement age is 60 for Chinese officials holding positions of vice-ministerial and 
department-level rank is 60. The position of chairman of China Building Company is of department-
level rank. Barry Naughton, “Leadership Transition and the ‘Top-Level Design’ of Economic Reform,” 
Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor, no. 37, Spring 2012. 
307 Wendy Leutert, “The Political Mobility of China’s Central State-owned Enterprise Leaders,” The 
China Quarterly, forthcoming. 
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required every central state-owned enterprise to set up new departments to advance the 
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, like the “Transportation Department” that Mr. Wu 
established after becoming chairman.  
However, policies since 2011 have largely affirmed central state-owned 
enterprises’ operational autonomy relative to their administrative superiors and even 
devolved it further, with several exceptions.308 For example, SASAC launched pilots 
for state capital management in 2014, which involves granting central state-owned 
enterprises increased autonomy for capital management decision-making within 
particular state-owned business groups.309 In 2017, the State Council issued new 
guidelines to shift SASAC’s overall function away from state-owned asset 
management toward state-owned capital management and supervision. These 
guidelines not only eliminated and devolved a number of SASAC’s administrative 
                                                
308 These exceptions include: the anti-corruption campaign initiated after Xi Jinping came to power in 
2012, because it has involved the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection dispatching 
investigators to central state-owned enterprises to carry out on-site investigations; strengthened 
requirements for oversight of state-owned assets in China and overseas introduced in 2016 and 2017, 
which mandate greater information reporting and in a small number of cases has also involved SASAC 
sending investigators to conduct on-site inspections; mandatory reductions to state-owned enterprise 
executive salaries introduced in 2015; and ongoing efforts to get central state-owned enterprises to 
reduce their commercial activities outside of their core business areas (especially in real estate). 
However, no direct link is apparent between these policies and the changes observed at China Building 
Company; moreover, some of these policies were initiated after these changes had already occurred. 
Politburo of the CCP Central Committee: 《中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案》 
[Compensation Reform Plan for Heads of Enterprises Managed by the Center], January 1, 2015; State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission: 《中央企业投资监督管理办法》 
[Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Investment of Central State-owned Enterprises] 
and 《中央企业境外投资监督管理办法》 [Measures for the Supervision and Administration of 
Overseas Investment of Central State-owned Enterprises], January 18, 2017.  
309 State capital management reform also comprises a second experimental scheme in which state-
owned enterprises with broad cross-industry holdings function like asset management companies, 
managing state-owned assets on the government’s behalf. This second type of state capital management 
reform commenced in 2016 when SASAC and the National Development and Reform Commission 
tapped China Reform Holdings Corporation and Chengtong Holdings Group Limited as pilot 
enterprises. The two subsequently launched funds to manage state capital and to facilitate state-owned 
enterprises’ restructuring, respectively. 《国资委启动四项改革试点》 [SASAC Starts Four Reform 
Pilots], Xinhua News, July 14, 2014. 
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functions, they affirmed specific areas in which central state-owned enterprises 
possess administrative rights—including the right of their heads to determine the 
strategies for their companies’ development.310 In 2017, SASAC also announced that 
central state-owned enterprises will be categorized into three groups—entity industrial 
groups, investment companies, and operating companies—suggesting that they may 
enjoy greater autonomy for capital management in the future.311  
 An organic transformation perspective on economic reform in China points to 
changes in market competition as another possible explanation. Major shifts in the 
markets in which China Building Company operates might have triggered 
corresponding adaptation in organizational structures and strategies. However, there 
were no significant changes in the domestic construction market after China Building 
Company’s establishment in 2011. The number of central state-owned enterprises in 
the industry did not change.312 Nor did the overall level of competition in the 
construction industry: the percentage of state-owned enterprises in the sector between 
2012 and 2016 remained relatively stable, ranging between 18% and 33% during this 
period.313 The overseas construction market did not exhibit any major fluctuations 
either. Between 2012 and 2015, the top 250 international contractors ranked by 
Engineering News-Record reported total contracting revenue from projects outside 
                                                
310 State Council: 《国务院国资委以管资本为主推进职能转变方案》 [Plan for State Council State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission Advancing Functional Transformation By 
Taking Capital Management as the Core], April 27, 2017. 
311 “China State-owned Enterprises to be Divided Into Three Categories,” China Daily, June 5, 2017. 
312 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission: 《中国国有资产监督管理年
鉴》 [State-owned Assets Supervision and Management Yearbook] (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji 
chubanshe, 2012, 2013, 2014). 
313 I calculate levels of market competition based on the proportion of publicly listed companies on both 
the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets in a given industry for which the ultimate parent company is 
a state-owned enterprise, using data from the WIND commercial database and its industry classification 
for the construction sector.  
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their home countries ranging from a low of $501.14 billion to a high of $543.97 
billion.314  This market was relatively stable, with average annual change in total 
contracting revenues varying between 4% and 6% during this period.315 Finally, while 
Mr. Chen and Mr. Wu discussed international markets in general terms in their 
speeches (such as the imperative of international competitiveness and the issue of 
declining overseas demand), they did not cite specific changes in international markets 
to justify their changes in organizational strategy or structure.  
 Ruling out these alternative explanations increases confidence in a political 
leadership explanation, but several caveats remain. First, while Mr. Chen and Mr. Wu 
reached top leadership posts after decades of work within the industry and their firms, 
the career trajectories that lead to leadership appointments in central state-owned 
enterprises vary and may reflect divergent motivations.316 In addition, SASAC and 
State Council policies may affect central state-owned enterprises in different ways 
depending on the industries in which they operate and their historical relationships 
with the center. Finally, changes in international markets might impact even peer firms 
in the construction industry in varied ways, depending on the circumstances of the 
specific country markets in which they operate, or the state of industries like mining 
                                                
314 The top 250 contractors are ranked on the basis of contracting revenues outside of their home 
countries. 2015 is the latest year for which data is available. Engineering News-Record “Top 250 
International Contractors,” accessed on August 1, 2017 at http://www.enr.com/toplists/2016-Top-250-
International-Contractors.  
315 Author’s calculations using Engineering News-Record data.  
316 Such motivations may include the Party center’s intention to broaden an individual’s experiences 
across functional areas of the Chinese bureaucracy as part of a grooming process for continued political 
advancement, efforts to foster organizational learning by bringing in individuals with successful 
experiences running other state firms, or attempts to limit the potential risk of departmentalism through 
intra-industry executive swaps. Departmentalism (本位主义, benweizhuyi) refers to a phenomenon in 
which long-serving individuals in specialized bureaucracies come to evaluate policy priorities from the 
perspective and interests of their own bureaucratic unit. Leutert forthcoming; Kenneth Lieberthal and 
Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1988). 
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and petroleum to which the infrastructure they specialize in constructing might be 
related (such as power plants). Further sector-specific and even company-specific 
research is needed in all three of these areas—personnel appointment, central policies, 
and market competition. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that political leadership is an important yet understudied 
factor shaping the economic reform of central state-owned enterprises in China. I 
investigated whether the political leadership that Mr. Chen and Mr. Wu exercised in 
China Building Company—their choices about strategies and organizational 
structure—impacted its economic reform. Specifically, I analyzed developments in 
three areas: changes in the level of marketization of global expansion efforts, shifts in 
influence among intra-firm entities, and how they conceptualize their relationship to 
international markets. I found that Mr. Chen’s bottom-up strategy of “prioritize the 
international, coordinate with the domestic” and changes to organizational structure 
resulted in market-oriented global expansion efforts, increased influence for market-
oriented actors within the firm, and an organic binary conceptualization of intra-firm 
entities’ relationship to international markets. In contrast, Mr. Wu’s new strategy of 
“planning and design come first, technology leads,” and his creation of CBC 
International centralized global expansion efforts, increased influence for the holding 
company and other administrative actors within the firm, and an imposed tripartite 
conceptualization of intra-firm entities’ relationship to international markets. Table 3.3 
below summarizes findings from the case study analysis.   
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Table 3.3: Summary of Mr. Chen and Mr. Wu’s Chairmanships 
 
  Mr. Chen 
 
 
Mr. Wu 
 
Tenure 
d 
• 2011-2015  
 
• 2015-Present 
 
Strategy  
 
• “Prioritize the 
international, coordinate 
with the domestic” 
 
• “Planning and design comes first, 
technology leads”  
 
 
Major changes to 
organizational 
structure  
 
• Increase in the 
administrative rank of 
engineering bureaus 
• Authorization for 
engineering bureaus to 
conduct “autonomous 
marketing” overseas 
 
• Creation of CBC International 
• Withdrawal of engineering 
bureaus’ authorization to conduct 
“autonomous marketing” 
overseas 
 
Overseas 
expansion efforts 
 
• Market-oriented 
(decentralized): 
engineering bureaus play 
leading role  
 
 
• Administrative  
(centralized): holding company 
plays leading role 
 
 
Shifts in influence 
among intra-firm 
entities 
 
• Market-oriented 
engineering bureaus gain 
influence 
 
• Holding company 
supports increased market 
autonomy of engineering 
bureaus vis-à-vis Sino-
Construction 
International, weakening 
its influence 
 
• Administrative holding company 
gains influence 
 
• Holding company restrains 
market autonomy of engineering 
bureaus 
 
• Creation of CBC International 
further weakens influence of 
Sino-Construction International 
 
 
Conceptualization 
of relationship to 
international 
markets 
 
• Intra-firm entities develop 
conceptualization 
organically 
 
• Binary: ‘front party’ and 
‘back party’ 
 
• Administrative superiors impose 
modified conceptualization 
 
• Tripartite: ‘front party,’ ‘middle 
party,’ ‘back party’  
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Additional empirical study is needed to assess whether this chapter’s findings 
about political leadership’s impact on economic reform at the company level can be 
extended to other state-owned enterprises in China and beyond. Further research could 
examine the effects of political leadership on economic reform for a group of Chinese 
state-owned enterprises in a single industry or across industries during a particular 
period. Alternatively, it could follow the approach here of examining multiple 
consecutive chairmanships in selected central state-owned enterprises over time. 
Additional research could also be comparative in nature. For instance, it might 
investigate the effects of state-owned enterprise heads’ political leadership on 
economic reform in central versus local state-owned enterprises or in different sub-
national regions. Alternatively, it could assess the impact of political leadership on 
state-owned enterprise reform in different country contexts or under different types of 
political regimes. Finally, future studies could also develop and assess alternative 
explanations beyond the three examined here: intervention by external actors, major 
changes in central-level policies, and fluctuations in market competition. 
Future research about the impact of political leadership on Chinese state-
owned enterprise reform could address four specific areas. First, the upper echelons 
literature in business studies suggests a possible relationship between central state-
owned enterprises’ economic reform and the individual attributes of their leaders.317 
                                                
317 The ‘upper echelons’ literature in business studies examines the impact of specific demographic 
attributes of the top management team, such as age and education (taken as measurement proxies for 
psychological constructs like cognitive bases, perceptions, and values), on a range of organizational 
outcomes. Mason A. Carpenter, Marta A. Geletkanycz, and Wm. Gerard Sanders, “Upper Echelons 
Research Revisited: Antecedents, Elements, and Consequences of Top Management Team 
Composition,” Journal of Management 30, no. 6 (2004): 749-778; Donald C. Hambrick and Phyllis A. 
Mason, “Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers,” Academy of 
Management Review 9, no. 2 (1984): 193-206. 
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For example, an increasing number of central state-owned enterprise heads in China 
hold master’s degrees or doctoral degrees in business administration. Are these 
individuals more likely to increase the marketization of global expansion efforts or to 
empower market-oriented actors within their companies? Second, research on elite 
factions suggests that social networks, especially patronage ties, condition individual 
officials’ autonomy and influence.318 Are heads of central state-owned enterprises who 
assume leadership after decades within a company less likely to make major changes 
to organizational structure than an individual appointed from outside the company, for 
instance from a previous position in central or local government? Third, analysis of 
central state-owned enterprise leaders’ political mobility reveals that a significant 
proportion are appointed to lead more than one central state-owned enterprise during 
their careers.319 Do these individuals replicate their previous strategies and changes to 
organizational structure in the enterprises where they are next appointed? Finally, 
research on local political budget cycles in China suggests that officials are likely to 
increase government spending at strategically important points in their leadership 
tenure in order to increase their probability of political promotion.320 Are central state-
owned enterprise heads more likely to make major changes to organizational structure 
early in their leadership terms? These are only some of the important issues that future 
research could address.  
                                                
318 Victor C. Shih, Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation (New York: Cambridge 
University, 2008); Franziska Keller, “Networks of Power: An Informal Network among Chinese 
Communist Elites 1982-2007,” APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper, accessed on August 1, 2017 at: 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2454603. 
319 Leutert forthcoming. 
320 Gang Guo, “China’s Local Political Budget Cycles,” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 3 
(2009): 621-632. 
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Chapter 4 
Political Leadership and Central State-owned Enterprise Mergers  
 
Economic reform in a state-owned economy is typically understood as the decrease of 
administrative control over resource allocation and decision-making, epitomized by 
partial or full privatization of state-owned assets and corporate governance 
development.321 Accordingly, ownership and control rights have long been the two 
main issues in research on state-owned enterprise reform. Arguments for state 
ownership underscore the needs to address market failure, to limit externalities like 
pollution, and to provide public goods such as health care and defense.322 Other 
studies contend that state ownership harms productivity, efficiency, and profitability, 
with some suggesting that state regulation combined with taxes and subsidies is a 
better alternative.323 Those who approach state-owned enterprise reform from the 
perspective of control rights often focus on the agency problems that state ownership 
                                                
321 This view follows Kornai 1986’s classic definition of economic reform as the process of moving 
away from administrative control toward market coordination. Janos Kornai, “The Soft Budget 
Constraint,” Kyklos 39, no. 1 (1986): 3-30. 
322 William L. Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter, “From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies 
on Privatization,” Journal of Economic Literature 39, no. 2 (2001): 321-389. 
323 Kathryn L. Dewenter and Paul H. Malatesta, “State-owned and Privately-owned Firms: An 
Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage, and Labor Intensity,” The American Economic Review 91, 
no. 1 (2001): 320-334; Isaac Ehrlich, Georges Gallais-Hamonno, Zhiqiang Liu, and Randall Lutter, 
“Productivity Growth and Firm Ownership: An Analytical and Empirical Investigation,” Journal of 
Political Economy 102, no. 5 (1994): 1,006-1,038; Roman Frydman, Cheryl Gray, Marek Hessel, and 
Andrzej Rapaczynski, “When Does Privatization Work? The Impact of Private Ownership on Corporate 
Performance in the Transition Economies,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 4 (1999): 
1,153-1,191; World Bank (1995), Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government 
Ownership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
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creates and how to address them through particular corporate governance 
arrangements.324   
However, economic reform in China’s state-owned economy is comprised of 
both government-directed restructuring of state-owned assets as well as the extension 
of decision-making authority to non-state actors through marketization of assets and 
corporate governance.325 Government-directed restructuring of state-owned assets may 
contradict how some researchers understand the concept of “reform,” because it 
involves the government intervening in resource allocation instead of granting markets 
a greater role. However, government-directed restructuring of state-owned assets is an 
essential part of how reform of the state-owned economy actually occurs and is 
understood in China. As Chinese economist Li Yining writes: “It is important to know 
that in China, the reorganization of state-owned assets is an indispensible part of the 
process of transition from a planned economic system to a market economy.” 326 While 
a handful of empirical studies address the restructuring of state-owned assets in China, 
existing research remains limited and most works do not address developments during 
the past decade.327  
                                                
324 Yingyi Qian, “Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political Control,” Economics of 
Transition 4, no. 2 (1996): 427-447; Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang, “Ownership Structure and Corporate 
Governance in Chinese Stock Companies,” China Economic Review 10, no. 1 (1999): 75-98. 
325 Vertical government-directed restructuring of state-owned assets refers to government bodies’ 
deliberate organizational reforming (重组, chongzu) of state-owned enterprises through the 
consolidation, recombination, transfer, and/or sale of existing assets and of authority relations for their 
management.  
326 厉以宁 [Li Yining], speech at the first Private Economy Forum at the Guanghua School of 
Management at Peking University, published in 《厉以宁改革论集》 [Collected Works of Li Yining 
on Reform] (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe, 2008): 186. 
327 Studies analyzing the extent of ownership restructuring and reassignment of property rights in state-
owned enterprises include Jefferson and Singh 1998, Jefferson and Su 2005, Lin and Zhu 2001, and 
Steinfeld 1998. Keister 2000 and Sutherland 2003 examine the development of state-owned industrial 
enterprise groups. None of these studies addresses developments in the past decade. Gary H. Jefferson 
and Inderjit Singh, Enterprise Reform in China: Ownership, Transition, and Performance (New York: 
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At the central level, multiple reform efforts since 1978 have involved 
government restructuring of state-owned assets with the aim of developing large, 
internationally competitive state-owned conglomerates. Experimentation with ‘general 
companies’—large corporate entities under central ministries linking multiple 
factories across provincial lines—starting in 1981 was followed by central-level 
promotion of large industrial state-owned ‘enterprise groups’ beginning in 1991.328 In 
1998, reorganization of the State Council broke up existing ‘general companies’ into 
centrally-controlled enterprises along geographic or vertical industry lines. At each 
stage, the government actively directed the restructuring of state-owned assets and 
carried it out through an administrative process. While heads of state-owned 
enterprises had significant influence on the restructuring process at the enterprise level, 
the government exercised predominant authority to initiate or to approve large-scale 
mergers.  
Since the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003, government restructuring of state-
owned assets has proceeded primarily through SASAC-directed mergers among 
central state-owned enterprises. Mergers include two main types of asset consolidation: 
                                                                                                                                       
Oxford University Press, 1998); Gary H. Jefferson and Jian Su, “Privatization and Restructuring in 
China: Evidence from Shareholding Ownership, 1995-2001,” Journal of Comparative Economics 34, 
no. 1 (2006): 146-166; Lisa A. Keister, Chinese Business Groups: The Structure and Impact of 
Interfirm Relations during Economic Development (Oxford University Press, 2000); Yi-min Lin and 
Tian Zhu, “Ownership Restructuring in Chinese State Industry: An Analysis of Evidence on Initial 
Organizational Changes,” The China Quarterly 166 (2001): 305-341; Edward S. Steinfeld, Forging 
Reform in China: The Fate of State-owned Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
Dylan Sutherland, China’s Large Enterprises and the Challenge of Late Industrialisation (New York: 
Routledge, 2003). 
328 Enterprise groups differed from earlier experimentation with ‘general companies’ because they 
started from large production units (the core enterprises of the groups) at a lower level of the production 
system under central ministries, rather than originating from central ministry headquarters or even 
directly from the State Council itself. Li 2014: 64. 
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when a central state-owned company is merged into (并入, bingru) another state-
owned company, or when two existing central state-owned enterprises are combined 
(合并, hebing) to create a new firm. Both economic and political factors motivate 
these mergers. In theory, they can boost competitiveness by eliminating price wars 
among central state-owned enterprises overseas, combining complementary capacities, 
and increasing resources—employees, capital, and client networks. In addition, 
mergers among central state-owned enterprises constitute a key method for 
restructuring and upgrading domestic industry. They enable coordinated cuts in 
surplus capacity industries, reduction of losses by merging poor performers into 
stronger firms, and price stabilization for products previously undervalued because of 
market competition among state firms. Consolidation of state-owned assets is also 
politically appealing. Most importantly, it avoids the sensitive issues of selling state 
firms, which prompts corruption concerns, or closing them and dismissing their 
employees, which raises the specter of social instability. It also fits the central 
leadership’s longstanding strategic vision for the development of China’s ‘national 
champions’—market competitiveness with Party control. 
SASAC-directed mergers have steadily transformed the central government’s 
portfolio of state-owned enterprises since 2003. Between 2003 and 2015, 96 central 
state-owned enterprises under SASAC’s administration were merged. However, the 
incidence of mergers among central state-owned enterprises during this period has 
varied significantly across firms and over time (see Figure 4.1). This suggests that 
government-directed restructuring of central state-owned enterprises through mergers 
cannot simply be attributed to a developmental sequence in which asset consolidation 
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occurs early on and enterprises are stable once formed. What factors then affect the 
incidence of central state-owned enterprise mergers?  
 
Figure 4.1: Central State-owned Enterprise Mergers, 2003-2015 
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In this chapter, I assess three hypotheses, drawn from existing research, for the 
incidence of mergers among central state-owned enterprises between 2003 and 2015. 
First, a top-level political leadership hypothesis posits that mergers should be most 
likely for central state-owned enterprises operating in sectors that the State Council 
has designated as of high strategic importance, as China’s leadership deliberately aims 
to concentrate state-owned assets in a small number of firms in the “commanding 
heights” of the economy. Second, a middle-level political leadership hypothesis 
suggests that mergers should be most frequent during the tenures of SASAC directors 
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whose reform strategies prioritize asset consolidation. Third, a market competition 
hypothesis posits that mergers should be most likely when market competition is high, 
as only the fittest firms survive and the government acts to protect state firms’ market 
share and prevent price wars. I assess these hypotheses with logistic regression 
analysis on the likelihood of mergers using an extensive original dataset compiled 
from SASAC yearbooks, the WIND financial database, company websites, and media 
reports. I find strong support for the top-level political leadership hypothesis and little 
support for the middle-level political leadership and market competition hypotheses. 
These findings are robust to the inclusion of additional variables to capture the 
possible effects of central state-owned enterprise heads’ previous work experience at 
the center.  
 
Hypotheses 
Top-level Political Leadership 
Strategic design accounts of China’s economic reform underscore the importance of 
decisions by top national leaders about the particular industries in which state-owned 
assets are to be concentrated. As Roselyn Hsueh (2011) contends, these decisions 
proceed from assessments about the “perceived strategic value” of particular 
industries.329 The government is more likely to centralize bureaucratic coordination, to 
regulate market entry, and to use industrial policy to target the development of sectors 
with high strategic importance. In contrast, the government is more likely to 
                                                
329 Roselyn Hsueh, China’s Regulatory State: A New Strategy for Globalization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2011); Roselyn Hsueh, “State Capitalism, Chinese-Style: Strategic Value of Sectors, 
Sectoral Characteristics, and Globalization,” Governance 29 (2016): 85–102. 
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decentralize bureaucratic coordination and to deregulate market entry in sectors with 
less strategic importance. Official designation of industry strategic importance impacts 
the likelihood of government intervention to restructure specific sectors and the 
enterprises operating in them through consolidating, recombining, transferring, and/or 
selling existing assets. 
The Jiang Zemin administration (1989-2002) initiated official designation of 
industry strategic importance in China. In Jiang’s Report to the 15th National Party 
Congress in 1992, he emphasized that absolute state control of the economy was not 
necessary but rather its control of the “commanding heights” (国民经济命脉, guomin 
jingji mingmai)—specific sectors deemed critical to the national economy.330 The 
Fourth Plenum in 1999 specified that state ownership should maintain the “dominant 
position” (支配地位, zhipei diwei) in “important industries and key areas” (重要行业
和关键领域, zhongyao hangye he guanjian lingyu).331 During the subsequent Hu 
Jintao administration, the State Council further differentiated and formalized the 
strategic importance of specific sectors in 2006 when it designated seven industries 
where the state will maintain “absolute control,” and nine industries where it will keep 
“strong control.”332 These two groups, together with industries not designated as 
                                                
330 Jiang Zemin, Report to the National Party Congress, October 12, 1992. 
331 It specified three important industries (sectors relating to national security, natural monopolies, and 
public goods or services provision) and one key area (high and emerging technology industries)—as 
well as “backbone enterprises in important industries” (重要产业中的骨干企业, zhongyao chanye 
zhong de gugan qiye). Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: 《中共中央关于国有企
业改革和发展若干重大问题的决定》 [The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China on Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises], 
September 22, 1999.   
332 Industries where the state will keep “absolute control” are: defense, electricity, petroleum, 
telecommunications, coal, aviation, and shipping. Sectors where it will maintain “strong influence” are: 
machinery, electronics, information technology, automobiles, steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals, and 
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strategically important, comprise what Margaret Pearson (2015) terms China’s “tiered 
economy.”333 
One observable implication of a top-level political leadership explanation is a 
positive relationship between the level of strategic importance of the industry to which 
a central state-owned enterprise belongs and the incidence of mergers. Specifically, 
mergers should be most likely for central state-owned enterprises in industries with 
high strategic importance, as the state deliberately seeks to concentrate state-owned 
assets in a small number of firms in specific sectors that it deems strategically 
important to China’s national economy. Table 4.1 below summarizes the levels of 
industry strategic importance in China according to the State Council’s 2006 
classification scheme.   
 
Table 4.1:  Official Designation of Industry Strategic Importance in China  
 
 
Role for state  
 
Industries 
 
Official designation of  
strategic importance 
 
 
“absolute control” 
 
 
Defense, electricity, petroleum, 
telecommunications, coal, aviation, 
shipping 
 
 
High 
 
 
“strong influence” 
 
 
Machinery, electronics, information 
technology, automobiles, steel, 
nonferrous metals, chemicals, 
construction  
 
 
Low 
 
 
None specified 
 
 
Investment, trade, research and 
development, services, agricultural 
products 
 
 
None specified 
                                                                                                                                       
construction. 《我国明确七大行业将由国有经济保持绝对控制力》 [China Specifies Seven Major 
Industries in Which the State-owned Economy Will Maintain Absolute Control], 《上海证券报》 
[Shanghai Securities News], December 19, 2006. 
333 Margaret Pearson, “State-owned Business and Party-State Regulation in China’s Modern Political 
Economy,” State Capitalism, Institutional Adaptation, and the Chinese Miracle, eds., Barry Naughton 
and Kellee S. Tsai (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 31-36.  
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: Central state-owned enterprises in industries assigned higher levels of 
strategic importance are more likely to experience mergers. 
 
Middle-level Political Leadership 
A middle-level political leadership explanation suggests that SASAC directors’ 
exercise of political leadership may affect the likelihood of mergers among central 
state-owned enterprises.334 SASAC directors exercise political leadership in two main 
ways. First, they set the specific strategies by which to achieve the center’s goals: 
preserving and increasing the value of state assets, making central state-owned 
enterprises internationally competitive, and promoting the development of a modern 
enterprise system.335 Second, SASAC directors can indirectly alter the organizational 
structures of the central state-owned enterprises under their administrative authority, 
for instance through consolidating or transferring assets among firms or mandating 
changes to their governance structures, such as the establishment of boards of directors. 
These two mechanisms of political leadership are complementary and SASAC 
directors often employ them in tandem. For example, a SASAC director might 
advance a reform strategy that emphasizes restructuring state-owned enterprises in a 
                                                
334 I focus on SASAC directors rather than SASAC Party secretaries because they possess primary 
decision-making authority for setting reform strategies. Moreover, a single individual may jointly hold 
the positions of both director and Party secretary. For example, SASAC director Li Rongrong 
concurrently served as SASAC Party secretary between February 2005 and August 2010, as did his 
successor Wang Yong between August 2010 and March 2013. 
335 Development of a modern enterprise system refers primarily to the legal reorganization of state-
owned enterprises as limited liability or shareholding companies and to corporate governance 
development.  
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particular way in order to increase the value of state-owned assets or to promote the 
development of a modern enterprise system.   
Although SASAC directors exercise important decision-making authority for 
setting reform strategies and major organizational changes to central state-owned 
enterprises, they can only carry them out with the support and approval of their 
administrative superiors in the State Council and top national leaders. The autonomy 
granted to central state-owned enterprises themselves sets the bottom bound of 
SASAC directors’ authority. SASAC directors can in theory influence the relative 
frequency by which mergers occur by setting reform strategies that place varying 
emphasis on asset consolidation; however, they are not directly involved in the 
logistics of particular mergers.336 SASAC directors’ relative scope for authority may 
also vary by issue area or under different political regimes.337  
 One observable implication of the middle-level political leadership hypothesis 
is a positive relationship between the extent to which a SASAC director’s reform 
strategy emphasizes consolidation of state-owned assets and mergers. Specifically, we 
would expect that central state-owned enterprises are more likely to experience 
mergers when a SASAC director’s reform strategy emphasizes consolidation of state-
owned assets. The following sections analyze the emphasis that each SASAC 
                                                
336 Within SASAC, the Enterprise Department (企业局, qiye ju) is responsible for the logistics of 
mergers among central state-owned enterprises. 
337 For example, SASAC directors do not typically determine the content or lead the execution of Party 
building/political education campaigns; the Central Organization Department determines campaign 
content and the Party secretary of SASAC is responsible for their implementation. Changes that 
particular regimes make to the hierarchy of organizations responsible for economic governance may 
also affect SASAC directors’ space for political leadership (one example is the Xi Jinping 
administration’s creation of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms to 
centralize decision-making authority for economic reform).  
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director’s reform strategy placed on consolidation of state-owned assets between 2003 
and 2015.  
The founding director of SASAC, Li Rongrong (August 2003-August 2010), 
emphasized the imperative of making central state-owned enterprises “large and 
strong” (做大做强, zuo da zuo qiang).338 This reform strategy prioritized the 
consolidation of state-owned assets by making increased firm size the goal of reform. 
Mr. Li believed that asset consolidation could help to realize the center’s objective of 
preserving and maintaining the value of state-owned assets in multiple ways. He felt 
that it could advance vertical industry integration and economies of scale within state-
owned business groups, increase central state-owned enterprises’ market share at 
home and abroad, and make central state-owned enterprises “strong” by amalgamating 
poor performers into stronger state firms.339 At the very first meeting of central state-
owned enterprise heads in December 2003, Mr. Li stated: “Facing the new situation of 
the quickening pace of global industrial restructuring and multinational corporations 
intensifying their global layout, we must enhance our sense of urgency and speed up 
the pace of enterprise reorganization and restructuring.” 
The second director of SASAC, Wang Yong (August 2010-March 2013), did 
not prioritize state-owned asset consolidation. Instead, he stressed the importance of 
                                                
338 Li Rongrong was formally appointed as SASAC director in March 2003; however, SASAC was not 
formally established until August 2003. Mr. Li also used the similar phrase of making central state-
owned enterprises “strong and large” (做强做大, zuo qiang zuo da). Although at times the two phrases 
appear to be used interchangeably, he often used “strong and large” to refer to the need for enterprises 
to grow by performing well in their main business area, rather than to an overall reform strategy.  
339 Li Rongrong also pledged SASAC’s support for central state-owned enterprises that met conditions 
to engage in overseas mergers and acquisitions; however, the primary focus remained domestic rather 
than international mergers. 李荣融 [Li Rongrong], 《重组必须有利于优势互补》 [Restructuring 
Must Be Beneficial to Complementing Mutual Strengths], 李荣融 [Li Rongrong], 《遵循规律办企
业》 [Running Businesses Abiding by Rules] (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 2013): 140. 
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making central state-owned enterprises “strong and excellent” (做强做优, zuo qiang 
zuo you). In an interview, Mr. Wang explained that his approach to making state firms 
“strong” entailed strengthening their innovation capacity, resource allocation ability, 
risk control and personnel quality, while making them “excellent” involved improving 
their operating performance, corporate governance, organizational layout, and social 
image.340 This reform strategy deprioritized asset consolidation by removing “large” 
as a priority of reform strategy and focusing on company-level reforms, such as 
developing corporate governance, readjusting organizational structures, and improving 
operational efficiency.  
After the short-lived tenure of SASAC director Jiang Jiemin (March 2013-
August 2013), subsequent acting director and then director Zhang Yi (September 
2013-January 2016) put the imperatives of fighting corruption and maintaining 
stability first and foremost.341 Amalgamating his predecessors’ reform strategies, Mr. 
Zhang called for making central state-owned enterprises “strong, excellent, and large” 
(做强做优做大, zuo qiang, zuo you, zuo da).342 However, although Mr. Zhang 
indicated renewed emphasis on consolidation of state-owned assets by again including 
firm size as a goal, he reordered the components of his reform strategy to put “making 
firms large” last. This indicated that although asset consolidation was again a 
component of Mr. Zhang’s reform strategy compared to that of his predecessor Mr. 
                                                
340 李其谚 [Li Qiyan], 鲁菲 [Lu Fei], 《国资委主任王勇：“做强做优”央企需制度保障》 [SASAC 
Director Wang Yong: “Strong and Excellent” Central State-owned Enterprises Need Institutional 
Guarantee], 《财经国家周刊》[Economy and Nation Weekly], January 11, 2012.  
341 《张毅接掌国资委:张老纪检”面临改革新任务》 ［Zhang Yi Takes Over At SASAC: “Old 
Discipline Inspector Zhang” Faces New Reform Task], 《人民网－中国共产党新闻网》 [People’s 
Network CCP News Network], December 26, 2013.   
 342 《国资委 2015年重点工作:全力以赴保增长居首位》 [SASAC 2015 Priority Work: Going All 
Out To Maintain Growth Takes First Place], 国资委网站  [SASAC Website], December 22, 2014.  
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Wang, it was still less of a priority than it had been in Mr. Li’s reform strategy. In 
summary, this analysis of the SASAC directors’ reform strategies suggests that 
mergers should be most likely during the tenure of Mr. Li and least likely during the 
tenure of Mr. Wang.  
 
: Central state-owned enterprises are more likely to experience mergers when 
the SASAC director’s reform strategy emphasizes consolidation of state-owned 
assets.  
 
Market Competition 
A third explanation derived from organic transformation accounts emphasizes 
adaptation to dynamic external conditions. It suggests that government-directed 
organizational restructuring of central state-owned enterprises is best understood as a 
response to changes in market competition. Rising market competition in a particular 
industry puts pressure on state firms to compete with one other and private 
companies—both domestic and international—through increasing operational 
efficiency, cutting costs, lowering prices, and improving product quality. The stability 
and improvement of state-owned enterprise performance matters to the government 
because state firm revenues and taxes constitute an important source of fiscal revenue. 
In cases where central state-owned enterprises struggle to compete or where making 
state firms bigger might boost their performance by promoting economies of scale or 
vertical industry integration, the government may therefore elect to restructure state 
firms. Combining central state-owned enterprises can help to maintain their 
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competitiveness and protect their industry position, thereby also ensuring the 
government’s fiscal revenues.   
 Government-directed restructuring of state-owned enterprises in response to 
changing market conditions first became a major component of the government’s 
strategy for state sector reform during the 1990s. The Fourth Plenum in 1995 officially 
endorsed “strategic reorganization” (战略性改组, zhanluexing gaizu) of the state-
owned economy, to proceed “in accordance with the market and industrial policies.”343 
Continued deterioration in the state sector’s performance together with Chinese 
leaders’ concern about rising domestic market competition after China’s accession to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) were early market motivations for government-
directed restructuring of state-owned assets, including mergers.344 Widespread and to 
some extent organic consolidation of state-owned assets at the local level occurred 
during the massive downsizing of the state sector under the strategy of “grasping the 
large, releasing the small.” In the simultaneous consolidation of state-owned assets at 
the central level, the government took the lead in decisions about organizational 
restructuring—but it often invoked considerations about market competitiveness as it 
did so. For example, in a 2002 speech following China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization, Jiang Zemin emphasized both market opportunity and challenges as key 
                                                
343 Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: 《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展
“九五”计划和 2010年远景目标的建议》 [Suggestions of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China on Formulating the 9th Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development 
and 2010 Long-Term Goals], September 28, 1995. 
344 In March 1999, the State Economic and Trade Commission reported that 30% of 7,680 large and 
medium state-owned enterprises were operating at a loss and one third of the 512 key large state-owned 
enterprises made losses during the first half of 1998. Moreover, state-owned companies accounted for 
an estimated 90% of all non-performing loans held by state-owned banks by 1999. China Statistical 
Yearbook.   
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factors motivating the development of a small group of large state-owned enterprise 
groups.345 
An observable implication of a market competition explanation is a positive 
correlation between levels of market competition and the likelihood of mergers. 
Mergers should be more likely for central state-owned enterprises operating in 
industries with higher levels of market competition. This is because market 
competition erodes state firms’ market share and puts pressure on them to lower prices. 
However, state-owned enterprises are limited in their ability to adapt to market 
pressures since mass layoffs are not politically acceptable.346 Moreover, state firms are 
also expected to fulfill political priorities that contradict profit maximization.347 
Government-directed organizational restructuring therefore may be one possible 
method by which adjustment to changes in market competition occurs. Increased 
industry competitiveness should thus ultimately lead to survival of central state-owned 
enterprises that the government deems fittest, not the survival of all.   
                                                
345 Jiang stated: “In the long run, we must form a group of internationally competitive large enterprises 
and multinational enterprises. We must seize all opportunities under the new situation after joining the 
WTO and strive to form and develop a group of Chinese-style multinational companies. Our expansion 
of opening up, increase in economic strength and international competitiveness, and withstanding of the 
various challenges of economic globalization are urgently needed in order for China to truly become an 
economic great power.” 《中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席江泽民出席省部级主要领
导干部“国际形势与世贸组织”专题研究班座谈会并发表重要讲话》 [General Secretary of the CCP, 
National Chairman, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission Jiang Zemin Attended the 
“International Situation and the World Trade Organization” Symposium for Main Leading Cadres at the 
Provincial Level and Delivered an Important Speech], 《新华社》 [Xinhua News], February 25, 2002.   
346 Recent comments by SASAC director Xiao Yaqing at the National People’s Congress in March 
2017, in which he emphasized that reform of central state-owned enterprises would absolutely not 
generate a “wave of layoffs,” reflect the political sensitivity of mass layoffs.《肖亚庆:央企改革绝对不
会出现什么“下岗潮”》 [Xiao Yaqing: Central State-owned Enterprise Reform Absolutely Will Not 
Bring Any Appearance of “Wave of Layoffs”], 《中国证券网》 [China Securities Network], March 9, 
2017.  
347 These political priorities include fostering indigenous innovation, supporting social stability and 
crisis response in China, and advancing economic initiatives abroad such as the Xi Jinping 
administration’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative. 
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: Higher levels of market competition in the domestic industries in which 
central state-owned enterprises operate increase the likelihood of mergers.    
 
I test these hypotheses using data about industry market competition and the attributes 
and mergers of all central state-owned enterprises in China between 2003 and 2015. 
The following section introduces the sample, variables, data sources, and coding 
procedures used.  
 
Variables and Data 
Sample 
The sample includes the 189 non-financial central state-owned enterprises under 
SASAC’s administration at its founding in 2003.348 These firms represent the universe 
of cases of central state-owned enterprises. I include the new firms created through 
mergers (合并,  hebing) in the dataset as separate observations because of the 
possibility that one firm may experience multiple mergers. In the few cases where a 
new central state-owned enterprise was set up (组建, zujian) after 2003, I add them 
into the dataset into their year of creation. When a given firm is merged into and 
absorbed by another firm (并入, bingru) or combined with another firm to form a new 
entity (合并, hebing), its firm-year observations end the year that the merger is 
approved and it is removed from the dataset. The data range from 2003 to 2015, 
                                                
348 The starting point of the analysis is the official list of 189 central state-owned enterprises under 
SASAC’s administration at its establishment in 2003. For this list, see State Council: 《国务院办公厅
关于公布国务院国有资产监督管理委员会履行出资人职责企业名单的通知》 [General Office of 
the State Council Notice Regarding the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission Carrying Out Investor Responsibilities Enterprise List], October 21, 2003.  
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yielding an unbalanced panel dataset with 1,901 firm-year observations. Additional 
data sampling and analysis is needed to assess whether this study’s findings can be 
extended to other cases, such as state-owned enterprises owned by governments in 
China below the central level. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this study is the incidence of central state-owned enterprise 
mergers, measured at the company level by year (0 for no merger, 1 for merger). A 
merger occurs if a central state-owned enterprise is either merged into another existing 
central state-owned enterprise or if it is combined with another existing central state-
owned enterprise to form a new firm in a given year. Central state-owned enterprises 
refer to those firms under the administration of SASAC. Data on mergers were 
collected from SASAC’s official website (www.sasac.gov.cn), company websites, and 
media reports.349  
 
Independent Variables 
I evaluate top-level political leadership by examining the Chinese leadership’s 
designation of industry strategic importance. To assess the varying strategic 
importance of particular sectors, I use the State Council’s official listing in 2006 of 
seven industries in which the state is to maintain “absolute control” and nine industries 
in which the state is to keep “strong influence,” as this remains the most recent official 
                                                
349 See Appendix B for a list of all central state-owned enterprises that experienced mergers and the 
firms into which they were either merged with or combined to create new firms between 2003 and 2015. 
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designation of industry strategic importance (see Table 4.1 above).350 I first use 
SASAC’s industry classification scheme to identify the sector to which a central state-
owned enterprise belongs, and then use the State Council’s 2006 official listing to 
categorize it as operating in an industry of high strategic importance (where the state is 
to maintain “absolute control”), an industry of low strategic importance (where the 
state is to keep “strong influence”), or an industry that is not formally designated as 
possessing strategic importance (all other sectors). I use these measures to create a 
categorical variable with values ranging from 0 (no official designation of strategic 
importance) to 2 (high strategic importance).  
 I examine middle-level political leadership by looking at SASAC directors and 
the relative emphasis that their reform strategies place on the consolidation of state-
owned assets. I identify SASAC directors’ reform strategies from their speeches and 
writings, reports on SASAC’s official website, Chinese media reports, and secondary 
sources.351 Over the study period, there are three different directors: Li Rongrong 
(2003-2010), Wang Yong (2011-2013), and Zhang Yi (2014-2015).352 Based on my 
textual analysis of their reform strategies, Wang Yong emphasizes asset consolidation 
the least, Li Rongrong stresses asset consolidation the most, and Zhang Yi falls in 
between the two. Each variable takes the value of 1 for years during that SASAC 
                                                
350 I assume that the varying levels of strategic importance assigned to these industries already existed 
in 2003, even though the State Council did not formally codify them until 2006. 
351 It is important to note that SASAC directors typically articulate strategies for reform within 
approximately one year of taking office; this increases confidence that reform strategies precede and 
can therefore be theorized to shape behavior and are not merely a post-hoc rationalization of actions 
that have already occurred. 
352 I code the year of 2013 as part of Wang Yong’s leadership tenure because due to the brevity of Jiang 
Jiemin’s directorship (March-August 2013) and because he was under investigation for corruption from 
the start of his time at SASAC, it is reasonable to assume that any mergers that occurred during his 
tenure resulted from planning that had already been initiated during Wang Yong’s leadership. 
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director’s tenure and 0 otherwise. I expect more mergers under Li Rongrong than 
under other SASAC directors. This measurement assumes that each SASAC director’s 
reform strategy is in effect for the duration of his tenure, which is a reasonable 
assumption, while also controlling for other idiosyncratic influences that SASAC 
directors’ leadership tenure may have on the likelihood of mergers. 
 I assess market competition by measuring the relative proportion of state-
owned enterprises among all firms operating in a particular industry in China. I 
calculate this based on the ratio of publicly listed companies in a given industry on 
both the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets for which the ultimate parent company 
is a state-owned enterprise. This proportion varies over time with changes in the 
numbers of state-owned and private companies active in a particular industry. As a 
single central state-owned enterprise may have multiple publicly listed subsidiaries 
operating in different industries, I classify its industry based on the WIND industry 
classification for its largest publicly listed subsidiary company (by asset size). For 
central state-owned enterprises that do not have publicly listed subsidiaries, I classify 
them according to the WIND industry classification that corresponds to their main 
business area (主业, zhuye). I calculate the proportion of state-owned enterprises 
compared to privately-owned enterprises in a given industry by year. Market 
competition is a continuous variable with values ranging from 0 to 1; increasing values 
indicate a greater proportion of private companies in an industry market and higher 
levels of competition. Table 4.2 below summarizes the independent variables used in 
the analysis and their expected signs. 
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Table 4.2: Independent Variables and Expected Coefficient Signs  
 
Variable Sign 
 
Top-level political leadership  
 
Industry strategic importance 
 
+ 
  
Middle-level political leadership  
 
SASAC director reform strategy 
 
+ 
 
Market competition 
 
 
Level of domestic industry competition 
 
+ 
 
 
Control Variables 
To better isolate the impact of these independent variables of interest, I also include a 
series of control variables. First, I include a control variable for central state-owned 
enterprise size based on total assets.353 Large firm size may decrease the likelihood 
that a central state-owned enterprise is merged, because the government may be less 
likely to alter the organizational structure of major industry players due to potential 
market disruption and logistical difficulties. In contrast, smaller central state-owned 
enterprises may be more likely to be merged into larger state firms, which might hold 
advantages in market share, production capacity, and/or technological capabilities. To 
calculate firm size, I first average the total reported assets for the central state-owned 
enterprises in the years for which this data is given in SASAC’s annual yearbooks to 
calculate three size cut points—small, medium, and large. Using these cut points, I 
then classify the size of each central state-owned enterprise according to the SASAC 
yearbook data or the most recent reported data on total asset size from company 
                                                
353 While it might appear that size and strategic value could be highly correlated, Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) tests do not indicate significant collinearity (VIF < 10). 
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websites, the SASAC website, and official Chinese media to categorize the size of the 
remaining state firms.354 I code size as a categorical variable with values ranging from 
1 (small) to 3 (large).  
I also include a control variable for central state-owned enterprises’ 
administrative rank. Central state-owned enterprises are divided into two main groups. 
The first is a core set of state firms termed “important backbone state-owned 
enterprises” (重要骨干国有企业, zhongyao gugan guoyou qiye) which are ranked at 
the vice-ministerial level (副部级, fubuji).355 The remaining group of central state-
owned enterprises are ranked at the department level (正厅级, zhengtingji). Central 
state-owned enterprises with vice-ministerial rank are typically larger in size than 
firms ranked at the department level but vary significantly with regard to the strategic 
importance of the sectors in which they operate.356 Vice-ministerial ranked firms may 
be less likely to experience mergers than lower-ranked firms due to their status as the 
“core” of the state-owned economy; moreover, their greater influence and relatively 
larger size increase the political and logistical challenges of mergers. I create a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a company possesses vice-ministerial rank and 0 
otherwise. 
                                                
354 A list of firms for which SASAC yearbooks did not report information on total assets and data 
sources other than SASAC yearbooks were used to code firm size is available from the author upon 
request. 
355 For a recent list of these firms, see Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Politics and Business Group Formation 
in China: The Party in Control?” The China Quarterly 211 (2012): 635-637. The members of this group 
have remained largely constant over time, with only slight changes as mergers have reduced the number 
of firms and several new central state-owned enterprises created after 2003 were also accorded ‘core’ 
firm status, such as China Commercial Aircraft Group Corporation (中国商用飞机集团公司) and 
National Nuclear Power Technology Company, Ltd. (国家核电技术有限公司).   
356 Administrative rank is positively correlated with firm size and strategic value; however, Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) tests do not indicate any significant collinearity (VIF < 10). Hosmer and 
Lemeshow goodness of fit tests also indicate that models including administrative rank as a control 
variable fit the data better than those without it.  
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I also include a control variable to indicate whether a central state-owned 
enterprise is a research or design institute. Research institutes (研究院, yanjiuyuan) 
and design institutes (设计院, shejiyuan) differ from other types of central state-
owned enterprises because their primary function is to conduct activities related to 
research and development, although they may also engage in production indirectly by 
providing services such as consulting for technical designs or even directly by 
operating for-profit subsidiaries. Research institutes and design institutes may be more 
likely to experience mergers than other types of central state-owned enterprises, 
because the combination of research and design expertise with production capacity has 
long been a main objective of state-owned asset consolidation. I identify research and 
design institutes using the “research and design” (科研设计, keyuan sheji) official 
industry classification assigned by SASAC. The variable takes the value of 1 if a 
central state-owned enterprise is a research or design institute and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, I include a control variable corresponding to the pre- and post- global 
financial crisis periods.357 The global financial crisis reached worldwide proportions 
by 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the United States. In that year, the 
Chinese government announced a ¥4 trillion (approximately $590 billion) stimulus 
package to address the effects of the crisis on China’s domestic economy.358 The 
external shock of the global financial crisis can be considered a dividing line in the 
                                                
357 I include this theoretically informed variable to control for possible time effects instead of year fixed 
effects for two reasons. First, the inclusion of time dummies to control for possible year-variant time 
effects is confounded with the temporal variation implicit in the independent variable of SASAC 
directors’ reform strategies, because these reform strategies correspond to a given director’s leadership 
tenure. Second, no prior theoretical explanation exists in this case for why one would expect year-
variant time effects.  
358 Barry Naughton, “Understanding the Chinese Stimulus Package,” China Leadership Monitor 28, no. 
2 (2009): 1-12. 
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landscape of state-owned enterprise reform in China, because it affirmed the Chinese 
government’s desire for greater autonomy through the accelerated development of a 
select group of “national champions”—large, internationally competitive state-owned 
companies.359 At the same time, the increased amount of loans and credit that the 
stimulus package channeled to state-owned enterprises provided complementary 
material support for this aspiration.360 I create a binary variable that takes the value of 
0 in the pre-global financial crisis period (2003-2007) and 1 in the post-global 
financial crisis period (2008-2015). Below, Table 4.3 reviews the control variables 
used in the analysis and their expected signs; Table 4.4 provides summary statistics for 
all variables. 
 
Table 4.3: Control Variables and Expected Coefficient Signs  
 
Variable Sign 
 
Size (total assets) 
 
 
- 
 
Vice-ministerial rank 
 
- 
Research institute - 
 
Post-global financial crisis 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
359 For a discussion of how the global financial crisis increased the Chinese government’s desire for 
greater autonomy in the realms of currency and the global monetary order, see Jonathan Kirshner, 
“China, Regional Hegemony, and an Emerging RMB Zone,” The Great Wall of Money: Politics and 
Power in China’s International Monetary Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). 
360 According to a 2017 report by Gavekal Dragonomics: “SOEs [state-owned enterprises] have 
consistently accounted for 70-80% of infrastructure investment in recent years. An infrastructure 
stimulus is by definition an SOE stimulus, and the central government has repeatedly used public works 
spending to stimulate the economy since 2008.” Gavekal Dragonomics, “The State of the State Sector,” 
March 2017. 
172 
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
 
 
Mean  
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
 
Min.  
 
 
Max. 
 
n 
 
Merger 
 
0.050  
 
0.219  
 
0 
 
1 
 
1,901 
Industry strategic importance 
  (top-level political leadership) 
1.965  0.806  1 3 1,901 
SASAC director tenure—Li Rongrong 
  (middle-level political leadership) 
.692 .462 0 1 1,901 
SASAC director tenure—Wang Yong 
  (middle-level political leadership) 
.189 .392 0 1 1,901 
SASAC director tenure—Zhang Yi 
  (middle-level political leadership) 
.119 .323 0 1 1,901 
Market competition 0.630  0.324  0 .993 1,901 
Size 2.153  0.799  1 3 1,844   
Research institute 0.075  0.263  0 1 1,901 
Vice-ministerial rank 0.348  0.476  0 1 1,901 
Post-global financial crisis period 0.534  0.499  0 1 1,901 
 
 
Research Design and Results 
I compute maximum likelihood estimates for a binary logistic regression with robust 
standard errors clustered by firm ID. I analyze a total of 1,901 firm-year observations 
for all Chinese central state-owned enterprises between 2003 and 2015. I estimate a 
series of models with results reported in Table 4.5 below. Model 1 assesses the effects 
of top-level political leadership (top national leaders and State Council), plus control 
variables. Model 2 assesses the effects of middle-level political leadership (SASAC 
directors), plus control variables. Model 3 examines the effects of market competition, 
plus control variables. Model 4, the full model, assesses the effects of top-level and 
middle-level political leadership and market competition, plus control variables. 
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Table 4.5: Estimation Results for Logistic Regression Models  
 
 
Variable 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Industry strategic importance     
     Low  
    
0.668* 
(0.317) 
 
  0.683* 
(0.311) 
     High  
 
1.356** 
(0.283) 
 
  1.340** 
(0.279) 
     
SASAC director Li Rongrong 
 
 0.184 
(0.375) 
 
 0.106 
(0.378) 
SASAC director Wang Yong      -0.466 
(0.452) 
 -0.477 
(0.45) 
     
Market competition   -0.158 
(0.364) 
 
-0.16 
(0.325) 
     
Size (medium) -1.258** 
(0.28) 
 
-0.946** 
(0.261) 
-0.978** 
(0.267) 
-1.230** 
(0.278) 
Size (large) -2.379** 
(0.555) 
 
-1.851** 
(0.48) 
-1.908** 
(0.494) 
-2.325** 
(0.54) 
Vice-ministerial rank -1.115* 
(0.536) 
 
-0.882 
(0.521) 
-0.875 
(0.522) 
-1.127* 
(0.536) 
Research institute -0.828 
(0.501) 
-0.546 
(0.434) 
-0.567 
(0.443) 
-0.829 
(0.493) 
Post-global financial crisis 0.735** 
(0.268) 
 
0.808** 
(0.271) 
0.624* 
(0.267) 
0.932** 
(0.289) 
Constant -2.810** 
(0.238) 
-2.557** 
(0.434) 
-2.273** 
(0.259) 
-2.838** 
(0.485) 
 
AIC .332 0.339 0.340 0.333 
BIC -13,210.557 -13,196.118 -13,200.496 -13,190.988 
 
Observations 
 
 
1,844 
 
1,844 
 
1,844 
 
1,844 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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 The top-level political leadership hypothesis suggests that higher levels of 
industry strategic importance assigned by the State Council increase the likelihood of 
mergers. Model 1 assesses the effects of top-level political leadership (top national 
leaders and State Council), plus control variables. Results presented in Table 4.5 
(columns 1 and 4) strongly support this hypothesis. The likelihood of mergers 
increases relative to the strategic importance of the industry in which a central state-
owned enterprise operates. This positive relationship is consistent and is statistically 
significant across all of the models. 
Based on the full model (column 4), the predicted probability of merger for 
central state-owned enterprises operating in a sector with no formal designation of 
strategic importance (strategic importance = 0) is .027, for those operating in a sector 
where the state is to retain “strong influence” (strategic importance = 1) the predicted 
probability of merger is .051, and for those operating in a sector where the state is to 
retain “absolute control” (strategic importance = 2) the predicted probability of merger 
is .089, holding all other variables at their means. Figure 4.2 below shows that the 
predicted probability of merger grows as industry strategic importance increases and 
that this positive relationship is consistent across all levels of industry strategic 
importance. The confidence intervals shown indicate the precision of these estimates 
of predicted probability of merger at each level of industry strategic importance. 
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Probability of Merger by Industry Strategic Importance with 
95% Confidence Intervals (Top-Level Political Leadership) 
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The positive and statistically significant relationship between industry strategic 
importance and mergers accords with the Chinese government’s deliberate efforts 
since the 1990s under Jiang Zemin’s leadership to concentrate state ownership in 
specific sectors deemed critical to the national economy. This finding suggests that 
central state-owned enterprises are not merged indiscriminately; instead, mergers do 
aim at the consolidation of state-owned assets in the “commanding heights” of the 
state-owned economy. 
Next, the middle-level political leadership hypothesis posits that greater 
emphasis on consolidation of state-owned assets in a SASAC director’s reform 
strategy increases the likelihood of central state-owned enterprise mergers. Model 2 
assesses the effects of middle-level political leadership (SASAC directors), plus 
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control variables. Mergers should be least likely during the tenure of a SASAC 
director whose reform strategy does not prioritize asset consolidation (Wang Yong 
tenure = 1) and most likely during the tenure of a SASAC director whose reform 
strategy prioritizes asset consolidation (Li Rongrong tenure = 1). Results presented in 
Table 4.5 (column 2 and column 4) provide limited support for this hypothesis. 
Emphasis on consolidation of state-owned assets in SASAC directors’ reform 
strategies is positively correlated with mergers across all of the models; however, this 
relationship is not statistically significant.  
 Finally, the market competition hypothesis suggests that higher levels of 
domestic competition in the sectors in which central state-owned enterprises operate 
increase the likelihood of mergers. Model 3 examines the effects of market 
competition, plus control variables. Results presented in Table 4.5 (column 3 and 
column 4) do not support this hypothesis. The correlation between market competition 
and mergers is negative and is not statistically significant in any of the models.  
In addition, the results presented in Table 4.5 show a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between two other company-level variables—size and vice-
ministerial rank—and the likelihood of mergers. The larger a company is in terms of 
asset size, the less likely it is to experience a merger. The negative relationship 
between size and mergers holds and is statistically significant across all of the models. 
In the full model, the predicted probability of merger for the smallest firms (size = 1) 
is .112, for medium-size firms (size = 2) the predicted probability of merger is 037, 
and for the largest firms (size = 3) the predicted probability of merger is .013, holding 
all other variables at their means. This finding is not surprising, because the largest 
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central state-owned enterprises often function as “merger recipients,” into which other 
central state-owned enterprises are amalgamated. State firms with vice-ministerial 
rank are also less likely to experience mergers. The negative relationship between 
vice-ministerial rank and mergers is consistent across all of the models. In the full 
model, the predicted probability of merger for firms that do not possess vice-
ministerial rank (vice-ministerial rank = 0) is .053 and for firms with vice-ministerial 
rank (vice-ministerial rank = 1) the predicted probability of merger is .018, holding all 
other variables at their means. These findings further support the notion that mergers 
among central state-owned enterprises do not occur indiscriminately, nor primarily in 
response to market forces. Instead, they reflect a political design crafted by top-level 
leaders aimed at building a core group of large central state-owned enterprises 
concentrated in strategically important industries.  
Finally, the results presented in Table 4.5 also indicate that mergers of central 
state-owned enterprises are more likely in the post-global financial crisis period. The 
positive and statistically significant relationship between the post-global financial 
crisis period and mergers holds across all of the models. Prior to the global financial 
crisis (before 2008, post-global financial crisis = 0), the predicted probability of 
merger estimated in the full model is .029; following the global financial crisis (2008 
and after, post-global financial crisis = 1), the predicted probability of merger is .068, 
holding all other variables at their means. This finding too is consonant with a top-
level political leadership explanation in which a predominantly political rather than 
economic logic drives mergers among central state-owned enterprises. This appears 
especially the case because China’s massive stimulus package in theory created an 
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economic environment in which central state-owned enterprises could both survive 
and grow larger—through infrastructure spending and easy credit at home and state-
supported mergers and acquisitions abroad—without government-orchestrated 
mergers.361 
 
Robustness Checks 
One might also suggest that the professional backgrounds of central state-owned 
enterprise heads could be related systematically to the likelihood of mergers.362 
Although these individuals do not have authority to decide whether mergers among 
central state-owned enterprises will occur, previous work experience in central 
government may make central state-owned enterprise heads more likely to implement 
the policies or decisions mandated by their administrative superiors. First, those with 
central government work experience may be more sympathetic to central directives 
and therefore more likely to carry them out, instead of seeking to delay or to resist 
them.363 Second, individuals with central government work experience may be more 
likely to carry out mergers because they view them as less of a threat to their 
professional and personal interests than individuals who have spent their entire careers 
                                                
361 The Xi Jinping administration (2012 to present) has justified ongoing mergers among central state-
owned enterprises on economic grounds, by suggesting that mergers are intended to reduce excess 
domestic capacity (in sectors like steel, heavy machinery, and construction) produced by China’s 
stimulus package and slowing domestic growth. However, it remains to be seen whether these mergers 
actually result in significant capacity cuts.    
362 I consider the chairman (董事长, dongshizhang) of a central state-owned enterprise to be its head. If 
a central state-owned enterprise does not have a board of directors, I consider the general manager (总
经理, zongjingli) to be its head. It is possible for a single individual to concurrently hold more than one 
of the top three leadership positions in a central state-owned enterprise: board chairman, general 
manager, and Party secretary.  
363 Central government work experience is a standard measure for assessing officials’ closeness to the 
center and their relative support for central policies. Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls 
in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations during the Reform Era (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Yumin Sheng, Economic Openness and Territorial Politics in 
China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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working in state-owned industry or even a particular state firm. This is because time 
spent working in the central government may enable officials to develop broad 
knowledge and skills across functional areas and to cultivate informal connections at 
the center, both of which constitute important sources of comparative advantage in the 
competition for political promotion. Therefore, I expect that previous work experience 
at the center will increase the likelihood of central state-owned enterprise mergers. 
 To investigate this, I create a new variable measuring whether central state-
owned enterprise heads have worked previously in the central government. For every 
firm-year observation, I first identify the head of each firm during that year and then 
assess whether he had previous work experience in a government or Party organ at the 
center, such as a State Council ministry or a central-level regulatory agency.364 Data 
for this variable comes from an extensive original dataset on the biographical 
attributes of all central state-owned enterprise heads covering the period 2003 to 
2015.365 I compiled this dataset using their official CVs available online and Chinese 
media reports, as well as the Chinese Political Elites Database hosted by National 
Chengchi University.366 I code this variable as 1 if the head of a central state-owned 
enterprise in a given year has previous central government work experience and 0 if he 
does not.367 Out of 1,781 firm-year observations for which data on this variable is 
available, approximately 20% represent central state-owned enterprise heads with 
                                                
364 I do not consider work in research institutes affiliated with ministries to be central government work 
experience. 
365 The dataset also includes information about central state-owned enterprise heads’ previous local 
government work experience, age, highest educational attainment, and graduate degrees in business 
studies. None of these variables has a statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of mergers.   
366 《中共政治精英资料库》[Chinese Political Elites Database], accessible at http://cped.nccu.edu.tw/. 
367 I use a binary measure here in order to maximize the number of observations for estimation, because 
some of the official CVs available online only report biographical data in narrative rather than 
chronological format.   
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previous central government work experience. Re-estimating the full model including 
this variable, I find that the relationship between central state-owned enterprise heads’ 
previous government work experience and the likelihood of mergers is negative and is 
not statistically significant.368 Table 4.6 below summarizes these results. 
                                                
368 Additional research is needed to supplement the information available online in order to gather the 
data necessary to disaggregate the duration of central state-owned enterprise heads’ previous central 
government experience, the specific government bodies where they worked, and the administrative rank 
of their positions. The negative relationship observed may be due to the broad measure of central 
government experienced employed here, whereby any work experience at the center of one year or 
more is treated as equivalent. 
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Table 4.6: Estimation Results for Central State-owned Enterprise Heads’ Previous 
Work Experience at the Center 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Model 5 
Industry strategic importance 
   Low 
0.730* 
(0.344) 
Industry strategic importance 
   High  
1.338** 
(0.316) 
  
SASAC director Li Rongrong 
    
0.054 
(0.391) 
SASAC director Wang Yong 
 
-0.456 
(0.451) 
  
Central state-owned enterprise heads with 
   previous center work experience  
 
-0.471 
(0.354) 
Market competition 
 
-0.423 
(0.346) 
 
Size (medium) -1.300** 
(0.293) 
Size (large) -2.307** 
(0.569) 
Vice-ministerial rank 
 
-1.136* 
(0.549) 
Research institute 
 
-1.126 
(.580) 
Post-global financial crisis 
 
1.208** 
(0.319) 
Constant -2.797** 
(0.519) 
AIC 0.310 
BIC -12,391.168 
Observations 1,743 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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 There could also be a potential interaction effect between central state-owned 
enterprise heads’ previous work experience at the center and SASAC directors’ 
varying emphasis on state-owned asset consolidation during their tenures. The 
predilection of enterprise heads with previous central government work experience to 
implement the policies or decisions mandated by their administrative superiors might 
vary depending on whether their political bosses clearly prioritize a particular course 
of action. The observable implication is that a central state-owned enterprise should be 
even more likely to experience a merger during the tenure of a SASAC director who 
clearly prioritizes asset consolidation (Li Rongrong) and when an individual with 
previous work experience at the center leads it. Conversely, a central state-owned 
enterprise should be even less likely to experience a merger during the tenure of a 
SASAC director who does not clearly prioritize asset consolidation (Wang Yong) and 
when an individual with previous work experience at the center leads it. 
To assess possible interaction effects between central state-owned enterprise 
heads’ previous work experience at the center and SASAC directors’ varying 
emphasis on state-owned asset consolidation during their tenures, I re-estimate the full 
model including an interaction term. I find that the relationship between central state-
owned enterprise heads’ previous government work experience and the likelihood of 
mergers remains positive during the tenure of Mr. Li and negative during the tenure of 
Mr. Wang, consistent with the results of the previous analysis.369 It is not statistically 
significant for either. Table 4.7 below summarizes these results.  
                                                
369 While the relationship between Mr. Li’s tenure and merger likelihood remains positive and that 
between Mr. Wang’s tenure and merger likelihood remains negative, consistent with the results of the 
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Table 4.7: Estimation Results for Central State-owned Enterprise Heads’ Previous 
Work Experience at the Center Interacted with SASAC Directors’ Reform Strategies 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Model 6 
Industry strategic importance 
   Low 
0.734* 
(0.344) 
Industry strategic importance 
   High  
1.335** 
(0.318) 
  
SASAC director Li Rongrong 
    
0.185 
(0.431) 
SASAC director Wang Yong 
 
-0.302 
(0.491) 
  
Central state-owned enterprise heads with 
   previous center work experience during 
   Li Rongrong tenure 
-0.842 
(0.89) 
 
Central state-owned enterprise heads with 
   previous center work experience during 
   Wang Yong tenure 
-1.096 
(1.342) 
 
  
Central state-owned enterprise heads with 
   previous center work experience  
 
0.277 
(0.841) 
Market competition 
 
-0.429 
(0.346) 
 
Size (medium) -1.314** 
(0.291) 
Size (large) -2.303** 
(0.569) 
Vice-ministerial rank 
 
-1.131* 
(0.547) 
Research institute 
 
-1.129 
(0.578) 
Post-global financial crisis 
 
1.213** 
(0.318) 
Constant -2.910** 
(0.541) 
AIC 0.309 
BIC -12,405.222 
Observations 1,743 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
                                                                                                                                       
previous analysis, the relationship between enterprise heads’ previous work experience at the center and 
the likelihood of merger changes from negative to positive when this interaction term is included. 
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 Finally, one might also argue that central state-owned enterprises’ economic 
performance is an important factor affecting their likelihood of experiencing a merger. 
Firms with poor economic performance may be more likely to be merged. Two key 
indicators of state-owned enterprises’ economic performance are percentage of state-
owned asset value preserved (国有资产保值增值率, guoyou zichan baozhi zengzhi lv) 
and operational income (营业收入, yingye shouru). Preservation of state-owned asset 
value refers to whether a central state-owned enterprise has succeeded in maintaining 
or increasing its asset value.370 Losses in state-owned asset value (if the percentage of 
state assets preserved is less than 100%) are a salient indicator of economic 
performance, because although there is no publicly available information on specific 
levels of state-owned asset growth that a state firm must achieve, one can assume that 
losing asset value constitutes a red line. I therefore expect a positive relationship 
between losses in state-owned asset value and mergers. In addition, I expect a negative 
relationship between income and mergers, because SASAC may be less likely to 
restructure state firms that generate higher incomes due to the support they provide to 
the government’s fiscal revenues. 
                                                
370 This indicator is more appropriate than income, profits, or return on assets as an indicator of 
economic performance for state-owned enterprises across industries, because the government has 
different expectations for the performance of state-owned enterprises in different sectors. For example, 
SASAC assesses state-owned utilities by the stability and quality of their service provision, not their 
maximization of profits; indeed, price controls on electricity and oil further underscore the point that 
profit maximization is not these companies’ primary objective. In contrast, SASAC does consider 
profits to assess the performance of state-owned enterprises engaged in trading or investment. For a 
summary of the different performance indicators for Chinese state-owned enterprises operating in 
public versus commercial sectors, see Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State 
Council: 《国有企业改革的指导意见》 [Guiding Opinions on the Reform of State-Owned 
Enterprises], September 13, 2015. 
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I collected data on these economic performance variables but ultimately 
decided they could not be used due to serious concerns about bias and missing data.371 
I gathered data for percentage of state-owned asset value preserved and operational 
income for central state-owned enterprises as a whole using hundreds of pages of 
company-level narrative economic data and statistical tables reported in SASAC’s 
annual yearbooks. The problem of missing data was immediately apparent: for the 
1,901 firm-year observations examined here, income was reported for fewer than half; 
the percentage of assets preserved was reported for just one third. This raises serious 
concerns about data unreliability and bias due to the possibility that missing data is not 
missing at random, but rather reflects deliberate government withholding of data 
showing poor economic performance due to potential public criticism of loss of state-
owned assets. Loss of state-owned assets is a sensitive issue in China because of wide-
spread asset-stripping during state-owned enterprise reform in the 1990s and due to 
the Xi Jinping administration’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign. Close examination 
of the data itself further reinforced concerns about bias: less than 5% of all firm-year 
observations for which data were available indicated asset loss, which seems 
improbably low. Moreover, I discovered that when later years of the SASAC yearbook 
reported performance data for earlier years, the previous years’ data was 
systematically revised upward.372 Audits conducted in 2017 by the Chinese 
                                                
371 First, the possibility that missing data may not be missing at random risked introducing bias into the 
model estimation. Second, the scarcity of available data meant that including these variables in the main 
model estimation would have required dropping between one third to one half of the observations used 
for model estimation due to missing data.  
372 While adjustment of previous years’ data is justifiable, the systematic trend of increase in reported 
performance data is a red flag. 
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government have revealed deliberate falsification of operational revenue, underscoring 
concerns about the reliability of data for this indicator as well.373  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I assessed the effects of political leadership on the likelihood of 
mergers for all central state-owned enterprises between 2003 and 2015. Using logistic 
regression analysis, I evaluated three hypotheses for the incidence of mergers focused 
on top-level political leadership (the national leadership’s official designation of 
industry strategic importance), middle-level political leadership (the extent to which 
SASAC directors’ reform strategies prioritize consolidation of state-owned assets), 
and levels of market competition in domestic industries. I found strong support for the 
top-level political leadership hypothesis but little support for the middle-level political 
leadership and market competition hypotheses. I also found that while mergers are 
more likely in the period after the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, they are 
less likely for larger sized firms and those with vice-ministerial rank.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that a political logic crafted by top 
national leaders is what drove mergers among central state-owned enterprises between 
2003 and 2015—not economic considerations or the political leadership of 
organizational leaders at lower levels. Mergers of central state-owned enterprises 
appear aimed at building a core group of large central state-owned enterprises 
concentrated in strategic sectors of the economy; they do not seem to be an 
                                                
373 According to an investigation by China’s National Audit Office, 18 of the 20 central state-owned 
enterprises audited inflated their revenue by a total of ¥200.16 billion ($29.3 billion) in “recent years.” 
Yu Xi, “SOEs [State-owned Enterprises] Seen Inflating Revenue,” Global Times, June 25, 2017. 
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administrative method used primarily to respond to changing market conditions.374 
The political design that guides mergers originates from decisions made by top 
national leaders regarding the strategic importance of specific industries and of 
particular central state-owned enterprises, the latter of which is reflected in the 
assignment of vice-ministerial rank to a select group of firms. Both SASAC leaders at 
the middle level and central state-owned enterprise heads at the company level seem to 
have less influence to shape economic reform that involves the restructuring of overall 
firms through mergers. 
 These findings imply three possible limits on organizational leaders’ political 
leadership. First, organizational leaders at the central level and below may have 
greatest ability to shape the reform of the organizations that they lead. For example, 
SASAC directors may exercise more influence over the reform of SASAC itself than 
that of the entire portfolio of central state-owned enterprises under its administration. 
Second, this issue also suggests that organizational leaders’ domains of authority may 
shrink as one moves up China’s administrative hierarchy. Not only do top national 
leaders and their administrative superiors in the State Council limit SASAC directors’ 
scope for autonomous influence, so too do the numerous central-level bodies that 
participate in various aspects of the state-owned enterprise reform process, which 
include but are not limited to the Central Organization Department, the National 
Development and Reform Commission, and now also the Central Leading Group 
                                                
374 This argument is consistent with the claims of recent studies about the origins of China’s large state-
owned business groups and the motivations for their development. Sarah Eaton, The Advance of the 
State in Contemporary China: State-Market Relations in the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015); Chen Li, China’s Centralized Industrial Order: Industrial Reform and the Rise 
of Centrally Controlled Big Business (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
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established by the Xi Jinping administration.375 Third, organizational leaders’ ability 
to exercise political leadership in the economic reform process may vary according to 
issue area. For example, SASAC directors may have greater autonomous influence to 
decide technical issues, like the specific measures used to assess state-owned 
enterprise performance, than they do influence major restructuring of state-owned 
assets through mergers. Studies of political leadership must be attentive to 
organization heads’ jurisdictions of influence and how they vary depending on levels 
of administrative hierarchy and/or issue area.376 
Additional data collection and alternative variable specifications could help to 
better isolate and assess the effects of political leadership on merger likelihood relative 
to other factors. For top-level political leadership, further research is essential to 
pinpoint the key individuals within the top national leadership and to evaluate the 
content and consistency of their choices and actions relevant to state-owned enterprise 
mergers over time. In addition, alternative variable specifications could enable more 
fine-grained examination of the impact of central state-owned enterprise heads’ 
previous work experience on merger likelihood. Beyond the simple binary of having 
worked at the center or not, the effects of enterprise heads’ work experience in central 
government may vary depending on its duration, the administrative rank of their 
positions, and the particular government bodies where they worked. It may also be that 
interacting central state-owned enterprise heads’ previous work experience at the 
                                                
375 Barry Naughton, “The Current Wave of State Enterprise Reform in China: A Preliminary 
Appraisal,” Asian Economic Policy Review 12, no. 2 (2017): 282-298.  
376 For example, it would make little sense to study the potential impact of President Xi Jinping’s 
political leadership on variation in the mechanisms for public participation in local budgeting that have 
recently emerged in some Chinese counties. Broad national policies initiated by Xi Jinping might 
encourage the broad goal of participatory governance, but they fall short in accounting for variation in 
the emergence of such governance innovations and their particular organizational forms.  
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center with SASAC directors’ tenures does not adequately capture the dynamics of 
strategic interactions between enterprise heads and their administrative superiors, or 
the political incentives that might affect these strategic interactions. Finally, further 
data collection on the economic performance of central state-owned enterprises’ 
publicly listed subsidiaries offers another possible way to make baseline estimates 
about their overall economic performance. While this approach would also confront 
the challenge of missing data, it would enable the analysis to take enterprise 
performance into account without employing problematic data from SASAC 
yearbooks. 
 In conclusion, this study suggests multiple areas for future research. First, 
while this chapter analyzes variation in the incidence of mergers among central state-
owned enterprises, it does not disaggregate variation in the types of mergers 
themselves. If these mergers indeed reflect an underlying political logic, then more 
fine-grained study of different types of mergers might illuminate some of its key 
features. For example, such analysis could differentiate between mergers between 
small and large firms versus those involving two large firms, or mergers that link firms 
in upstream and downstream industries versus those that involve horizontal industry 
tie-ups. In addition, despite the previous chapter’s contention that domestic reform and 
globalization are increasingly intertwined, an important limitation of this study’s 
analysis is its lack of variables that capture the relative extent of central state-owned 
enterprises’ activity in international markets. This is due not only to the lack of 
publicly available data on central state-owned enterprises’ commercial activities 
overseas, but also because of the difficulty of identifying internationally-oriented 
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variables that would be meaningful for central state-owned enterprises across 
industries.377 Given the growing importance of Chinese state-owned enterprises in 
international markets, this is an important area for future data collection and analysis. 
Finally, additional research is needed to assess whether this study’s findings can be 
extended beyond the population studied here—Chinese central state-owned enterprises 
between 2003 and 2015. For example, future studies could analyze the factors that 
affect the likelihood of mergers among the large body of state-owned enterprises 
owned by governments below the central level.  
                                                
377 For example, the RMB exchange rate may strongly affect those central state-owned enterprises 
heavily involved in exports, trade or investment, but have much less impact on others. Similarly, levels 
of exports or overseas mergers and acquisitions cannot be used to measure the internationalization of 
central state-owned enterprises across industries, because some of the state firms under SASAC’s 
management (for example, research and design institutes) exhibit little activity in these areas. 
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Chapter 5 
Co-evolutionary Analysis of Economic Reform:  
Linking Political Leadership with Organizational and Institutional Change 
 
The institution of state ownership in China has transformed dramatically in its scope, 
function, and orientation since the initiation of market-oriented reforms in 1978.378 
Whereas state ownership was synonymous with the state’s ownership and control of 
assets at the start of the reform era, its scope has now broadened to encompass the 
ownership and control of capital as well as assets. The state has also gradually 
permitted non-state shareholders, including private sector actors, to exercise limited 
ownership and control rights over state-owned assets and capital. State ownership in 
the national economy has declined overall but has also become increasingly 
concentrated in a select group of large industrial conglomerates in sectors deemed 
critical to national development and security. Instead of ascribing strategic importance 
to state ownership as a whole, the government now differentiates among state-owned 
enterprises’ strategic importance based on industry and firm type.379 Finally, state 
                                                
378 I define state ownership as rights of ownership and control over assets and/or equity that are vested 
in the state as opposed to a private sector actor or individual; it is distinct from public ownership 
because these rights are restricted and a government body exercises them. 
379 The Chinese government first officially differentiated the strategic importance assigned to state 
ownership in 1999 by specifying that state ownership should maintain the “dominant position” (支配地
位, zhipei diwei) in “important industries and key areas” (重要行业和关键领域, zhongyao hangye he 
guanjian lingyu)—as well as “backbone enterprises in important industries” (重要产业中的骨干企业, 
zhongyao chanye zhong de gugan qiye). It named three important industries and one key area. In 2006, 
the State Council further differentiated the strategic importance assigned to state ownership by 
enumerating seven industries where the state will keep “absolute control” and nine industries where it 
will maintain “strong influence.” Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: 《中共中央关
于国有企业改革和发展若干重大问题的决定》 [The Decision of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of State-Owned 
Enterprises], September 22, 1999. 《我国明确七大行业将由国有经济保持绝对控制力》 [China 
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ownership’s original orientation toward an internationalizing domestic market has 
expanded to include state-owned enterprises’ engagement in world markets and their 
ownership and control of both assets and capital overseas. What factors explain these 
far-reaching changes in the institution of state ownership in China?  
 One explanation of change in state ownership in China focuses on the 
intertwining of political competition among top national leaders and intellectual 
debate among government-affiliated economists. Indeed, the shifting influence at the 
center of individuals like Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin and others did 
profoundly shape the institution of state ownership. Through their final authority over 
reform policy-making and the initiation and design of pilot programs, they exerted 
important influence on the content, timing, and sequencing of changes in state 
ownership. Also critical were the ideas, writings, and domestic and international 
exchanges carried out by economists like Xue Muqiao, Sun Yefang, Liu Guoguang, 
Dong Furen, Wu Jinglian, Zhao Renwei, Gao Shangquan, Zhou Xiaochuan, Lou Jiwei, 
and myriad others.380 Their intellectual output was a vital input in debates among top 
national leaders and ongoing processes of reform policy-making and experimentation; 
some even went into government themselves.381 Top national leaders and economists 
at the center thus remain the primary institutional architects of state ownership 
according to this explanation.  
                                                                                                                                       
Specifies Seven Major Industries Where the State-owned Economy Will Maintain Absolute Control], 
《上海证券报》 [Shanghai Securities News], December 19, 2006. 
380 Shitao Fan and Isabella Weber, “From Control of the ‘Commanding Heights’ to Control of the 
Whole Economy and Back: Chinese Ownership Theories Since 1949” (forthcoming); Joseph 
Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1994); Julian Gewirtz, Unlikely Partners: Chinese Reformers, Western Economists, and the 
Making of Global China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). 
381 Examples include Xue Muqiao, Liu Guoguang, and Wu Jinglian. 
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 Another explanation extends the premise of “state-led” change downward to 
argue that local governments generate change in state ownership.382 It inverts focus on 
the center as a unitary “owner” in the institution of “state ownership” by suggesting 
that “there potentially are as many owners…as there are government jurisdictions.”383 
While local governments do not operate autonomously of the center, they do drive 
evolution in state ownership by determining the form and pace of institutional change 
in particular localities. Property rights at the local level are thus ultimately constructed 
through processes of interpretation and negotiation that local governments lead.384 
Institutions designed at the center constrain and incentivize local governments; at the 
same time, local governments can act as “institutional entrepreneurs” by creatively 
remaking or repurposing existing institutions.385 Local governments may also close the 
“institutional gaps” necessary for institutional transformation in state ownership to 
occur, through ad-hoc practices that enabled privatization to proceed and maintained 
social stability despite rising unemployment.386 In summary, this explanation suggests 
that local governments—individually and in their interactions with the center—drive 
institutional change. 
                                                
382 Jin Zeng, State-led Privatization in China: The Politics of Economic Reform (Milton Park, NY: 
Routledge, 2013). 
383 Andrew G. Walder, “Local Governments as Industrial Firms: An Organizational Analysis of China's 
Transitional Economy,” American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 2 (1995): 270. 
384 Meg E. Rithmire, Land Bargains and Chinese Capitalism: The Politics of Property Rights under 
Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Adam Segal, Digital Dragon: High-
technology Enterprises in China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
385 Institutional entrepreneurship refers to “activities of actors who have an interest in particular 
institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing 
ones.” Steve Maguire, Cynthia Hardy, and Thomas B. Lawrence, “Institutional Entrepreneurship in 
Emerging Fields: HIV/AIDS Treatment Advocacy in Canada,” Academy of Management Journal 47, no. 
5 (2004): 657. 
386 Jin Zeng and Kellee S. Tsai, “The Local Politics of Restructuring State-owned Enterprises,” Going 
Private in China: The Politics of Corporate Restructuring and System Reform, ed., Jean C. Oi, (Walter 
H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, 2011). 
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 However, these two explanations of change in state ownership lack a dynamic 
organizational dimension. They do not specify the nature of the relationship between 
institutions and organizations—or even distinguish conceptually between them. 
Instead, they frequently portray institutions as somehow separate from organizational 
politics and change: something designed by political elites at the center or refashioned 
by local governments. But institutional change is inseparable from organizational 
change, because the institution of state ownership is embodied in organizations—from 
state-owned companies to development banks to sovereign wealth funds to 
government ownership agencies. Instead of recognizing political leadership as a driver 
of organizational change, these explanations instead attribute variation in 
organizational structures and strategies to resource endowments, institutional legacies 
and incentives, or the external environment. Finally, these explanations fail to fully 
take into account the feedback loops—flows of information and personnel—that link 
not only the center with localities but also organizations at the same level with one 
another. In addition to experimental pilot schemes and the promotion and rotation of 
officials, multiple other forms of formal and informal exchanges function to reinforce 
or to generate change in existing institutions.  
 In this chapter, I introduce a co-evolutionary approach to analyzing economic 
reform that links the micro-level organizational change wrought by political leadership 
with macro-level institutional change. Three specific aspects of co-evolution inspire 
this approach. First, co-evolution’s emphasis on mutual interdependence—and 
ultimately mutual constitution—suggests that institutions change because of changes 
in the behavior and structure of the organizations that constitute them. This diverges 
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from accounts that attribute institutional change to exogenous factors—such as 
economic shocks or regime change—or to endogenous change occurring within a 
single entity and not multiple mutually interdependent ones. Second, its emphasis on 
dynamic linkages—flows of information and personnel—draws attention to the multi-
directionality of influence among actors and the feedback loops that link organizations 
with organizations and organizations with institutions. Rather than viewing institutions 
solely as top-down constraints on organizational and individual behavior, a co-
evolutionary approach shows that changes at—and crucially, originating from—the 
organization level can directly influence the maintenance, modification, or demise of 
existing institutions. Third, a co-evolutionary approach to analyzing economic reform 
underscores processes of experimentation, competition, and selection.387 While 
organizational leaders are the primary agents of experimentation and competition, the 
state influences these processes and ultimately selects winners and losers.  
Political leadership at the organization level is central to co-evolutionary 
analysis of economic reform. Co-evolution does not occur spontaneously or without 
direction. Instead, organizations and institutions co-evolve as organizational leaders 
make choices about whether and how to alter given organizational structures and 
strategies. Through political leadership, heads of organizations mediate how 
institutional incentives and pressures influence their organizations and how their 
organizations respond to changes in the behavior of others. Political leadership also 
                                                
387 In this chapter I focus on experimentation, which includes actors’ reactive changes in response to 
external factors (such as other organizations and their institutional environment) as well as their 
proactive behavior to change that external environment. While I engage research on adaptation, I do not 
use this concept because it privileges the influence of external factors on actors’ behavior. Emphasizing 
the reactive nature of behavior by organizations and their leaders obscures the ways in which they may 
not only respond to—but also proactively seek to shape—other organizations and their institutional 
environments. 
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helps to explain the wide variation possible among the structures and strategies of 
similar organizations in a common institutional environment, or within a single 
organization over time. The organizational change shaped by political leadership at the 
micro-level can generate co-evolution in the particular institutions that organizations 
embody and potentially even the broader institutional environment.388  
 
A Co-evolutionary Approach to Analyzing Economic Reform 
Co-evolutionary analysis draws inspiration from the shared insight of systems theory, 
complexity research, and economic sociology that dynamic interactions among actors 
can generate institutional change. Systems theory emphasizes the importance of 
studying biological and social systems as integrated wholes; it suggests that their 
properties emerge from interactions among the elements of interpenetrating 
systems.389 These systems are characterized by their degrees of complexity (the non-
linear nature of the relationships among their elements, which means that multiple 
solutions can emerge from the same set of inputs); openness (the flows of information, 
energy, and matter linking them with external environments); and capacity for 
adaptation (the ability of their elements to respond to these environments). Although 
biological and social systems alike evolve in open-ended and unpredictable ways, they 
can be stable over long periods of time and exhibit self-regulation.390 From a systems 
                                                
388 An institutional environment refers to a negotiated, emergent, and dynamic constellation of multiple 
institutions. Definition adapted from Lynne G. Zucker, “Institutional Theories of Organization,” Annual 
Review of Sociology 13, no. 1 (1987): 447. 
389 Systems are differentiated through the “self-referential” nature of their operations; at the same time, 
they remain open to and dependent on their external environment, which may also include other 
systems. Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995): 37-41. 
390 Von Bertalanffy 1952 identifies the characteristic properties of systems as “mutual interdependence, 
self-regulation, adaption to disturbances, approach to states of equilibrium….” Ludwig von Bertalanffy, 
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theory perspective, institutions emerge from and change with the patterns of social 
relations that occur within interpenetrating systems. 
However, while systems theory usefully underscores the complexity and 
fundamental unpredictability of economic and political systems, it leaves little space 
for actor-based analysis of institutional change. A strict interpretation of systems 
theory implies that it is both practically and theoretically impossible to isolate the roles 
of discrete actors (such as local governments, enterprises, organizations, or individuals) 
in processes of institutional change. Even applied more loosely, system theory’s 
operational orientation at the system level makes it poorly suited for analyzing the 
sub-system hierarchies of influence among actors that shape system-level processes 
such as selection and the emergence and operation of feedback loops. System theory’s 
emphasis on system-wide dynamics like competition also overlooks a range of actor-
centered political behavior rooted in these hierarchies of influence, from 
accommodation to negotiation to domination.  
Complexity research focuses greater attention on the actors in a particular 
system and their interactions, strategies, and learning. It suggests that institutions 
emerge from patterns of interaction among actors in a system and that they change 
through ongoing, open-ended processes of mutual adaptation shaped by that system’s 
selection criteria.391 Unlike systems theory, complexity research does acknowledge the 
possibility that particular actors, such as central authorities, may exert dominant 
                                                                                                                                       
Problems of Life: An Evaluation of Modern Biological and Scientific Thought (New York: Harper, 
1952): 51-53. 
391 Ang 2016 and Axelrod and Cohen 1999 point out that how success is defined in the selection 
environment of social systems may vary widely, unlike in biological systems where survival and 
reproduction constitute “success.” Yuen Yuen Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2016); Robert M. Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, Harnessing Complexity: 
Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier (New York: Free Press, 1999). 
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influence over others.392 Yet its baseline for analysis remains the emergent attributes 
of the system as a whole and its main focus the effectiveness of particular 
interventions, rather than influential actors’ attributes, motivations, or actual behavior. 
Axelrod and Cohen (1999) describe the aims of complexity theory in the context of 
hierarchies of political influence as “to understand how those dominant influences 
come about, what sustains (or undermines) them, and how local action responds in the 
face of global constraints.”393 Yet this overlooks what influential actors actually do 
with the relative autonomy they enjoy—political leadership—and its effects beyond 
potentially inducing mimicry.394 More broadly, complexity research’s emphasis on the 
dynamics of adaptation ultimately restricts both the possible scope of individual action 
and its consequences. Focusing on adaptation and innovation, both of which involve 
responding to existing—even if newly emergent—ways of doing things, forecloses the 
possibility of genuine novelty, however rare, through truly open-ended processes of 
experimentation and invention.395  
Economic sociology shifts the locus of institutional change from systems to 
discrete, inter-connected networks among organizations and individuals. Seminal 
                                                
392 For example, central authorities or other influential actors may carry out social interventions aimed 
deliberately at altering the interactions among actors within and across particular systems, such as: 
segregation and integration policies, zoning restrictions, immigration rules, and sub-national and 
international educational exchanges or training programs. Axelrod and Cohen (1999): 21. 
393 Ibid: 18. 
394 Axelrod and Cohen 1999 state that actors are likely to copy the visible behavior of leaders, 
especially in periods of uncertainty and rapid change, because leaders set standards, establish norms, 
and their behavior is assumed to embody criteria of success. However, inducing mimicry by peers and 
subordinates is just one possible effect of political leadership. Moreover, in some selection 
environments, differentiation through niche creation—not only mimicry—is ultimately the best strategy 
for success. Ibid: 148-150. 
395 Powell and Padgett 2012 contrast innovation, activities that generate improvements on existing ways 
of doing things, with invention, activities that fundamentally change existing ways of doing things. John 
F. Padgett and Walter W. Powell, “The Problem of Emergence,” John F. Padgett and Walter W. Powell, 
eds., The Emergence of Organizations and Markets (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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work on social embeddedness and its argument that economic transactions occur 
through social relationships does assume some degree of autonomy at the individual 
level.396 However, networks, not the individual actors they comprise, are the primary 
agents of institutional change in economic sociology.397 Economic sociology offers 
important insights into sub-institutional dynamics, such as how networks operate to 
create and regulate norms and to solve problems of trust.398 However, it too pays less 
attention to how intra-organizational politics and hierarchies of influence among 
individuals and among and within organizations shape organizational and institutional 
change. Norms do not constrain all individuals equally; those in positions of influence 
have greater scope for action.399 Moreover, heads of organizations can change 
organizational structure or mediate among competing actors within a network, thereby 
shaping new patterns of organizational and individual behavior, and ultimately 
generating institutional change.  
 Co-evolutionary analysis builds on systems theory, complexity research, and 
economic sociology approaches to studying institutional change. It embraces their 
                                                
396 Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” 
American Journal of Sociology, 91, no. 3 (1985): 481-510. 
397 On networks in economic sociology, see Victor Nee, “The New Institutionalisms in Economics and 
Sociology,” The Handbook of Economic Sociology, eds. Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
398 These studies examine the structure of networks and its effects. Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of 
Capital,” Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. John Richardson (New 
York: Greenwood, 1986): 241-258; James S. Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human 
Capital,” American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988): 95-120; Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner, 
“Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action,” The 
American Journal of Sociology, 98, no. 6 (1993): 1,320-1,350. 
399 The concept of brokerage by actors with bridging ties across “structural holes” and/or exclusive ties 
engages the possibility for particular actors to exercise disproportionate influence or even to change 
market structure; however these studies focus primarily on questions of information flows, transaction 
costs, and organizational structure, not intra-organizational politics. Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes: 
The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Neil Fligstein, 
The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
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process orientation and the idea that institutions are inseparable from the activities of 
actors at all levels. However, it takes organizations and even individual actors—not 
systems or networks—as the key units of analysis in institutional continuity and 
change. Three specific aspects of co-evolution provide the building blocks for a co-
evolutionary approach to analyzing economic reform. First, co-evolution underscores 
the mutual interdependence—and ultimately mutual constitution—of institutions and 
organizations. Not only can change in institutions during economic reform impact how 
organizations are structured and behave, change in organizational structure and 
behavior can also generate corresponding change in institutions. Second, co-evolution 
underscores the dynamic linkages—flows of information and personnel—among 
actors that can generate change in organizations and institutions alike. These dynamic 
linkages provide the potential for multi-directional influence and can also generate 
feedback loops that function to reinforce or alter existing institutions. Third, co-
evolution highlights both the dynamics of experimentation, competition, and selection, 
as well as the hierarchies of political influence that are central to interlinked processes 
of organizational and institutional change. In the following sections, I discuss these 
three elements of co-evolutionary analysis and then explain how political leadership is 
integral to each.  
The first element in a co-evolutionary approach to analyzing economic reform 
is the mutual interdependence of institutions and organizations. In the context of 
economic reform, this suggests that we should think of institutions such as state 
ownership as embodied in and shaping the behavior of organizations—like state-
owned enterprises and government ownership agencies—but also as simultaneously 
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being affected by changes in the structure and behavior of these organizations. 
Institutions function to constrain and guide both individual and organizational actors’ 
behavior in important ways: by shaping their relationships, defining their positions in 
those relationships, and guiding interaction among them by providing shared sets of 
meanings as the basis for their own behavior and for interpreting the behavior of 
others.400 Institutional environments can also constrain the repertoire of possible 
organizational forms through processes of coercion, mimicry, and normative 
pressure.401 But institutions do not determine organizational actors’ behavior, and they 
are also subject to influence by it.402 As Paul Ingram (1998) writes: “Since institutions 
determine the opportunities and incentives that determine outcomes for actors, and 
because institutions are humanly devised, we should expect actors to try to influence 
institutions.”403 In some cases, this process of influence occurs through deliberate 
negotiation among multiple actors.404 In other cases, it takes the form of uncoordinated 
                                                
400 Neil Fligstein, “Social Skill and Institutional Theory,” American Behavioral Scientist 40, (1997): 
397-405.  
401 Constraint on organizational repertoires can arise through these institutional channels and through 
competition, as organizations with non-optimal forms and behaviors are eliminated. Paul DiMaggio and 
Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Collective Rationality and Institutional Isomorphism in 
Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review 48, no. 2 (1983): 147-160. 
402 Even Hannan and Freeman 1977, who focus primarily on the process of selection by which 
organizations with non-optimal forms and behaviors are eliminated, acknowledge that organizational 
decision-makers’ response to their external environments—not only the conditions of those 
environments themselves—can determine survival. Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, “The 
Population Ecology of Organizations,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 5 (1977): 930. 
403 Ingram 1998 shows how hotel organizations in the United States—in particular a coalition of 
presidents of large hotel chains—changed institutions related to training and education in the hospitality 
industry. He concludes: “Ultimately, institutional dynamics cannot be separated from organizational 
dynamics.” Paul Ingram, “Changing the Rules: Interests, Organizations, and Institutional Change in the 
U.S. Hospitality Industry,” Institutionalism in Sociology, eds., Mary Brinton and Victor Nee (Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1998): 258, 273-274. 
404 For instance, Rithmire 2015 argues that political bargaining between local governments and state 
bodies and social groups generates variation in property rights institutions at the local level in China. 
Rithmire 2015: 20.  
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strategic behavior by a group of actors.405 In still other cases, actors may 
unintentionally create institutional variation and change.406 No matter whether actors 
set out to modify existing institutions or trigger a series of unintended effects through 
their behavior, they can still generate what Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott (1998) term 
“direct effects”: “a partial transformation of that institutional environment (though not 
necessarily as anticipated) and altering the course of its temporal unfolding (however 
marginally).”407  
 Second, a co-evolutionary approach to analyzing economic reform underscores 
the dynamic linkages that connect actors and generate organizational and institutional 
continuity as well as change. These dynamic linkages consist of information and 
personnel flows among individuals and organizations. As individuals move from one 
organization to another, they bring a particular set of knowledge, skills, and relational 
protocols into the new environments in which they are “transposed.”408 At the same 
                                                
405 For example, Nee and Opper 2012 describe how private entrepreneurs in China during the 1990s 
exploited the creation of new legal categories for corporate organization, such as state-owned business 
groups, limited liability corporations, and joint stock companies. Private entrepreneurs strategically 
registered their companies as limited liability corporations to gain the legitimacy necessary to survive in 
China’s fledgling markets, since this organizational form also included state-owned enterprises. In 
doing so, they aided the emergence of capitalist market institutions and a private enterprise economy. 
See Chapter 5, “Legitimacy and Organizational Change,” Victor Nee and Sonja Opper, Capitalism from 
Below: Markets and Institutional Change in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
See also David Daokui Li, Junxin Feng, and Hongping Jiang, “Institutional Entrepreneurs,” The 
American Economic Review 96, no. 2 (2006): 358-362. 
406 For example, Saxenian 1994 describes how former Stanford University president Frederick 
Terman’s view of the university as a “community of technical scholars” prompted him to establish the 
Stanford Research Institute, Stanford Industrial Park, and the Honors Cooperative Program. This 
created new linkages between academia and industry and ultimately contributed to the development of a 
distinct regional economy in California’s Silicon Valley. Annalee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: 
Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1994). 
407 Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, “Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism,” Political 
Studies 46 (1998): 956.  
408 For further discussion of the concept of transposition and its consequences specifically for changes 
in organizational structure, see John F. Padgett, “Transposition and Refunctionality: The Birth of 
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time, heads of organizations constantly make choices about whether to maintain or 
alter existing organizational strategies and structures in response to the behavior and 
structure of other organizations and to the institutional environments in which they 
operate. Dynamic linkages connecting actors with one another and their institutional 
environments matter because they create the potential for multi-directional influence. 
Each actor has the capacity to influence others and its institutional environment, 
although in practice capacity for influence varies widely. Finally, these dynamic 
linkages can give rise to feedback loops.409 While these feedback loops can sustain 
and enforce existing institutions, they can also spread alternative ideas and practices 
with the potential for ultimately transformative effects.410  
 Third, a co-evolutionary approach to analyzing economic reform highlights 
processes of experimentation, competition, and selection. The central state as well as 
organizations and their leaders participate in each of these processes. The center may 
seek to influence the aims and scope of experimentation, for example by delineating 
its goals, carrying out pilot programs, and selecting model organizations and 
disseminating successful experiences. At the same time, heads of organizations 
formulate and choose among multiple possible ways to alter organizational strategies 
and structures in response to central reform goals. They may also engage in 
                                                                                                                                       
Partnership Systems in Renaissance Florence,” The Emergence of Organizations and Markets, eds., 
John F. Padgett and Walter W. Powell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
409 A feedback loop is a pathway by which some of the output of a particular situation becomes new 
input, generating a cyclical flow that ultimately produces either more or less of the same effect. 
410 As Saxenian and Lee 2007 write: “…When it comes to a set of rules, standards, norms and 
conventions that are to be reproduced and improvised by daily practices, then, through the orchestration 
of strategic purposes and deliberate actions, microevents and occurrences may lead to structural 
changes that start off a new path of development.” Chuan-Kai Lee and Annalee Saxenian, “Coevolution 
and Coordination: A Systemic Analysis of the Taiwanese Information Technology Industry,” Journal of 
Economic Geography, 8, no. 2 (2007): 159. 
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experimentation outside the bounds of the center’s directives, especially in situations 
of high ambiguity or uncertainty about the goals of reform and its methods. In addition, 
co-evolutionary analysis of economic reform underscores how competition among 
actors occurs in multiple selection environments—both economic and political. 
Individuals compete for political promotion not only by steering their organizations to 
perform well relative to others, but also through differentiating themselves from their 
peers and predecessors. The center mediates this competition among actors; however, 
it is not an impartial referee that defines the criteria of success for this competition and 
then steps back until winners appear. Certain organizations and their heads may gain 
disproportionate political and material support based on their personal connections or 
if their approaches accord with the preferred policy agenda of particular political 
elites.411 Finally, the center selects the winners and losers of competition and rewards 
individuals and organizations with political and/or material benefits.  
Political leadership is integral to all three elements of co-evolutionary analysis. 
First, it lies at the heart of the mutual interdependence of institutions and organizations. 
Institutions exert important influence on organizations and their heads, but they do not 
control them. Organizational leaders still possess bounded autonomy to exercise 
political leadership through choosing whether and how to maintain or to modify 
existing organizational strategies and structures. The organizational change fashioned 
by their political leadership can in turn generate corresponding change in the 
institutions that their organizations constitute. Individual and organizational actors 
                                                
411 Hongbin Cai and Daniel Treisman, “Did Government Decentralization Cause China’s Economic 
Miracle?” World Politics 58, no. 4 (2006): 505-535. 
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may generate institutional change either unintentionally or deliberately through 
individual or collective efforts to alter institutions to their benefit.  
Political leadership is also crucial in the dynamic linkages—flows of 
information and personnel—that provide the potential for multi-directional influence 
and generate feedback loops that reinforce or alter existing institutions. Heads of 
organizations make choices about the content, amount, and veracity of the information 
that they share with peers and superiors through both formal and informal channels. 
They also decide whether and how to respond to and use the information they receive. 
If the center disseminates information about a model enterprise, for instance, other 
enterprise heads must assess its appropriateness and lessons for their own organization, 
weigh the costs and benefits of altering their own organizational strategies and 
structure in line with the model (either superficially or substantively), decide whether 
to do so or not, and finally determine how to act based on that decision.  
Finally, political leadership is fundamental to processes of experimentation, 
competition, and selection. Experimentation itself is in significant part the exercise of 
political leadership, as heads of organizations formulate and choose among multiple 
possible ways to alter organizational strategies and structures in response to central 
reform goals and lead their subordinates to carry them out. Furthermore, political 
leadership is not only a method of seeking to deliver performance gains, it is also a 
means by which heads of organizations attempt to differentiate themselves from both 
their peers and predecessors in order to stand out for political promotion. The state’s 
selection of winners and losers—organizations and individuals alike—thus turns not 
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only on organizational outcomes (performance) and personal ties (connectedness) but 
also on how well organization heads succeed in political product differentiation. 
 
Political Leadership: The Missing Factor  
A growing body of research in political economy employs the concept of co-evolution 
to analyze interlinked processes of organizational and institutional change.412 From 
dye companies and national institutions in Germany, to national champions and 
developmental states in East Asia, to local governments and market institutions in 
China, this diverse literature advances a common argument that change in 
organizations and institutions is deeply intertwined. But what drives and mediates 
their co-evolution? Co-evolution of institutions and organizations does not occur 
spontaneously or without direction. I argue that political leadership at the organization 
level is an important factor driving and mediating this process. This section of the 
chapter first reviews three key works applying the concept of co-evolution to study 
organizational and institutional change. It then analyzes each of these works to show 
how political leadership is integral to the co-evolutionary processes they posit.  
                                                
412 Early studies examining the co-evolution of institutions and organizations include Clemens 1993 and 
Haveman and Rao 1997. Clemens 1993 shows how women in the United States during the Progressive 
Era altered the structures and strategies of the existing organizational form of women’s groups to imbue 
them with new political purpose. This organizational change was both impacted by and in turn drove an 
institutional shift in American democracy in which party voting declined and interest group politics 
became more prominent. Haveman and Rao 1997 show how institutional definitions, rules, and 
expectations changed in tandem with organizational structures and processes in the thrift industry 
during the same era. Elisabeth S. Clemens, “Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: 
Women’s Groups and the Transformation of U.S. Politics, 1890-1920,” American Journal of 
Sociology (1993): 755-798; Heather A. Haveman and Hayagreeva Rao, “Structuring a Theory of Moral 
Sentiments: Institutional and Organizational Coevolution in the Early Thrift Industry,” American 
Journal of Sociology 102 (1997): 1,606-1,651. 
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  In an influential early study, Johann Peter Murmann (2003) argues that 
German dye companies actively shaped national institutions in Germany during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, just as national institutions shaped these firms’ 
development.413 Murmann analyzes two processes of co-evolution: between German 
industry and the university system, and between German dye firms and domestic law. 
Latecomers to global chemicals markets, German firms confronted shortages of 
trained personnel, limited resources for scientific research and development, and 
limited legal protections for their technological innovations. However, personnel 
exchanges and the formation of commercial ties drew German universities and dye 
firms closer, ultimately yielding a coalition of industrialists, academics, and 
government officials. This coalition reshaped national educational institutions by 
lobbying successfully for greater policy and financial support for research and training 
relevant to the dye industry.414 In addition, German dye firms advocated for changes in 
German patent laws that would favor domestic firms, thereby giving them a 
competitive advantage in the protection of new technologies and incentivizing further 
technological development. By deliberately altering their selection environment, 
German dye firms catalyzed a positive feedback loop that ultimately enabled them to 
become global industry leaders.  
Henry Wai-chung Yeung (2016) presents a novel analysis of industrial 
transformation and the developmental state in East Asia with both evolutionary and 
                                                
413 Johann Peter Murmann, Knowledge and Competitive Advantage: The Coevolution of Firms, 
Technology, and National Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See especially 
Chapter 4, “The Co-evolution of National Industries and Institutions.” 
414 Murmann 2003: 211-213. 
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co-evolutionary elements.415 Yeung concurs that developmental states in South Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan played crucial “midwifery” and “husbandry” functions by first 
establishing and supporting strategic industries and national champions during the 
early stages of their development.416 As these national firms expanded into 
international markets, they became increasingly embedded in global production 
networks and began to engage in “strategic coupling” with leading global firms. 
Yeung argues that these partnerships with extra-national actors have transformed 
national firms, thereby also prompting the co-evolution of East Asian states. In these 
“post-developmental states,” the state’s developmental functions are less important 
and today’s national champions—made stronger and less reliant on the state through 
“strategic coupling”—are part of a far more diverse group of capitalist firms.417 
Yuen Yuen Ang (2016) focuses on reform-era China to argue that economic 
development is a co-evolutionary process in which states and markets mutually 
adapt.418 States and markets co-evolve in an incremental, iterative process as 
bureaucratic agents, especially at the local level, use existing weak institutions to build 
markets that then reinforce those institutions.419 Ang describes how the center fosters 
an adaptive, bottom-up search for solutions through “directed improvisation.” In this 
process, the center aims to influence, but not control, local officials by: setting broad 
reform goals that authorize yet guide policy localization; defining and rewarding 
                                                
415 Henry Wai-chung Yeung, Strategic Coupling: East Asian Industrial Transformation in the New 
Global Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016). 
416 Peter B. Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995). 
417 Yeung 2016: 40.  
418 Yuen Yuen Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016). 
419 Ang divides bureaucratic agents into two groups: “elite bureaucrats” (the approximately 500,000 
officials with county-level administrative rank and above) and “regular bureaucrats” (a grouping she 
estimates in the tens of millions). Her account focuses on the former. Ang 2016: 65-66.  
209 
bureaucratic success through the Chinese Communist Party’s cadre management 
system; and encouraging officials to engage in exchanges with other localities. In 
response, local officials drive experimentation and generate variation by determining 
specifically how to implement (or not to implement) the center’s policy directives in 
particular localities and at particular points in time.  
 Political leadership at the organization level plays a key but underappreciated 
role in the co-evolutionary processes in every one of these works. While Murmann 
discusses organizational leaders in industry and government, he fails to highlight the 
critical role of their political leadership. Yet a closer read suggests that the co-
evolutionary development of German dye companies and national institutions would 
have been impossible without it. For example, one might argue that Friedrich Althoff, 
a top government official in the education ministry in Prussia, created the conditions 
for this co-evolution by prioritizing scientific research and training in German 
academia and curtailing universities’ autonomy to appoint faculty.420 These actions 
doubly amplified the dye industry’s political influence. The political leadership of 
Henry Bottinger, head of leading German dye firm Bayer Cooperation, was also 
critical in this co-evolutionary process. Mr. Bottinger was instrumental in gaining state 
support for the dye industry by mobilizing collective associations like the German 
Chemical Industry Corporation and through his own direct lobbying of government 
officials as a member of Parliament.421 These examples suggest that political 
leadership was indispensable in creating the flows of information and personnel that 
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resulted in mutual influence and change; feedback loops between national institutions 
and dye firms would not have arisen on their own. 
Political leadership also plays a central role in Yeung’s analysis of “strategic 
coupling” between East Asian national champions and leading global multinationals. 
In Yeung’s account, “transnational technopreneurs” establish and mediate the 
networks through which national champions partner with global multinationals and 
transform themselves in the process, prompting simultaneous co-evolution between 
national champions and developmental states. But these transnational technopreneurs 
are more than just interchangeable “relational bridges” that catalyze and facilitate 
novel network ties among firms.422 First, transnational technopreneurs must decide 
whether to prioritize strategic couplings, and if so, then which to engage in. Take for 
example the case study of Venture Manufacturing Singapore, led by Ngit Liong Wong 
as chairman and chief executive officer since 1986. Yeung describes how no one 
client accounted for more than 10% of Venture’s revenue in 1993, but by 2005 more 
than 80% of its revenue came from 12 clients, including Hewlett Packard with a share 
of 25%.423 Not only did Mr. Wong’s strategy for Venture’s development prioritize the 
establishment of strategic partnerships, as Yeung describes: “Venture has been careful 
and selective in partnering with specific global lead firms.”424 In addition, 
transnational technopreneurs make choices about how to alter the structures of their 
organizations throughout the course of the couplings. For example, Yueng describes 
how Mr. Wong led Venture to improve its design, manufacturing and service delivery 
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capacities through new technology alliances with suppliers and other high-tech firms 
in order to fulfill the specific needs of its strategic partner firms like Hewlett-
Packard.425 In short, organization heads determine how to respond to and to utilize the 
new resources and opportunities (such as technology and markets) that both 
developmental states and these strategic couplings create.  
Finally, Ang’s argument about the co-evolution of markets and institutions in 
reform era China is persuasive but incomplete without consideration of political 
leadership. Take for example the case study of “Forest Hill,” a city in Fujian 
province.426 After improving regional transportation links through a flurry of 
infrastructure construction in the late 1990s, “Forest Hill” proceeded to aggressively 
court capital and investments through personal networks in order to grow the economy, 
and then finally pursued improvements in the quality of growth by fostering economic 
specialization and technological upgrading. Ang distills the developmental trajectory 
of “Forest Hill” to illustrate her thesis on the co-evolution of institutions and markets: 
weak institutions are harnessed to build markets, emerging markets stimulate strong 
institutions, and strong institutions preserve markets.  
However, a political leadership argument, using Ang’s own field research data, 
can also explain the developmental trajectory of “Forest Hill.” The locality’s early 
push for infrastructure development can be attributed to Party secretary Chen, 
described as “The Builder,” who formulated a development strategy prioritizing 
infrastructure expansion and won approval for construction of a new regional railway 
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after lobbying the center for years.427 The city’s subsequent shift to emphasize capital 
and investment attraction was inseparable from the later efforts of ambitious new 
mayor and subsequent Party secretary Yang, described as “The Recruiter.” Ang 
recounts: “Whipping the beehive campaign into turbo mode, he set a goal of attracting 
one hundred investment projects every year at each of the three stages of planning, 
negotiation, and execution.”428 The next mayor, Mayor Lin, continued these efforts 
while placing new emphasis on the concept of “quality” and “development” instead of 
merely economic growth. Ang emphasizes that Mayor Lin’s first work report was 
“significant because it underlined a turning point: the need to pursue quantity and 
quality of growth at the same time.”429 In Ang’s case study, both the transitions from 
one stage of development to the next and the specific priorities of particular 
developmental stages coincide identically with the leadership terms of top local 
officials. This suggests that political leadership at the organization level drives and 
shapes the co-evolution of markets and institutions; it does not occur spontaneously or 
without direction.   
 
Linking Organizational with Institutional Change 
How then does the organizational change wrought by political leadership at the micro-
level influence institutional change at the macro-level? At least four mechanisms link 
organizational and institutional change in China’s state-owned economy: 1.) political 
                                                
427 Ibid: 173. 
428 The “beehive campaign” refers to local Chinese officials’ innovative method of attracting capital and 
investments in which all of a locality’s agencies, regardless of formal function, are mobilized to recruit 
investors using any means at their disposal. Ang 2016: 174. 
429 Ibid: 176. 
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promotion of organizational leaders to the center; 2.) the center’s selection of an 
organization as a model; 3.) formal diffusion of organizational experiences through 
meetings and publications; and 4.) informal sharing of organizational experiences.430 
These mechanisms create feedback loops among organizations through the circulation 
of personnel and information. Organization heads who are promoted can exercise 
influence in new organizational settings based on their previous organizational 
experiences. Formal diffusion and informal sharing of organizational experiences of 
reform may promote emulation and learning as organization heads interact with other 
organizations and their leaders and/or study their experiences. These feedback loops 
function to maintain institutions if the organizational structures and strategies enacted 
or shared are consonant with existing institutions. Conversely, if they differ from 
existing institutions, then these flows of personnel and information act to gradually 
alter existing institutions.  
Political leadership drives the operation of these mechanisms and feedback 
loops. As heads of organizations compete for promotion, they choose whether and 
how to maintain or modify the strategies and structures of the organizations they lead 
in response to both external factors (such as the institutional environment, the behavior 
of other organizations, or market competition) and internal factors (such as the 
situations of their own organizations or the political leadership of their predecessors). 
Political leadership is also an important factor generating the variation in 
organizational experiences that the state recognizes via political promotion of 
                                                
430 These mechanisms are discussed separately here for the sake of clarity; however, they may overlap 
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organization heads or model selection. It also shapes the extent to which organizations 
alter their structures and behavior by emulating and learning from a particular model. 
Political leadership is inseparable from the organizational experiences that constitute 
the raw material that the center formally disseminates through organized meetings and 
publications; in some cases the ideas and experiences of particular leaders are even 
their main focus.  
The center serves important selection and bridging functions in these 
mechanisms and feedback loops. It serves a selection function by initiating and 
mediating flows of information and personnel. For example, the center decides which 
individuals are to be promoted or which organizations are to be recognized and put 
forward as models. The center also serves a bridging function—made possible by state 
agencies’ disparate capacity for control and influence over subordinate actors—by 
facilitating the flows of personnel and information among organizations at various 
levels of the administrative hierarchy. This is essential to overcome the multiple 
barriers to such exchanges taking place: geography, organization heads’ prioritization 
of other activities, their reluctance to share information or exchange personnel with 
potential competitors, and differences in administrative rank that differentiate the 
political activities and influence of organization heads.431 However, the degree of state 
control and influence varies among the four mechanisms examined here. It is high for 
personnel promotion and model selection, medium for the sharing of organizational 
                                                
431 Administrative rank confers important political privileges, including access to documents of varying 
grades of classification, invitations to meetings for officials of a certain rank, and the opportunity to 
participate in study groups and further training at the Central Party School of the Communist Party of 
China. Wendy Leutert, “Challenges Ahead in China’s Reform of State-owned Enterprises,” Asia Policy 
no. 21 (National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016): 87. 
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experiences through meetings, publications, and information reporting and low for the 
exchange of organizational experiences informally within industries and among peer 
groups. In the following sections, I outline the four mechanisms and illustrate them 
with empirical examples.  
 
Mechanism 1: Political Promotion of Organizational Leaders to the Center 
The first mechanism linking organizational with institutional change is the political 
promotion of organizational leaders to the center. These individuals may then reshape 
institutions through reform policy-making, designing and assessing national-level 
pilots, policy research, and public and private advocacy. While a large body of 
research has examined the political promotion of provincial and municipal leaders to 
central-level positions, scholars have paid less attention to the political mobility of 
officials in the state-owned economy.432 Multiple possible aims motivate the 
promotion of state-owned enterprise heads to central-level positions. For example, 
state-owned enterprise heads may be appointed to regulatory or ministerial positions 
requiring specific industry or technical expertise in the sectors in which they worked 
previously. For those not yet approaching retirement age, appointment to the center 
may reflect the Central Organization Department’s intention to broaden their 
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experience beyond state-owned industry as part of a grooming process for continued 
political advancement. For others, promotion to the center reflects recognition of 
lifetime career success and may be their final stop before retirement.433  
The example of Chen Qingtai (陈清泰), former head of the Second Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturing Plant (第二汽车制造厂, di er qiche zhizao chang, hereafter 
referred to as Second Motor), shows how political promotion of organizational leaders 
can create broader institutional change. Mr. Chen, an automotive engineer by training, 
entered Second Motor in 1970 and rose through the ranks to serve as its chairman and 
general manager between 1984 and 1992. China’s leaders originally planned Second 
Motor to be part of the defensive Third Front launched during the Mao era, 
establishing it in a remote and hilly area of Hubei province.434 Subsequent efforts to 
develop locally autonomous production during the Cultural Revolution under the 
slogan of “large and complete, small and complete” (大而全，小而全, da er quan, 
xiao er quan) left the Chinese automobile industry highly fragmented and dispersed. 
Second Motor, like other large state-owned industrial enterprises, faced the challenge 
of developing economies of scale and competitive advantage.435 The center put 
                                                
433 Wendy Leutert, “The Political Mobility of China’s Central State-owned Enterprise Leaders,” The 
China Quarterly (forthcoming). 
434 The Third Front was a massive infrastructure project that Mao Zedong launched in 1964 to 
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217 
Second Motor directly under the central plan in 1984, thereby enhancing Mr. Chen’s 
autonomy to exercise political leadership at the organization level.436 
Second Motor sought to realize multiple central objectives under Mr. Chen’s 
leadership. First, Second Motor needed to successfully implement the contract 
responsibility system, which the enterprise introduced in 1982.437 However, Second 
Motor confronted serious development challenges because of its remote location and 
growing competition from more established industry competitors. To succeed, Second 
Motor needed to expand its production and product offerings by developing horizontal 
alliances with local producers within and beyond Hubei province. Second Motor also 
faced additional pressure to develop these horizontal alliances because the center 
viewed them as unofficial early experimentation in what it would ultimately formalize 
as state-owned enterprise groups with national-level pilots in 1991. 
 Mr. Chen’s assumption of leadership in 1984 coincided with overheating of 
the national economy and the emergence of serious organizational problems after 
Second Motor’s early implementation of the contract responsibility system.438 He 
                                                
436 This meant that the central State Planning Commission exercised administrative authority over 
Second Motor, not the local government. As Thun 2006 writes: “The result was the enviable position of 
having significant independence in decision-making … and a great deal of leverage at the central level.” 
Eric Thun, Changing Lanes in China: Foreign Direct Investment, Local Governments, and Auto Sector 
Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 187.  
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Second Motor’s contract details, see Byrd 1992: 387-388. 
438 While Second Motor continued to meet its contractual obligations, Mr. Chen describes how product 
quality began to deteriorate and overinvestment and even illegal sales occurred as subordinate 
production units prioritized expanding production and short-term material gain over product quality 
improvements and the company’s long-term interests. 陈清泰 [Chen Qingtai]:《一盘未下完的好棋》 
[A Board of Good Pieces that Are Not Yet Entirely Played Out]，陈清泰 [Chen Qingtai]:《汽车产业
和汽车社会：一个汽车人的思考》 [The Automobile Industry and Automobile Society: Reflections 
of an Automobile Person] (Beijing: Zhongxin chubanshe, 2014). This part of the book is an excerpt 
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proposed a strategy of “shrinking the battle line” (缩短战线, suoduan zhanxian) to 
recentralize internal authority for decision-making and investment, and he initiated 
Second Motor’s gradual restructuring into a new three-level organizational 
structure.439 Together, these moves enabled Second Motor to successfully implement 
the contract system while also simultaneously integrating an increasing number of 
local producers across a greater geographic area.440 In addition, Mr. Chen announced 
that Second Motor must become a “operations and development company” (经营开发
型企业, jingying kaifaxing qiye). This strategy comprised multiple elements: continual 
technological upgrading, development of new product offerings, and management 
training.441 Mr. Chen described it as a broader effort to reorient Second Motor from 
being a producer in a planned economy in which the scale of production was first and 
foremost, to being a modern company in a market economy in which consumers’ 
demand for product variety and quality took precedence.442 In addition to developing a 
new three-level organizational structure, Mr. Chen also altered Second Motor’s 
organizational structure in other ways. For example, he set up “three major centers” 
                                                                                                                                       
from a 7 hour oral history interview conducted by reporters from 《汽车商业评论》 [Auto Business 
Review] on September 27, 2011.  
439 The first level was the company headquarters, which would function as the center for company 
finances, strategy, and investment decision-making; the second level was the various divisions, like the 
procurement and sales departments, responsible for carrying out investment according to the plans of 
company headquarters and collecting profits and transmitting them up to headquarters; the third level 
was production units, responsible for production and quality and cost control in accordance with the 
plans of company headquarters. Chen 2011: 216.     
440 In 1981, Dongfeng Motors [Second Motor’s subsidiary corporation with which it would ultimately 
merge] integrated production by firms in eight provinces; by 1987 this number increased to 24 
provinces. Byrd 1992: 410-411.  
441 For example, Mr. Chen invited European experts from the China Europe International Business 
School Training Center as well as Chinese economists including Wu Jinglian, Zhou Xiaochuan, Guo 
Shuqing, Luo Jiwei, and Jiang Yiwei to visit Second Motor and give trainings on topics such as stock 
shareholding system reforms. Chen 2011: 205. 
442 Ibid: 202. 
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(三大中心, san da zhongxin) at headquarters: the Technology Development Center, 
the Technical Equipment Center, and the Education Center.443 He also led Second 
Motor to make a “three-direction leap” (三极跳, san ji tiao) by establishing new 
production and management centers in three locations at successively further distances 
from headquarters.444  
 Mr. Chen’s record of economic success at Second Motor prompted the Central 
Organization Department to promote him to the center in 1992 to serve as deputy 
director of the State Economic and Trade Commission under Zhu Rongji. Mr. Chen’s 
promotion put him in a position to influence the institutional evolution of state 
ownership through reform policy-making, designing and assessing national-level 
pilots, policy research, and public and private advocacy. For example, he played a key 
role in reform policymaking through his work preparing the pivotal Third Plenum 
report “Decision on the Establishment of Socialist Market Economy” in 1993.445 As 
deputy director of the State Economic and Trade Commission, he moved from leading 
experimentation at the company level as the head of Second Motor to designing and 
assessing national-level pilots for enterprise reforms.446 He strongly advocated 
shareholding system restructuring and the development of corporate governance, even 
during the mid-1990s when there was a conservative backlash against partial 
                                                
443 Ibid: 212.  
444 These three locations were Xiangfan City in Hubei province, Wuhan in Hubei province, and 
Huizhou City in Guangdong province. Chen 2011: 212-213. 
445 During the preparation of this report, Mr. Chen was the head of the investigation group (调查组, 
diaocha zu), consisting of more than 100 people; his suggestions directly influenced the writing by the 
drafting group (起草组, qicao zu). Interview with drafting group member, Beijing, June 2016. 
446 For example, Mr. Chen led the State Economic and Trade Commission’s efforts to carry out the 
1994 national-level experimental scheme on developing a modern enterprise system. The State 
Economic and Trade Commission was responsible for assessing 70 out of the 100 pilot enterprises; the 
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privatization of state-owned enterprises and the Chinese government had not yet 
equated the modern enterprise system with corporate governance.447 In 1998, Mr. 
Chen became the Party secretary and vice-director of the Development Research 
Center of the State Council, where he assumed full ministerial rank and responsibility 
for policy research. Since then he has continued to advocate publicly and privately in 
support of market-oriented reforms, in particular corporate governance development 
and the need to transition from the state’s management of assets to the state’s 
management of capital.448  
While Mr. Chen did not single-handedly redefine the institution of state 
ownership, the successful development that he led Second Motor to achieve prompted 
his promotion and enhanced his influence at the center to advocate for market-oriented 
enterprise reform policies. The experience of Second Motor under Mr. Chen’s 
leadership showed how a single state-owned enterprise might pass through multiple 
organizational forms during the process of corporatization, thereby helping to 
legitimate the idea that state ownership could be embodied in multiple different 
organizational forms at the firm level. This idea enabled first the development of 
wholly state-owned industrial state-owned enterprise groups—which Second Motor 
spearheaded with its wide network of horizontal economic alliances—and then the 
partial privatization of large industrial state-owned enterprises through restructuring as 
                                                
447 See Chapter 2 for detailed discussion of these two issues.  
448 陈清泰 [Chen Qingtai]:《董事长不是“一把手”》 [The Chairman is Not the “Number One Hand”], 
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shareholding companies and public listing—which Second Motor too pioneered as the 
first central state-owned enterprises to experiment with this reform.449 
 
Mechanism 2: Selection of an Organization as a Model 
The second mechanism linking organizational with institutional change is the center’s 
selection of a particular organization as a successful model for wide-scale emulation. 
The Communist Party of China (CCP) has long employed models to influence 
individual and organizational behavior, by recognizing and elevating specific 
examples of success for broader emulation.450 Models include individuals, like the 
mythologized worker Lei Feng, enterprises, like industrial pioneer Daqing Oil Field, 
and localities, like Dazhai village and Ganzhou city.451 Models can influence 
institutional change in a particular direction by promoting the widespread adoption of 
particular forms of organizational structure and behavior, thereby narrowing the space 
for organizational leaders to formulate divergent strategies or to alter the structures of 
their organizations in alternative ways. 
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Reform Era,” Civic Discourse, Civil Society, and Chinese Communities, eds., Randy Kluver and John H. 
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The example of state-owned enterprise Capital Iron and Steel Corporation (首
都钢铁公司, Shoudu gangtie gongsi, hereafter referred to as Shougang) illustrates 
how political leadership and organizational change can ultimately influence 
institutional change through model designation. Founded in 1918 in the outskirts of 
Beijing, Shougang ultimately became one of the largest national steel companies in 
China and in the world.452 The company reached the peak of its influence in 1992 
when Deng Xiaoping publicly toured Shougang and it became the first enterprise in 
China permitted to open and own a national commercial bank.453 The development of 
Shougang is inseparable from the political leadership of Zhou Guanwu (周冠五), who 
served as its Party secretary between 1959 and 1995 and its chairman between 1983 
and 1995. Born in the same year as Shougang’s founding, Mr. Zhou participated in the 
military resistance to Japanese occupation and the CCP’s struggle for power during 
the Chinese Civil War. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
he joined the newly-established Shijingshan Iron and Steel Plant (石景山钢铁厂, 
Shijingshan gangtie chang—what would later become Shougang) in 1950 and worked 
there for nearly five decades until he retired in 1995. Mr. Zhou enjoyed personal ties 
and the trust of Deng Xiaoping, with whom he had fought during the Chinese Civil 
War, enhancing his existing autonomy for organizational-level experimentation.454  
                                                
452 By 1993, Shougang had become the 18th largest steel producer in the world and the largest company 
in China by total profits. Peter Nolan: Indigenous Large Firms in China’s Economic Reform: The Case 
of Shougang Iron and Steel Corporation (London: Contemporary China Institute, School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University of London, 1998): 20-21.  
453 Nicholas R. Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998): 67-69. 
454 While Mr. Zhou’s close relationship with Deng Xiaoping prompted Shougang to be caught up in a 
backlash against Deng’s reform policies during the late 1990s, including the arrest of Mr. Zhou’s son 
Zhou Beifang on corruption charges in 1995, there is little evidence to suggest that he was a proxy of 
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Mr. Zhou’s political leadership was decisive in Shougang’s successful 
implementation of the contract responsibility system.455 He led Shougang to sign its 
groundbreaking 15 year contract with the Beijing municipal government in 1982.456 
As Edward Steinfeld (1998) writes: “From the start, Zhou ensured that his name 
would become synonymous with Shougang and with the Shougang contract. He 
openly advocated this particular brand of reform in the years leading up to 1982 and, 
in a sense, staked his reputation and his career on its success.”457 During the 
implementation process, Mr. Zhou exercised political leadership by determining the 
specific strategies by which to increase the company’s production output and 
profitability.458 He emphasized that the contract responsibility system comprised both 
external relationships of responsibility—between the enterprise and the whole people 
(who formally owned state-owned enterprises)—and internal relationships of 
responsibility—among all the levels and areas inside the enterprise itself.459 
                                                                                                                                       
external political superiors at any time during his leadership tenure. For a rebuttal of suggestions that 
Shougang was “Deng’s firm” and that Deng was a close patron of Zhou, see Edward S. Steinfeld, 
Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-owned Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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see John Hassard, Jackie Sheehan, and Jonathan Morris, “Enterprise Reform in Post-Deng China: Part 
A: The Fall of the Contract Responsibility System,” International Studies of Management & 
Organization 29, no. 3 (1999): 65-68.  
455 Shougang’s early experimentation with the economic responsibility system occurred between 1979 
and 1981. During that time Shougang was a pilot enterprise for expanding enterprise autonomy reforms 
and it signed annual contracts with the Beijing municipal government. 
456 The contract required Shougang to increase the profits it remitted to the state by 6% every year from 
the baseline of the profits remitted in 1981 (the State Council increased this amount to 7.2% after the 
first year of the contract). Shougang was to spend 60% of retained profits on company development, 
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457 Steinfeld 1998: 179. 
458 Here I discuss key examples of main strategies for Shougang’s implementation of the contract 
responsibility system; this is not an exhaustive list.  
459 周冠五 [Zhou Guanwu]:《论承包制》[On the Contract Responsibility System] and 周冠五 [Zhou 
Guanwu]:《适应现代化大生产的需要，加强思想作风教育，建立企业内部承包制》 [Meeting the 
Needs of Large-Scale Modern Production], both published in  中共北京市委宣传部 [Beijing 
Municipal Party Committee Propaganda Department]，北京市思想政治工作研究会 [Beijing Political 
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Accordingly, he proposed a strategy of “contracting, guaranteeing, assessing” (包, 保, 
核, bao, bao, he) involving comprehensive contracting down to the individual level; 
coordination among work units, departments, and positions; and strict assessment.460 
He called for implementing the contract responsibility system and modernizing 
management by managing every project according to five principles: completeness, 
standards, time limits, cooperation, and assessment.461 Mr. Zhou also emphasized the 
integration of production and operations through “simultaneously grasping production, 
sales, distribution, and receipt” (产、销、运、收一把抓, chan, xiao, yun, shou yi ba 
zhua) in order to proactively coordinate and adjust Shougang’s operations in response 
to market factors, instead of the old system of taking orders from administrative 
superiors and reporting back up to them.462 He also changed the company’s 
organizational structure. He cut the number of vice-managers at the top levels of 
management while simultaneously increasing the number of assistants.463 He 
aggressively demoted or removed managers who failed to meet performance targets 
                                                                                                                                       
and Ideological Work Society]，首都钢铁公司 [Shougang Corporation]: 《首钢改革》 [Reform of 
Shougang], vol. 3 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1992). 
460 周冠五 [Zhou Guanwu]: 《首钢改革十年》 [Shougang: Ten Years of Reform], in 首钢研究与开
发公司 [Shougang Research and Development Company]: 《首钢承包制试点中的制度和政策》 
[The Institutions and Policies of Shougang during Its Contract Responsibility System Experimentation] 
(Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1989): 1-18.  
461 Shougang Research and Development Company 1989: 377. 
462 Mr. Zhou achieved this through employee organizing and communication initiatives such as 
introducing the “three discussions” (regular daily meetings at 8 o’clock, 1 o’clock and 5 o’clock) and 
publication of an internal newsletter, the 《情况通报》 [Circumstances Bulletin] to disseminate 
company matters. 冶金工业部 [Ministry of Metallurgical Industry], 中共首钢委员会 [Central 
Shougang Committee]: 《首钢实行经济责任制的经验》 [Shougang’s Experience Implementing the 
Economic Responsibility System] (Beijing: Beijing ribao chubanshe, 1982): 82, 344. 
463 Steinfeld 1998: 204. 
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across the firm.464 These changes to the company’s organizational structure were more 
than efforts to incentivize performance; they show a deliberate attempt to streamline 
management structure and thereby bolster the hierarchical exercise of authority. 
Shougang achieved impressive improvements in performance during its 
implementation of the contract responsibility system. Profits increased by 20% per 
year on average between 1978 and 1985 and by 18% per year on average between 
1985 and 1990.465 While Mr. Zhou’s political leadership was not the only reason for 
Shougang’s successful implementation of the contract responsibility system, it was a 
critical factor.466 As Peter Nolan (1998) concludes in his study about Shougang: 
“Analyses of Shougang have focused almost exclusively on the expanded autonomy 
given to Shougang as the explanation of its exceptional growth under the contract 
system. This monograph has argued that a relatively high degree of autonomy 
compared to other state enterprises is not a sufficient explanation. Many other 
enterprises adopted the ‘Shougang system,’ but few were as successful as 
Shougang. … A distinctive feature of Shougang’s growth was the central role for 
industrial entrepreneurship [of Zhou Guanwu].”467The Beijing municipal government 
                                                
464 Between 1983-1984, more than 200 leading managers were removed from their posts. Between 1978 
and 1990, 678 of Shougang workers at or above the level of plant and division management were 
demoted (643) or dismissed (35). Nolan 1998: 54. 
465 Beijing Municipal Party Committee Propaganda Department et al, vol. 2, 1992: 70, 90    
466 Other important factors in Shougang’s success were high levels of employee mobilization and 
productivity, steadily increasing demand for steel in China’s construction industry, and continued price 
controls on inputs and energy. One might also argue that the center selected firms with experienced 
management and strong performance for reform experimentation. However, this factor does not explain 
Shougang’s particular success, because these conditions were also present for other pilot enterprises. 
Another factor that may have contributed to Shougang’s successful implementation of the contract 
responsibility system was its earlier experience with operational autonomy during the Second Five-Year 
Plan (1958-1962), in which Shougang was responsible for budgeting, choosing equipment, and 
selecting suppliers. However, this experience, while important, was decades removed from the 
economic and political realities that Shougang and its leadership faced in the 1980s. See Nolan 1998: 26. 
467 Ibid: 75. 
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advanced a similar thesis in a 1982 report on the lessons of Shougang: “The Shougang 
experience is rich in content, comprehensive and detailed, with many things worthy of 
study. But the most fundamental experience remains the revolutionary spirit of 
fighting of the leadership, guiding the correct thinking, and adhering to taking 
improved economic efficiency as the center to lead production and the organization of 
production. If you do not study the Shougang experience from here, then you cannot 
grasp the important lessons of the Shougang experience, and you will not be able to 
truly learn the Shougang experience.”468 And despite Mr. Zhou’s careful emphasis on 
workers’ contributions and democratic decision-making at Shougang, he too argued 
that leadership determined not only the success of an enterprise, but also the economic 
development of a country. In an internal lecture in 1987, Mr. Zhou stated: “If 
enterprise is not successful, not managed well, can the economy of a country improve? 
This is impossible. Therefore, getting enterprises to do well, especially large and 
medium state-owned enterprises, truly impacts the questions of the consolidation of 
socialist institutions and the rise and fall of nations….”469 
Mr. Zhou’s success in pioneering the contract responsibility system at 
Shougang resulted in the emergence and official recognition of the “Shougang model” 
in 1982.470 In that year, both Zhao Ziyang and Chen Yun praised the enterprise’s 
                                                
468 Ministry of Metallurgical Industry and Central Shougang Committee 1982: 229. 
469 周冠五 [Zhou Guanwu] 《工业企业的组织管理法——1987年在首钢厂矿长培训班的讲课稿》 
[Organization and Management of Industrial Enterprises—1987 Shougang Factory Head Training Class 
Lecture Notes] in Ministry of Metallurgical Industry and Central Shougang Committee 1982: 439. 
470 Feng Baoxing describes the Shougang model as comprising six elements: profit retention after 
meeting contract quotas; use of retained funds for development over consumption; linking the wage bill 
to annual profits; the right to market output; the long-term nature of its contract; and contracting 
involving all actors in the firm. 冯宝兴 [Feng Baoxing], 《论 “首钢模式”》[On the “Shougang 
Model”],《经济纵横》 [Economic Review] 12 (1991): 47-51. 
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success.471 Reformists and conservatives alike embraced Shougang’s approach 
because it offered the prospect of improving enterprise performance and thereby 
stabilizing the government’s fiscal revenues. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, 
State Council leaders, the State Planning Commission, the State Economic 
Restructuring Commission, the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, the National 
People’s Congress, and the Beijing municipal government urged state-owned 
enterprises to “study the experience of Shougang and improve economic results” (学
习首钢经验，提高经济效应, xuexi shougang jingyan, tigao jingji xiaoying).472 
Higher-level government authorities sent inspectors to Shougang and printed and 
disseminated booklets on Shougang’s reform experience, as did Shougang itself. The 
Beijing city government sent government officials and heads of enterprises to 
Shougang to learn from its experience on site and also required work units to organize 
                                                
471 Both Zhao Ziyang and Chen Yun endorsed Shougang but for different reasons. Zhao Ziyang’s 
primary concern was the stabilization of fiscal revenues, whereas Chen Yun focused on the 
management of planning within enterprises. 赵紫阳 [Zhao Ziyang],《首钢 1982年进一步完善经济责
任制的设想》 [Shougang 1982: Ideas on Further Improving the Economic Responsibility System]; 房
维中 [Fang Weizhong], 《十三年纪事》 [Thirteen Years Chronicle] (Beijing: Zhongguo jihua 
chubanshe, 2013): 338. 
472 《首钢的承包是成功的——全国人大部分常委、委员到首钢考察》 [Shougang’s Contract Is 
Successful—Some National People’s Congress Standing Committee Members and Members Inspect 
Shougang], June 1991;《主人翁精神和科学技术相结合就能超过资本主义——国家计委各部门领
导同志到首钢考察》 [The Combination of Master Spirit and Science and Technology Can Surpass 
Capitalism—Some Leading Comrades of Economic Planning Commission Inspect Shougang], June 
1991; 《你们的成绩证明了工人阶级最有力量和智慧——国家体改委部分领导同志到首钢考察》  
[Your Achievements Prove the Working Class Has Most Strength and Wisdom—Some Leading 
Comrades of State Economic Restructuring Commission Inspect Shougang], June 1991; 《一条迅速发
展钢铁工业的新路子——冶金部部分领导同志到首钢考察》 [A New Path to the Rapid 
Development of the Steel Industry—Some Leading Colleagues of Ministry of Metallurgy Inspect 
Shougang], May 1991; 《希望首钢百尺竿头更进一步——北京市部分领导同志到首钢考察》 
[Wishing that Shougang Advances Further—Some Leading Comrades of Beijing Municipal 
Government Inspect Shougang], May 1991; all published in Beijing Municipal Party Committee 
Propaganda Department et al, vol. 1, 1992: 173-179. 
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internal study groups on Shougang’s experience.473 Delegations from competitors like 
Anshan Steel and provinces as far away as Guangdong and Ningxia traveled to 
Shougang to study its successful experience.474 The influence of the Shougang model 
reached its peak in 1992, when Deng Xiaoping toured the company on May 22. 
However, the shortcomings of the contract responsibility system were becoming 
increasingly evident: the problems of moral hazard and soft budget constraint persisted, 
state-owned enterprises’ information asymmetry meant that many contracts ended up 
being highly favorable to enterprises, and there was no progress toward the 
development of a uniform tax system. In 1993, the Third Plenum quietly abandoned 
the contract responsibility system, and few would again mention the Shougang model 
as the example for state-owned enterprise reform.  
Both the rise and fall of the Shougang model under Zhou Guanwu’s leadership 
influenced the institutional evolution of state ownership. By making Shougang an 
official model, the center legitimated and affirmed the limited extension of authority 
for economic decision-making and resource allocation to enterprises and their 
leaders—together with responsibility for enterprise profits or losses. Shougang’s 
success in delivering sustained economic gains during a multi-year contract period 
also provided political support for advocates of nationwide expansion of the contract 
                                                
473 Ministry of Metallurgical Industry and Central Shougang Committee 1982: 227. 
474 《首钢创造了具有普遍意义的经验——广东省考察团评论首钢》 [Shougang Created an 
Experience with Universal Meaning—Guangdong Province Investigation Delegation Assesses 
Shougang], January 1991;《让首钢经验在内蒙古大地开花结果——内蒙古自治区考察团评论首
钢》 [Let the Shougang Experience Greatly Flourish in Inner Mongolia—Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region Investigation Delegation Assesses Shougang], February 1991;《首钢经验深刻丰富——鞍钢
考察团评论首钢》 [The Shougang Experience is Profoundly Fruitful—Anshan Iron and Steel 
Corporation Assesses Shougang], March 1991; all published in Beijing Municipal Party Committee 
Propaganda Department et al, vol. 1, 1992: 180-183. 
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responsibility system.475 With the formal abandonment of the contract responsibility 
system in 1993, Shougang’s financial decline and ultimate collapse in 1995, and Mr. 
Zhou’s forced retirement that year, the decline of the Shougang model also influenced 
institutional change in state ownership.476 This was because the crux of the Shougang 
model that Zhou Guanwu pioneered was the idea that state-owned enterprises could 
succeed economically without privatization if the right incentives were in place. As 
Shougang and other state-owned enterprises began to struggle economically during the 
late 1990s, it prompted the Chinese leadership to consider partial privatization through 
share issuance as an alternative reform approach. The subsequent embrace of partial 
privatization would ultimately transform the institution of state ownership from the 
state’s ownership of capital as well as assets.     
 
Mechanism 3: Formal Sharing of Organizational Experiences through Meetings and 
Publications 
The third mechanism linking organizational and institutional change is the formal 
exchange and diffusion of organizational experiences of reform through meetings and 
publications. The Chinese government employs a variety of methods to recognize, 
legitimate, discuss, and diffuse organizational experiences of reform. These methods 
include in-person meetings within organizations, such as study groups (学习班, 
xuexiban), using standardized content provided by administrative superiors and/or 
content created by organizations themselves. They also include in-person meetings 
                                                
475 Prominent advocates of the contact responsibility system included CCP General Secretary Hu 
Yaobang, Vice-Premier Wan Li, Vice-Director of the State Economic Commission Yuan Baohua, and 
economist Li Yining. 
476 For a detailed account of Shougang’s financial collapse, see Steinfeld 1998: 207-219. 
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across organizations, such as forums (座谈会, zuotanhui), in which an invited speaker 
or speaker shares his opinions and organizational experiences. Another type of such 
in-person gatherings includes discussion meetings (研讨会, yantaohui) or experience 
sharing meetings (经验交流会, jingyan jiaoliuhui) in which multiple participants 
discuss their views and organizational experiences. Formal exchanges across 
organizations can also occur on a more limited scale, for example through the 
exchange of visits (互访, hu fang) by individuals holding the same position across 
localities or in a particular industry to discuss the situations of their organizations. 
Finally, formal sharing of organizational experiences also occurs through the regular 
Party school trainings that Chinese officials are required to attend; these trainings too 
may include both Chinese and international participants.477  
Government agencies also seek to formally share organizational experiences 
and political leadership approaches—of organizations tapped as key models for study 
as well as those simply considered successful—through publications.478 They publish 
profiles of particular organizations’ reform approaches and their results and distribute 
them to other enterprises, government bodies, and even the general public. The content 
of these publications varies in nature. It may be a record of a previous meeting, for 
example a compendium of reports and content originally presented at an earlier 
                                                
477 For example, in 2013 the China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong (CELAP), a Party school in 
Shanghai, organized a week-long training session for 100 business leaders, including the heads of 
China’s 53 core central state-owned enterprises, 15 Chinese financial sector representatives, 22 heads of 
private Chinese firms, and eight international representatives ranging from Deutsche Bank to Pepsi to 
Dow Chemicals and Proctor and Gamble. Interview with CELAP representative, Shanghai, July 2016. 
478 Government publications on organizational experiences range in length and focus, from simply a 
chapter in a longer work or a short feature in an internal journal, to entire works presenting multiple 
organizational case studies, to book-length treatments pairing profiles of single organizations and 
leaders with relevant laws and regulations.  
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discussion meeting (交流会文集, jiaoliuhui wenji). It may also be a profile drafted 
from materials shared by an organization and its leader and/or gathered through visits 
to the organization by an external inspection delegation (考察团, kaochatuan). In still 
other cases, government agencies feature the experiences of organizations and their 
leaders as parts of “how-to” publications like guidance manuals (指南手册, zhinan 
shouce). These publications use the experiences of specific organizations and their 
heads to show the steps to implement particular reforms set out in relevant laws and 
speeches by top leaders (which are often also included for reference).479  
The government’s efforts to diffuse organizational experiences through 
meetings and publications may be followed by additional informational reporting or 
inspections. Through this informational reporting—which may be mandatory, 
encouraged, or optional—organizations and their leaders share feedback and evidence 
that they have at a minimum engaged with the content disseminated and at a 
maximum altered either the behavior or structure of their organizations as a result. In 
                                                
479 Examples of such guidance manuals featuring company profiles include: State Economic and Trade 
Commission (Enterprise Reform Division), ed.:《企业股份制改组运作指南》 [Enterprise 
Shareholding System Reform Operational Guidance Manual] (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2000); State 
Economic Restructuring Commission (Production System Division), ed.: 《企业股份制改造与资产重
组方案》 [Enterprise Shareholding System Reform and Asset Restructuring Plans] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
shangye chubanshe, 1997); State Economic and Trade Commission (Enterprise Division): 《建立现代
企业制度试点工作手册》 [Establishing a Modern Enterprise System Pilot Work Handbook] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1996). The State Economic and Trade Commission also published specific 
guidance manuals on particular enterprises, like Xuji Corporation [许继集团] in Henan province and 
Yaxing Corporation [亚星集团] in Shandong province, as successful examples of state-owned 
enterprise reform and disseminated them to local economic and trade commissions. These works 
include speeches, interviews, and reports by their heads—Wang Jinian (王纪年) and Chen Hualin (陈
华森), respectively—about the two enterprises’ strategies and organizational structure. State Economic 
and Trade Commission (Enterprise Reform Division), ed.: 《机制创新与三项制度改革：许继经验指
导手册》 [Mechanism Innovation and Three Institutional Reforms: Xuji Experience Guidance Manual] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 2001); State Economic and Trade Commission (Enterprise 
Reform Division), ed.: 《企业物资采购管理暨推广亚星经验指导手册》 [Enterprise Materials 
Procurement Management: Promoting the Yaxing Experience – Guidance Manual] (Beijing: State 
Economic and Trade Commission, 1999). 
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some cases, administrative superiors may require organizations to formally report (汇
报, huibao) the percentage of their subordinate units or employees who have 
organized and/or attended study groups on a particular topic. In other cases, 
organizational leaders will proactively show evidence that they have paid attention to 
the content disseminated and/or made corresponding efforts within their own 
organizations. For example, a state-owned enterprise leader may send a delegation to 
inspect a model enterprise and then write up a short report summarizing its visit and 
impressions, or he may describe efforts to alter organizational behavior and structure 
corresponding to the model and its positive results.480 Administrative superiors may 
also dispatch representatives to carry out follow-up inspections (考察, kaocha) to 
assess the progress of particular organizations and their leaders and to update the 
center’s previous judgments about the desirability of a particular reform approach.  
These flows of personnel and information create feedback loops that reinforce 
or modify existing institutions by affirming and amplifying the effect of particular 
organizational experiences. Regular information reporting and inspections drive a 
feedback loop between the center and subordinate organizations. This is an iterative 
process in which the center affirms or modifies institutional direction based on 
organizational experience. Flows of personnel and information through in-person 
exchanges and publications also generate a feedback loop among organizations. If the 
behavior and structure of an organization designated as a successful example is 
                                                
480 For example, the State Economic and Trade Commission’s guidance manual on the “Yaxing 
experience” includes reports by heads of other state-owned enterprises about their efforts studying 
Yaxing and the subsequent effects on their operations. See State Economic and Trade Commission 
1999: 188-270.  
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consonant with that of other organizations and existing institutions, then other 
organization heads are likely to cite this example to justify their current organizational 
structure and behavior and broader institutional change is unlikely. Conversely, if the 
political leadership of a particular leader and the behavior and structure of his 
organization represent a new type of organizational structure or behavior that differs 
from other organization heads’ current practice or what they had previously 
interpreted as permissible according to existing institutions, then they may seek to 
modify the structures and behavior of their own organizations as a result. Aggregative 
substantive change across organizations can ultimately generate broader institutional 
change. However, emulation and learning may also be limited or superficial, in which 
case significant change to current organizational behavior and structure or to existing 
institutions is unlikely.481  
 
Mechanism 4: Informal Sharing of Organizational Experiences  
The fourth and final mechanism linking organizational and institutional change is 
informal sharing of organizational experiences. This may occur among peer groups of 
organizational leaders as well as between heads of organizations and their 
administrative superiors. Informal sharing of organizational experiences typically 
occurs within peer groups of organizational leaders: those who serve in similar official 
positions both within and across industries and regions. Heads of organizations in the 
same industry or locality have the most opportunities to share organizational 
experiences informally, for example on the sidelines of industry association meetings 
                                                
481 Emulation and learning may also have limited organizational and institutional impact if a model is 
designated for only a limited number of organizations to study or if it falls from favor after a short time.  
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or through locally-based personal networks. Chinese officials also have opportunities 
to get to know their peers in different industries and localities, for example through the 
experience discussion meetings and Party school trainings discussed above. Networks 
originally created for the purpose of exchanging information specific to a given 
industry, locality, or group of officials at particular times can come to serve an 
alternative purpose of broader, long-term informal information exchange.482 In 
addition, informal sharing of organizational experiences does not just occur among 
Chinese officials serving in similar positions, it also occurs between Chinese officials 
and their international counterparts, whom they get to know through meetings in 
China or through international conferences and trainings. Finally, sharing of 
organizational experiences also occurs through informal communications between 
heads of organizations and their administrative superiors, for example between central 
state-owned enterprises and SASAC officials. Information shared through these 
informal channels also generates feedback loops, and it is especially valuable because 
information shared informally is likely to be more candid—including discussion of 
missteps and failures as well as successes.  
 Informal sharing of organizational experiences occurs in numerous forms. In-
person methods through which heads of organizations share information informally 
range from exchanges on the sidelines of official meetings or Party school trainings to 
conversations with their counterparts or superiors over meals or at other social 
gatherings. Informal sharing of organizational experiences also takes place through 
                                                
482 For example, Coleman 1988 describes how study circles of South Korean youth from the same 
hometown, church, or high school provided the unit of social organization for later radical student 
activism in universities. Networks created for one purpose may be appropriated for another once formed. 
Coleman 1988. 
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more indirect avenues such as telephone conversations (still a communications staple 
in Chinese officialdom), emails, and now even virtual chats through the Chinese social 
messaging platforms QQ and WeChat.483  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I outlined a co-evolutionary approach to analyzing economic reform 
linking the micro-level organizational change fashioned by political leadership with 
macro-level institutional change. Co-evolutionary analysis has three core elements. 
The first element is the mutual interdependence—and ultimately mutual constitution—
of institutions and organizations. The second element is dynamic linkages—flows of 
information and personnel—that generate potential for multi-directional influence 
among actors as well as feedback loops linking organizations with one another and 
with institutions. The third element is processes of experimentation, competition, and 
selection through which organizations and their leaders interact with one another—
including with their administrative superiors in the central government—and in doing 
so either maintain or modify existing institutions.  
Political leadership is integral to all three of these elements of co-evolutionary 
analysis. First, organizational leaders mediate the influence of institutions on 
organizations by exercising political leadership—choosing whether and how to 
maintain or to modify existing organizational strategies and structures—in response to 
                                                
483 For example, some local officials in Gansu province and in the municipality of Chongqing are now 
using WeChat groups to exchange information and experiences. 中国新闻网 [China News Network] 
《“微信问政”: 天水清水县乡镇领导干部微信工作群速写》 [“WeChat Governance”: Tianshui and 
Qingshui Counties Township Leading Officials WeChat Work Group Sketches], May 16, 2016; 李薇帆 
[Li Weifan], 《重庆日报》 [Chongqing Daily], 《县领导微信群每天交流心得》 [County Officials 
Exchange Experiences Every Day in WeChat Group], June 7, 2014. 
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institutional pressures and incentives. At the same time, the organizational continuity 
or change wrought by their political leadership serves either to reinforce existing 
institutions or to generate institutional change. Second, political leadership plays a 
critical role in the dynamic linkages—flows of information and personnel—that 
provide the potential for multi-directional influence and can generate feedback loops. 
Organizational leaders determine the content, amount, and veracity of the information 
they share with other peers and superiors through formal and informal channels. They 
also decide whether and how to respond to and use the information they receive from 
others. Finally, political leadership is central to processes of experimentation, 
competition, and selection. Experimentation itself is in important part the exercise of 
political leadership. As organizational leaders compete with one another in both 
economic and political selection environments, political leadership is both a method of 
seeking to deliver performance gains and a means by which to differentiate oneself 
politically. The center’s selection of “winners” and “losers” among individuals and 
organizations is based on organizational performance as well as how well 
organizational leaders distinguish themselves from their peers and predecessors. 
     Political leadership, this chapter has argued, is a critically important factor in 
co-evolutionary scholarship in political economy. Political leadership drives and 
mediates the co-evolution of organizations and institutions; co-evolution does not 
occur spontaneously or without direction. Heads of organizations mediate how 
institutional incentives and pressures influence the structure and behavior of their 
organizations through their exercise of political leadership. In addition, political 
leadership provides an explanation for why and how organizations act proactively in a 
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variety of different ways to affect change in other organizations and in institutions. 
However, heads of organizations cannot act however they wish. External factors, such 
as the institutional environment and the behavior of other organizations, and internal 
factors, such as resource endowments and configurations of influence among intra-
organizational actors, may constrain their exercise of political leadership.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion: 
Political Leadership in the State-owned Economy and Beyond 
 
Analysis of China’s economic reform often implicitly adopts top-down or bottom-up 
perspectives. A top-down perspective emphasizes the central leadership’s choices 
about economic policies, institutions, organizational forms, and resource allocations, 
while a bottom-up perspective highlights local actors’ on-the-ground adaptation to 
changing external conditions in a decentralized context. These two perspectives draw 
attention to different sets of actors: top national elites and intellectuals at the center 
versus local officials, enterprises, and non-governmental organizations. They also 
entail different assumptions about the nature of economic reform and how it actually 
occurs. A top-down perspective suggests that economic reform is an adaptive yet 
deliberate and controlled effort, in which the center guides subordinate actors to grope 
for particular stones to cross the river. In contrast, bottom-up perspectives contend that 
economic reform is an emergent process that results from attempts by disparate actors 
to swim across by any means possible.  
The political leadership approach proposed in this study expands these 
perspectives in three main ways. First, it examines a different set of actors—the heads 
of public sector organizations—to underscore both the individual agency and the intra-
organizational dynamics involved in economic reform. Hidden from scholarly view in 
closed and often complex organizational worlds, heads of public sector entities in 
China are part of the state bureaucracy charged with realizing the center’s reform 
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goals, but they still possess bounded autonomy to determine how precisely to act—or 
not—within the limitations imposed by particular organizational and institutional 
settings. In the state-owned economy, for example, China’s leaders have sought 
throughout the reform era to retain state ownership of a select number of enterprises 
while transforming them from struggling bureaucratic entities into profitable and 
globally competitive corporations. I show that heads of central state-owned enterprises 
faced with the same broad central goals can shape the reform process by modifying 
organizational strategies and structures in divergent ways. The center may direct 
organization heads toward certain stones in the river, but these individuals must still 
make decisions about how to get there, whether to search for other stones instead 
along the way, or whether to swim somewhere else entirely.  
Second, a political leadership approach advances a dynamic, multi-leveled 
account of economic reform. It begins by showing how individual organization heads 
can shape economic reform by making choices within constraints about the strategies 
and structures of the organizations they lead. This exercise of political leadership 
generates the potential for multi-directional influence. The center might attempt to 
initiate and control the operation of feedback loops through methods such as personnel 
appointment, design of experimental pilots, or selection of particular model units for 
widespread emulation. However, the center does not ultimately control the decisions 
that individual leaders make within particular organizations and which also shape how 
those organizations are structured and behave. The concepts of “directed 
improvisation” and “guarded improvisation” aptly capture the dynamic nature of these 
interactions between center/local and state/non-state actors within vertical hierarchies 
240 
of influence.484 A political leadership approach enriches these concepts by explicitly 
linking individual, organizational, and institutional levels of analysis.  
Third, a political leadership approach addresses a missing factor in co-
evolutionary analysis of economic reform. Beginning with the idea that institutions 
and organizations are mutually interdependent, it links the micro-level organizational 
change fashioned by individual leaders with macro-level institutional continuity and 
change. I identify four interrelated mechanisms through which political leadership and 
organizational change can generate institutional change in China’s state-owned 
economy: political promotion of organizational leaders who redefine existing 
institutions; the center’s selection of a particular organization as a model for wide-
scale emulation; government-directed diffusion of successful experiences through 
means such as discussion meetings and publications; and informal sharing of 
successful and unsuccessful experiences between organizations and the center and 
among organizations themselves through information reporting and informal 
communications.485  
                                                
484 Yuen Yuen Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016); 
Maria Repnikova, Media Politics in China: Improvising Power under Authoritarianism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
485 I illustrate the mechanism of political promotion with the case of Chen Qingtai’s political leadership 
at Second Motor and his subsequent promotion to the State Council, where he subsequently shaped the 
institution of state ownership through policy-making, design and assessment of national-level pilot 
programs, policy research, and public and private advocacy for market-oriented reforms. For the 
mechanism of model selection, I discuss how the rise and fall of the “Shougang model” for 
implementation of the contract responsibility system under Zhou Guanwu’s leadership influenced the 
institution of state ownership in two ways: 1.) by affirming early enterprise autonomy for economic 
decision-making and responsibility for enterprise profits or losses; 2.) by ultimately demonstrating that 
state-owned enterprises could not reverse their struggling performance just by changing firm-level 
incentives alone. 
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In this concluding chapter, I summarize the study’s main findings, discuss its 
limitations and areas for future research, and outline its broader implications for 
analysis of China’s politics and economy.    
 
Summary of the Study 
In the introductory chapter, I present the study’s two interrelated research questions. 
What explains change in organizations during the process of economic reform in 
China, both over time and across units? What factors explain changes in the institution 
of state ownership in China? I argue that political leadership is an under-theorized 
factor that can help to explain these interconnected processes of organizational and 
institutional change. I situate a political leadership approach relative to two broad 
competing perspectives on economic reform—the top-down, ‘strategic design’ and 
bottom-up, ‘organic transformation’ accounts described above—and describe how 
they fall short in answering these two questions. I introduce the types of leaders in the 
state-owned economy that the study examines and explain that I focus on economic 
reform in the state sector in China because its share of both the domestic and global 
economy is not only large but still growing.  
 Economic reform in China comprises not only the extension of decision-
making authority away from the state toward markets but also the government-
directed restructuring of state-owned assets. To assess variation in economic reform 
across units in China’s state-owned economy, I therefore take the incidence of 
mergers among central state-owned enterprises as a key indicator. To evaluate 
economic reform within units over time in China’s state-owned economy, I focus on 
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changes in levels of marketization in three areas: expansion efforts in international 
markets, shifts in influence among market-oriented and administrative entities within 
the firm, and how these entities conceptualize their relationship with international 
markets.  
 In Chapter 1, I outline a political leadership approach to studying economic 
reform. Specifically, organizational leaders in China’s state-owned economy possess 
bounded autonomy to exercise political leadership by making choices about the 
specific strategies and structures of the organizations that they lead or those under 
their immediate administrative authority. This bounded autonomy originates from 
multiple institutional sources: the CCP’s cadre management system, which functions 
as an instrument of macro-level rather than micro-level control; the decentralized 
context in which China’s economic reform has occurred; and the increasing 
fragmentation of decision-making authority for policy-making and implementation 
among a growing number of actors. It also derives from organizational sources: the 
formal authority conferred by official leadership positions and long-standing 
governance and management practices stressing organizational hierarchy, authority, 
and conformity. 
  Chapter 2 steps back from the contemporary period to investigate how 
enterprise reform policies in China’s state-owned economy since 1978 first created 
and then expanded space for the heads of state-owned enterprises and later the 
directors of SASAC to exercise political leadership. I argue that the center provided 
the initial “trigger” by granting state-owned enterprise heads greater autonomy 
through power delegation and profit-sharing reforms, but that ongoing devolution of 
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decision-making authority to enterprises and their heads has ultimately generated an 
increasingly dynamic and decentralized process of economic reform. I document this 
by summarizing key reform policies across four periods characterized by: a ‘dual 
track’ approach to economic reform (1978-1991); establishment of a socialist market 
economy (1992-1994); retrenchment of state ownership in the “commanding heights” 
(1995-2001); and internationalization and consolidation of the state sector (2002-
present). Over the past four decades, state-owned enterprise heads’ space to exercise 
political leadership has expanded from the operational management of production to 
include greater control over the operational management of state-owned assets, and to 
an increasing extent also the operational management of state-owned capital. 
 In Chapter 3, I use a most-similar case study design to examine the effects of 
political leadership by consecutive chairmen of China Building Company, a central 
state-owned enterprise, on the firm’s economic reform over time. I conduct process 
tracing on a large body of qualitative and statistical data gathered during 15 months of 
participant observation at the firm’s headquarters in Beijing, one-on-one interviews 
with actors inside the firm, and secondary sources including company documents and 
yearbooks. I find that each of the two chairmen, Mr. Chen and Mr. Wu, exercised 
political leadership by formulating specific strategies to achieve the center’s broad 
goals and by changing organizational structure, and that this significantly altered the 
company’s global expansion efforts, shifts in influence among intra-firm entities, and 
how these entities conceptualized their relationship to international markets. The 
chapter concludes by evaluating this political leadership explanation for economic 
244 
reform relative to alternative explanations derived from top-down ‘strategic design’ 
and bottom-up ‘organic transformation’ perspectives. 
 In Chapter 4, I extend these findings to investigate the possible effects of 
political leadership on variation in economic reform across the central government’s 
entire portfolio of state-owned enterprises. Since 2003, SASAC-directed mergers have 
reduced the number of central state-owned enterprises under its administration from 
189 to 101. However, the incidence of these mergers has varied across firms and over 
time. What factors affect the likelihood of central state-owned enterprise mergers? A 
top-level leadership hypothesis posits that state firms in industries assigned higher 
levels of strategic importance are more likely to experience mergers, as China’s 
leaders deliberately aim to concentrate state-owned assets in a small number of firms 
in the “commanding heights” of the economy. A middle-level political leadership 
hypothesis suggests that central state-owned enterprises are more likely to experience 
mergers when the SASAC director’s reform strategy emphasizes consolidation of 
state-owned assets.486 Finally, a market competition hypothesis suggests that mergers 
should be most likely when competition in a particular industry is high, as only the 
fittest firms survive and the government acts to protect state firms’ market share and 
prevent price wars. Using logistic regression models to evaluate these hypotheses, I 
find strong support for the top-level leadership hypothesis and little support for the 
middle-level political leadership and market competition hypotheses. While these 
                                                
486 While making central state-owned enterprises “large and strong” was the top priority for inaugural 
SASAC director Li Rongrong, his successor Wang Yong deprioritized this objective in a bid to make 
these firms “strong and excellent” through targeted company-level measures. The next director Zhang 
Yi articulated an amalgamated version of his predecessors’ strategies while prioritizing the immediate 
imperatives of fighting corruption and maintaining stability.   
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findings suggest an underlying political logic behind these mergers, they also point to 
the limits of a political leadership approach to economic reform, discussed in further 
detail below.  
 I proceed in Chapter 5 to examine how political leadership at the organization 
level can drive and mediate the coevolution of organizations and institutions, with a 
specific focus on Chinese state-owned enterprises and the institution of state 
ownership. Co-evolutionary analysis emphasizes three factors: mutual 
interdependence of organizations and institutions, dynamic linkages (flows of 
information and personnel), and processes of experimentation, competition, and 
selection. Political leadership is integral to all three. Organizational leaders choose 
whether and how to maintain or to modify existing organizational strategies and 
structures in response to institutional pressures and incentives, while the 
organizational continuity or change fashioned by their political leadership serves 
simultaneously to either reinforce existing institutions or to generate institutional 
change. They choose the content, amount, and veracity of the information they share 
with peers and superiors through formal and informal channels, while also deciding 
how to respond to and use the information they receive from others. Political 
leadership is also central to processes of experimentation, competition, and selection. 
Experimentation often involves choices about organizational strategy and structure, 
and the center’s selection of “winners” among competing organizations and 
individuals is based on organizational performance as well as how organizational 
leaders distinguish themselves from their peers and predecessors through political 
leadership.  
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Areas for Future Research 
This study has focused primarily on organizational leaders’ exercise of political 
leadership by making choices about organizational strategies and structures and its 
impact on economic reform. However, further investigation is needed to identify the 
tactics that organization heads use to carry out their leadership agendas against 
potential intra-organizational opposition—and how their subordinates respond. China 
Building Company’s reform experience suggests that organization heads may draw 
from a wide repertoire of tactics, ranging from personnel ploys, emphasis on material 
and status gains, invocation of external threats, underscoring of administrative 
superiors’ directives, and appeals to personal duty and morality. Additional study 
could seek to establish a common set of tactics across organizations, to address the 
conditions under which particular tactics are most likely to be effective, and to explore 
the range of possible responses and even counter-strategies by subordinate actors. This 
would engage both existing scholarship about the politics of the Chinese workplace 
during the reform era as well as studies of everyday resistance in other settings.487  
 Within state-owned enterprises, the politics of the relationship between the 
Party committee and top enterprise managers deserves further consideration. While the 
Party’s role in enterprise governance has been a contested issue throughout the reform 
                                                
487 Ching Kwan Lee, ed., Working in China: Ethnographies of Labor and Workplace Transformation 
(New York: Routledge, 2006); Ju Li, “Fight Silently: Everyday Resistance in Surviving State Owned 
Enterprises in Contemporary China,” Global Labour Journal 3, no. 2 (2012): 194–216; Kun-Chin Lin, 
“Class Formation or Fragmentation? Allegiances and Divisions among Managers and Workers in State-
Owned Enterprises” in Laid-Off Workers in a Workers’ State: Unemployment with Chinese 
Characteristics, eds. Thomas B. Gold, William J. Hurst, Jaeyoun Won, and Qiang Li (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2009); James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant 
Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). 
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era, the specific arrangements for Party governance vary by industry and enterprise 
and have changed over time. A starting point for analysis would be to examine the 
incidence of joint appointments in which enterprise heads serve simultaneously in top 
management and Party leadership roles.488 While one might infer that holding joint 
Party and managerial appointments would augment an individual leader’s authority 
within a particular organization, it could also signal efforts by administrative superiors 
to centralize their influence by simplifying the chain of command to a single person.489 
In cases where different individuals hold top Party and management roles, the 
potential for discord might be a possible constraint on organizational leaders’ 
influence within the organizations they lead. In recent years, the prevalence of joint 
appointments for board chairmen and Party secretaries in central state-owned 
enterprises underscores the importance of closely studying the corporate governance 
arrangements in particular firms and their decision-making procedures. Analyzing the 
relationship between the Party committee and top enterprise managers reveals the 
tensions between Party control and enterprise autonomy that may impact individual 
leader’s influence. 
 Such intra-organizational politics also need to be situated firmly within the 
context of an organization’s own struggles for autonomy with its administrative 
                                                
488 It is common for central state-owned enterprise executives to hold two of these positions 
simultaneously under the long-standing principle of “two-way entry, overlapping position holding” (双
向进入，交叉任职, shuangxiang jinru, jiaocha renzhi). See State Council: 《关于选择一批国有大中
型企业进行现代企业制度试点的方案（草案）》 [On Selecting a Group of State-owned Large- and 
Medium-size Enterprises to Implement Modern Enterprise Institution Pilots Program) (Draft)], 
November 1994. 
489 During the Hu Jintao period, the fact that the incidence of joint appointments was greatest in 
industries of high strategic importance—defense, electricity, and petroleum—lends support to the 
second interpretation. Wendy Leutert, “Challenges Ahead in China’s Reform of State-owned 
Enterprises,” Asia Policy no. 21 (National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016): 95.  
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superiors. Before the establishment of SASAC in 2003, government bureaus or 
ministries exercised varying levels of influence over particular state-owned enterprises. 
Beyond the broad trend of devolution of economic authority away from the state 
toward enterprises since 1978, how might the political leadership exercised by the 
heads of various bureaus or ministries have influenced the autonomy that particular 
state firms enjoyed? Analysis of additional enterprise cases within and across 
industries would better illuminate the clashes and compromises from which state-
owned enterprises and their heads gained or lost autonomy. Linking intra-enterprise 
and enterprise-bureau levels of analysis would also provide a fuller picture of the 
potential and limits for heads of different state-owned enterprises to shape the 
institution of state ownership through political leadership at the organization level.  
 Finally, investigation of industry-specific patterns in state-owned enterprise 
governance arrangements could also shed light on potential variation in organizational 
leaders’ ability to shape organizational and institutional change. During the reform era, 
China’s government has combined macro-liberalization with both selective re-
regulation at the industry level and sustained efforts to develop a set of national 
champion firms at the enterprise level.490 However, the prevalence of joint 
appointments for top managerial and Party positions in central state-owned enterprises 
operating in sectors of high strategic importance suggests the possibility that industry-
specific patterns in enterprise-level governance arrangements may also exist, in 
addition to variation in regulatory policies toward particular industries. Such 
                                                
490 Sarah Eaton, The Advance of the State in Contemporary China: State-Market Relations in the 
Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Roselyn Hsueh, China’s Regulatory State: 
A New Strategy for Globalization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
249 
examination of industry-specific enterprise governance practices within the state-
owned economy could also build on existing research about sub-national variation in 
China’s economic governance practices.491 On the other hand, if industry-specific 
patterns in enterprise level governance arrangements are not evident, then this would 
suggest that the Party center and/or bureaus or ministries in particular industries have 
less ability to systematically constrain enterprise leaders’ exercise of political 
leadership.  
 
Implications for Analysis of China’s Politics and Economy 
A political leadership approach to the study of economic reform underscores the 
imperative of considering not only institutions but also the agency of organizational 
and individual actors. Top-down and bottom-up perspectives on China’s economic 
reform both invoke institutions to explain continuity or change in organizational 
structure and behavior. A top-down perspective posits that the center’s trial and error 
experimentation with various institutional arrangements alters how organizations are 
structured and act, while a bottom-up perspective suggests that institutions can emerge 
from below, as organizations adapt to changing external conditions, and become self-
reinforcing. Despite their divergent views of institutional origins and change, both 
perspectives contend that institutions ultimately constrain organizational and 
individual actors in uniform and predictable ways. Yet narrowing the space for agency 
leaves these perspectives ill-equipped to explain the wide potential variation in policy 
                                                
491 Nis Grünberg, “The Party-state Order: Essays on China’s Political Organization and Political 
Economic Institutions” (Ph.D. dissertation, Copenhagen Business School, 2017); Yeling Tan, “State 
Strategies under Global Rules: Chinese Industrial Policy in the WTO Era,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University, 2017). 
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experimentation and implementation across similar units or over time during the 
process of economic reform—despite similar institutional conditions and resource 
endowments. In contrast, a political leadership approach enables studying economic 
reform as an open-ended process that can evolve in myriad and sometimes 
unpredictable ways.  
Studying political leadership at the organization level also provides a way to 
bring agency back in to state-centered accounts of economic reform. The 
developmental state paradigm, for example, posits a concept of “state agency” 
centered on the activities of bureaucratic actors within the state (such as state planning 
bodies) and their relationships with social and business interests (such as private 
enterprises).492 It assumes that a fixed set of interests—such as the desire for greater 
resources and autonomy—motivate these actors’ behavior. The regulatory state 
framework’s state-centered focus similarly leaves the “agents” of regulation 
underexplored. It contends that markets can be governed through the state’s 
establishment of rules for proper market behavior and the creation of professional, 
rational institutions to enforce them.493 Yet without considering political leadership, 
both the developmental state and regulatory state paradigms offer at best incomplete 
                                                
492 Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: 
The Growth of Industrial Policy: 1925-1975 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Robert 
Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).  
493 For China-focused applications of the regulatory state framework, see: Hsueh 2011, Shaoguang 
Wang, “Regulating Death at Coalmines: Changing Mode of Governance in China,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 15, no. 46 (2006): 1-30; Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market 
Transition and the Politics of Governance in China (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). 
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and at worst deterministic explanations of economic reform.494 “Circumstances do not 
make choices”—nor do aggregate state actors such as state planning agencies or 
regulatory bodies. A political leadership approach can help to explain why the same 
planning agencies might change reform policies in a particular issue area when 
external conditions remain unaltered, or why companies in the same industry might 
implement a particular regulatory policy in divergent ways despite similar 
conditions.495  
In summary, a political leadership approach offers new analytic leverage on 
two questions central to the study of economic reform. What factors explain variation 
in policy experimentation and implementation across units, such enterprises or 
localities? Why do the structure and behavior of particular organizations change over 
time? It zeroes in on the origins of organizational variation and change by highlighting 
the bounded autonomy of organization heads to shape these processes and by 
identifying the mechanisms through which they do so. However, this study has also 
shown that organization heads’ potential influence may vary significantly depending 
on administrative hierarchies and issue areas. For example, middle-level SASAC 
directors and central state-owned enterprise heads seem to have little influence on 
mergers. However, current reform policies focused on state capital management—
granting central state-owned enterprises increased autonomy to make decisions about 
capital management within their firms—are steadily increasing space for 
                                                
494 Wade 1990: 257. 
495 They suggest that variation in economic reform outcomes occurs primarily because of differences in 
resource endowments, state capacity, and bureaucratic politics. For example, Johnson 1982 states: “The 
particular mix of tools changes from one era to the next because of changes in what the economy needs 
and because of shifts in MITI’s power position in the government.” Johnson 1982: 29. 
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organizational leaders to shape the consolidation of assets within state-owned 
enterprise groups and to craft strategies for their expansion in domestic and global 
markets.496  
As Yuen Yuen Ang (2016) observes, how inputs are deployed and manipulated 
in the process of economic development is just as important as their existence: “There 
is no doubt that inputs like capital and labor are necessary for growth, but to conclude 
that such factors on their own will produce an economic miracle is like believing that 
eggs, sugar, and flour will turn into cake if left overnight in a mixing bowl.”497 By 
highlighting agency as a missing ingredient, Ang’s cake-baking metaphor raises a 
more fundamental question—who exactly is doing the baking and how? A political 
leadership approach opens up space to examine individual agency within the state and 
its impact on economic reform. To extend the culinary metaphor, it can thus help to 
explain whether existing recipes are followed or new ones made, how the baking 
process actually occurs, and the potential variety of cakes that can be produced—even 
with similar ingredients. 
More broadly, this project urges researchers to go forth and investigate the 
intra-organizational politics of economic reform in China, from the central level down 
to the grassroots. It is easy to assume that a uniform set of interests motivates 
organizational leaders—greater autonomy, larger budgets, increased personnel 
allocations, and potential political promotion—without going further to examine the 
variation in what these individuals actually do and its potential effects on economic 
                                                
496 《国资委启动四项改革试点》 [SASAC Starts Four Reform Pilots], Xinhua News, July 14, 2014. 
497 Ang uses this metaphor to simultaneously critique the notion of standard “recipes” for development 
and to provide a vivid figurative juxtaposition of static and dynamic explanations for economic 
development. Ang 2016: 7.  
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reform. Infighting among top political elites or the emergence of participatory 
governance institutions at the local level might initially appear much more attractive 
research topics than the processes of “everyday experimentation” which play out in 
the often mundane daily life of public sector organizations. But studying political 
leadership at the organization level underscores that much of China’s economic reform 
process occurs not in violent clashes between petitioners and local government 
officials or clandestine contests between dueling political elites, but rather in the 
“elbow politics” between organization heads, their subordinates, and their 
administrative superiors. This appears especially true at the central level, where 
autonomy and influence are just as much the goals and currency of politics as control 
over tangible resources like money and land. The political leadership approach 
proposed in this study offers an entry point into the world of intra-organizational 
politics in China’s state-owned economy and beyond.  
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Appendix A 
Case Study Analysis: Research Design and Data 
 
In Chapter 3, I use a two-part research design to assess the potential effect of political 
leadership on economic reform at the company level. First, I employ the most-similar 
case study method to select the units of analysis.498 One of the oldest techniques of 
qualitative research, the most-similar case study method involves analysis of two or 
more cases that are similar across a range of independent variables except for the 
independent variable of interest.499 This research design generates high internal 
validity because it allows background conditions to be held constant and reduces the 
potential for unobserved variables to impact the outcomes of interest. Second, I use 
process tracing to analyze the units selected.500 This involves investigating the 
potential links between the independent variable of interest and the dependent variable, 
while remaining attentive to the possible effects of other variables. Such a research 
design combining the most-similar case study method with process tracing is “doubly 
robust,” because it first conditions on some confounders during the process of case 
selection (the matching of most similar cases) and then further addresses potential 
                                                
498 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of 
Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 304-306. 
499 Examples of studies that use the most-similar case study method include Crowley 1994 and 
Lieberman 2003. On the method of paired comparison see also Tarrow 2010. Stephen Crowley, 
“Barriers to Collective Action: Steelworkers and Mutual Dependence in the Former Soviet 
Union,” World Politics 46, no. 04 (1994): 589-615; Evan S. Lieberman, Race and Regionalism in the 
Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Sidney 
Tarrow, “The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice,” Comparative Political 
Studies 43, no. 2 (2010): 230-259. 
500 I define “process tracing” as “attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain 
and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of interest.” 
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005): 207. 
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alternative causes (those not controlled for during the case selection) and remaining 
empirical variation among the cases through process tracing.501  
The specific cases that this study analyzes are consecutive board 
chairmanships at a central state-owned enterprise. I define a “case” as: “a spatially 
bounded phenomenon … observed at a single point in time or over some delimited 
period of time.”502 Focusing on consecutive board chairmanships in a single company 
increases confidence that the cases examined are similar along a range of independent 
variables that might affect economic reform at the firm level, including: industry, 
company size, revenues, profitability, ownership structure, geographic location, 
participation in international markets, state-business relations in a particular domestic 
context, and firm nationality. Holding these background conditions constant 
strengthens the study’s ability to isolate the variable of interest—the political 
leadership that these individuals exercise—and its impact on outcomes of interest. 
Examining consecutive leadership terms in a single firm since 2011 also minimizes 
potential concern that reform might differ across firm contexts or over long periods of 
time.   
I choose to study consecutive board chairmanships within China Building 
Company because it is representative of Chinese central state-owned enterprises both 
in the construction industry and overall, with regard to its size, revenues, profitability, 
and official designation of strategic industry importance. Among central state-owned 
enterprises in the construction industry in 2013, China Building Company ranked 
                                                
501 Richard A. Nielsen, “Case Selection via Matching,” Sociological Methods & Research 45, no. 3 
(2016): 574-575. 
502 John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?,” American Political Science 
Review 98, no. 2 (2004): 342. 
256 
second in size of total assets; fifth in revenue; fifth in ratio of state capital preserved; 
and sixth in profits.503 Its ratio of state capital preserved and profitability was closely 
equivalent to central state-owned enterprises as a whole: it posted profits of 
approximately 11 billion RMB, compared to the average of 13 billion RMB for the 97 
central state-owned enterprises reporting. Its ratio of state capital preserved of 107% 
equaled the average for the 85 central state-owned enterprises reporting.504 As a 
construction company, China Building Company operates in a semi-protected industry: 
in between “strategic” sectors in which the state maintains “absolute control” and 
“commercial” sectors where no explicit protections for state ownership are given. 
During the study’s timeframe, China Building Company did not experience any major 
changes in its size, performance, or official industry designation. 
I analyzed the data collected during my fieldwork at China Building Company 
through process tracing. Specifically, I investigated the potential links between 
political leadership and the selected indicators of economic reform at the company 
level. At the same time, I remained attentive to other alternative factors that could be 
explaining observed variation in economic reform over time, such as changes in policy 
by administrative superiors, external interference in company affairs, or economic 
shocks. This process involved continual inferences about counterfactual states of the 
world and corresponding triangulation of data to substantiate these inferences.505 My 
                                                
503 I use SASAC’s official industry categorization to identify this group of firms. 2013 is the most 
recent year for which data is available. State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, 《中国国有资产监督管理年鉴》 [State-owned Assets Supervision and Management 
Yearbook] (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 2014).  
504 Author’s calculations based on reported data. Ibid.   
505 For example, one counterfactual state of the world might be a situation in which changes in 
administrative superiors’ directives affected the economic reform outcomes that I was studying at the 
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long-term immersion at the company strengthened my ability to conduct process 
tracing effectively because it enabled me to collect both “measurement evidence” (that 
events in a particular process tracing chain actually happened) and “identifying 
evidence” (that rules out confounding variables and processes).506 
 During my fieldwork, which included interning at China Building Company’s 
offices in Beijing during three different time periods over 15 months between 2014 
and 2016, I collected qualitative and statistical data in three ways: participant 
observation, semi-structured interviews, and secondary sources.507 I performed a range 
of tasks within and beyond my department, ranging from market research, translation, 
development of company marketing materials, and personnel training.508 While 
interning at the firm two days a week full-time, from 8:30 AM to 5:30 PM, I kept 
detailed daily logs recording observations of company activities and exchanges with 
employees as well as my own activities, questions, and reflections.509 I also conducted 
multiple one-on-one semi-structured interviews with department and company 
leaders.510 In addition, I supplemented this firsthand data with an extensive record of 
secondary sources including company notices and documents (such as newsletters and 
work reports), company yearbooks, and media reports.  
                                                                                                                                       
firm level. To assess this, I closely tracked State Council and SASAC policies regarding the 
management of state-owned assets and state-owned companies.   
506 Nielson 2016: 574. 
507 I joined the company as an unpaid intern and worked two days a week full-time from January to 
June 2014, from September 2014 to March 2015, and from April to June 2016.  
508 Examples of market research include memos on infrastructure projects named in particular 
countries’ national development plans, their electricity pricing schemes, and current political situations. 
509 I wrote these daily logs directly on my computer using the notepad function. I took handwritten 
notes during group meetings and one-on-one interviews and then typed them up afterward.  
510 Each interview began with a set of fixed questions, followed by a series of open-ended queries 
tailored to the interviewee’s background and expertise. All interviews followed the protocol approved 
by the Cornell Institutional Review Board, number: 1507005681.   
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 This project is one of the first studies on Chinese central state-owned 
enterprises to employ data gathered through participant observation.511 Participant 
observation has multiple advantages over other data collection methods for studying 
economic reform in China.512 First, it can generate reliable data that is simply not 
available elsewhere. Beyond widespread scholarly concerns about scarce or unreliable 
data—particularly given the demonstrated manipulation of some official statistics—
researchers have been unable to access numerous Communist Party of China (CCP), 
state, and other organizations involved in economic reform policy-making and 
implementation.513 Data gathered through participant observation therefore provides 
essential context for analyses of policy experimentation and implementation, because 
it enables more accurate identification of internal decision-making participants and 
processes. Participant observation is especially well suited for analyses of 
                                                
511 Battat 1986 conducted participant observation through work in management education involving 
several Chinese industrial enterprises between mid-1977 and the end of 1979. Zhang 2014 also gathered 
data through participant observation at two Chinese state-owned companies in the automobile industry; 
however, her fieldwork at each of the total of seven firms in her study was at most two months in 
duration due to the comparative nature of her research. Previous studies about Chinese state-owned 
companies at the firm level have collected data through a variety of means other than participant 
observation, including: émigré interviews conducted outside of China (Walder 1988, Whyte and Parish 
1984); surveys administered indirectly to state firm managers (Child 1996); short-term observation of 
managers (Boisot and Liang 1992), and repeated interviews conducted with workers outside and even 
within state-owned companies (Steinfeld 1998). Joseph Y. Battat, Management in Post-Mao China: An 
Insider’s View (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1986); Max Boisot and Xing Guo Liang, “The 
Nature of Managerial Work in the Chinese Enterprise Reforms: A Study of Six Directors,” 
Organization Studies 13, no. 2 (1992): 161-184; John Child, Management in China during the Age of 
Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); William L. Parish and Martin K. Whyte, 
Urban Life in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Edward S. Steinfeld, 
Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-owned Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998); Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988); Lu Zhang, Inside China’s Automobile Factories 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
512 I define participant observation as a method in which “the researcher takes part in the daily activities, 
rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people as one of the means of learning the explicit and 
tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture.” Kathleen M. DeWalt and Billie R. DeWalt, 
Participant Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers (Lanham, MD: Rowman Altamira, 2011): 1. 
513 Jeremy L. Wallace, “Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China,” British 
Journal of Political Science 46, no. 1 (2016): 11-29. 
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organizational design, behavior, and change, because it sheds light on the drivers, 
mechanisms, and constraints within which these processes occur in particular 
organizational and institutional environments. In addition, participant observation can 
reveal the shared norms that guide individual and organizational behavior, through 
recurrent interactions between the researcher and actors within the social setting of a 
given organization. This is extremely difficult to do through interview-based fieldwork, 
in which the researcher typically has a single, one-on-one and brief interaction with an 
individual, often outside of the organizational setting in which the interviewee actually 
operates.514 Finally, participant observation enables improved construct validity, for 
instance how “reform” should be conceptualized and measured at the company level.  
Several factors were critical to the success of my fieldwork at China Building 
Company. The first was my introduction to the company through personal contacts in 
2012. I applied for an internship through the company’s human resources department 
in 2013 and began my fieldwork there in 2014. The second factor was a fieldwork 
strategy focused on long-term, iterative immersion. This permitted sustained 
accumulation of trust and understanding, while periodic removal from the research 
setting facilitated critical reflection. This enabled me to make more accurate 
inferences by improving my ability to consciously discern between informants’ first-
order reports and notions of what was happening in the corporate setting and my 
second-order conceptions as a researcher of what was actually occurring.515 Finally, 
                                                
514 An interviewee’s choice to hold an interview outside of the organizational setting in which he or she 
works, for example at home or at public venues such as restaurants or cafes, is entirely understandable 
given the scrutiny that meeting with a researcher might attract, and must be respected.  
515 John Van Maanen, “The Fact of Fiction in Organizational Ethnography,” Administrative Science 
Quarterly 24 (1979): 539-550. 
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my fluency in Mandarin was essential to perform my work responsibilities and interact 
with employees, and in doing so to gain a deeper understanding of the social 
dimensions of the workplace and the temporality of everyday life there.516 All 
communications and secondary sources cited in Chapter 3 are my translations from the 
original Chinese, unless otherwise indicated.    
However, several factors limited my data collection during the fieldwork. First, 
I naturally had the most interaction with employees who also worked in the 
department and member company where I was based in Beijing. Fortuitously, this 
member company’s office building became the headquarters for the entire enterprise 
group just one month after I began my fieldwork; this enabled me to interact regularly 
with employees of the holding company as well as other member companies when 
they visited headquarters. In addition, I attended internal training sessions and 
company meetings that brought employees across departments together, ate meals 
with colleagues outside of my department and member company, and traveled outside 
of Beijing to meet with employees working in other member companies. In the spring 
of 2016, I also gave three trainings on cross-cultural communication to employees of 
different member companies; I concluded these sessions with questionnaires to gather 
additional information about the experiences and views of employees in different parts 
of the company.517 Second, I did not have full access to the company’s internal 
                                                
516 Jordan and Lambert 2009 define the “temporality of everyday life” as “experiencing the boredom as 
well as the drama of mundane work and everyday life firsthand.” Brigitte Jordan and Monique Lambert, 
“Working in Corporate Jungles: Reflections on Ethnographic Praxis in Industry,” Ethnography and the 
Corporate Encounter, ed., in Melissa Cefkin (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009): 16. 
517 These questionnaires were informal and anonymous. I could relate responses to particular member 
companies because I asked participants which member company they worked in; however, I did not ask 
for any information that would have enabled identification of particular individuals, such as position 
titles.  
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computer network, which included an intranet with information about specific 
employees and projects, because I was not a formal full-time employee. To address 
this issue, I participated actively in the semi-official online QQ chat groups for our 
department and communicated regularly with employees about their work through QQ 
as well as in person. Third, I did not collect any information that was marked as for 
internal reference (内部参考, neibu cankao) or that I considered proprietary or 
sensitive, such as statistics on salaries, project costs, performance evaluations, or other 
issues. I did this to respect company regulations and to protect my own position as a 
foreign scholar conducting research in a public sector organization.518 Despite these 
limitations, this study contributes to existing scholarship on Chinese central state-
owned enterprises as one of the first to employ data gathered through participant 
observation. 
                                                
518 The Xi Jinping administration’s launch of a nationwide anti-corruption campaign after coming to 
power in 2011 heightened the potential sensitivity of my presence because it increased scrutiny of 
central state-owned enterprises’ internal operations.  
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Appendix B 
Mergers Among Central State-owned Enterprises (2003-2015) 
 
     
2003 
Rank 
Company Name 
(English / Chinese) 
 
Merged Company Name 
(English / Chinese) 
Year 
     
5 China Aviation Industry First Group 
Corp. 
To create China Aviation Industry Corp. 
中国航空工业集团公司 
 
 中国航空工业第一集团公司 
 
   
6 China Aviation Industry Second 
Group Corp. 
To create China Aviation Industry Corp. 
中国航空工业集团公司 
2008 
 中国航空工业第二集团公司 
 
   
21 China Electric Power Investment 
Corp. 
To create State Electric Power Investment 
Corp. 
2015 
 中国电力投资集团公司 
 
 国家电力投资集团公司  
25 China Network Communications 
Corp. 
Into China United Telecommunications 
Co., Ltd. 
2009 
 中国网络通信集团公司  
 
中国联合通信有限公司  
32 China Second Heavy Machinery Co. Into China Machinery and Equipment 
(Group) Co. 
2013 
 中国第二重型机械集团公司  
 
中国机械装备(集团)公司  
39 China Ocean Shipping (Group) Corp. 
中国远洋运输(集团)总公司 
To create China Ocean Shipping Group Ltd. 
中国远洋海运集团有限公司 
2015 
     
40 China Shipping (Group) Corp. 
中国海运(集团)总公司 
To create China Ocean Shipping Group Ltd. 
中国远洋海运集团有限公司 
2015 
   
 
  
55 China High-tech Investment Group 
Corp. 
Into National Development and 
Investment Corp. 
2010 
 中国高新投资集团公司  
 
国家开发投资公司  
57 China Grain and Oil Group Corp. 
中谷粮油集团公司 
Into COFCO Import & Export (Group) 
Co., Ltd. 
2006 
   
 
中粮进出口(集团)有限公司  
58 China Packaging Corp. Into China Chengtong Holding Co. 2010 
 中国包装总公司  
 
中国诚通控股公司  
59 China Imported Automobile Trade 
Center 
Into China Machinery and Equipment 
(Group) Co. 
2004 
 中国进口汽车贸易中心  
 
中国机械装备(集团)公司  
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60 China Business Group Corp. Into China Chengtong Holding Co. 2011 
 中商企业集团公司  
 
中国诚通控股公司  
61 China Huafu Trade Development 
Corp. 
Into COFCO Import & Export (Group) 
Co., Ltd. 
2014 
 中国华孚贸易发展集团公司  中粮进出口(集团)有限公司  
 
63 China Huaxing Group Co. 
中国华星集团公司 
Into China National New Holdings 
Limited Liability Co. 
2011 
   
 
中国国新控股有限责任公司  
65 Coal Science Research Institute 
煤炭科学研究总院 
To create China Coal Science and Technology 
Group Co., Ltd. 
2008 
   中国煤炭科工集团有限公司  
 
69 China Agricultural Mechanization 
Research Institute 
Into China Machinery and Equipment 
(Group) Co. 
2009 
 中国农业机械化科学研究院  
 
中国机械装备(集团)公司  
71 China Metallurgical Construction 
Group Corp. 
Into China Metals & Minerals Import & 
Export Corp. 
2015 
 中国冶金建设集团公司  
 
中国五金矿产进出口总公司  
73 Metallurgical Automation Research 
and Design Institute 
Into Iron and Steel Research Institute 
钢铁研究总院 
2006 
 冶金自动化研究设计院  
 
  
74 China Haohua Chemical Group Corp. To create China National Chemical Corp. 2004 
 中国昊华化工集团总公司  
 
中国化工集团公司  
76 China Chemical Supply and 
Marketing (Group) Corp. 
Into China National Offshore Oil Corp. 
中国海洋石油总公司 
2007 
 中国化工供销(集团)总公司    
 
77 China Chemical Construction Corp. Into China National Offshore Oil Corp. 2006 
 中国化工建设总公司  
 
中国海洋石油总公司  
78 China Blue Star (Group) Corp. 
中国蓝星(集团)总公司 
To create China National Chemical Corp. 
中国化工集团公司 
2004 
     
80 China Light Industry Foreign 
Economic and Technical Cooperation 
Corp. 
Into China Light Industry Group Corp. 
中国轻工集团公司 
2008 
 中国轻工业对外经济技术合作公司 
 
 
 
  
81 China Light Industry Machinery Corp. 
中国轻工业机械总公司 
Into China Building Materials Group 
中国建筑材料集团公司 
2004 
   
 
  
82 China Arts & Crafts (Group) Co. 
中国工艺美术(集团)公司 
To create China Technology (Group) Co. 
中国工艺（集团）公司 
2006 
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85 China Textile Materials (Group) Corp. 
中国纺织物资(集团)总公司 
Into China Hengtian Group 
中国恒天集团公司 
2005 
   
 
  
87 China Textile Science Research 
Institute 
Into China General Technology Group 
中国通用技术集团 
2009 
 中国纺织科学研究院  
 
  
90 China Building Materials Science 
Research Institute 
Into China Building Materials Group 
中国建筑材料集团公司 
2004 
 中国建筑材料科学研究院  
 
  
95 China Far East International Trade 
Corp. 
Into China Electronic Technology Group 
Corp. 
2009 
 中国远东国际贸易总公司  
 
中国电子科技集团公司  
96 China International Enterprise 
Cooperation Corp. 
Into China Chengtong Holding Co. 
中国诚通控股公司 
2008 
 中国国际企业合作公司 
 
   
98 China Geological Engineering Corp. 
中国地质工程集团公司 
Into China New Age Holdings (Group) 
Co. 
2006 
   中国新时代控股(集团)公司  
 
99 China Four-Dimensional Mapping 
Technology Corp. 
Into China Satellite Communications 
Corp. 
2003 
 中国四维测绘技术总公司  
 
中国卫星通信集团公司  
100 China Real Estate Development Corp. 
中国房地产开发集团公司 
 
Into China Communications 
Construction Group Co., Ltd. 
2010 
   中国交通建设集团有限公司  
102 China North Locomotive & Rolling 
Stock Industry Corp. 
To create China Automobile Co., Ltd. 
中国中车股份有限公司 
2014 
 中国北方机车车辆工业集团公司 
 
   
103 China Southern Locomotive & 
Rolling Stock Industry Corp. 
To create China Automobile Co., Ltd. 
中国中车股份有限公司 
2014 
 中国南方机车车辆工业集团公司    
 
107 China Harbor Construction (Group) 
Corp. 
To create China Communications 
Construction Group Co., Ltd. 
2005 
 中国港湾建设(集团)总公司  
 
中国交通建设集团有限公司  
108 China Road and Bridge (Group) Corp. 
中国路桥(集团)总公司 
To create China Communications 
Construction Group Co., Ltd. 
2005 
   
 
中国交通建设集团有限公司  
109 China Foreign Cargo Terminal Co. 
中国外轮理货总公司 
Into China Ocean Shipping (Group) 
Corp. 
2005 
   中国远洋运输(集团)总公司  
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111 China Post and Telecommunications 
Equipment Group Corp. 
Into China General Technology Group 
中国通用技术集团 
2009 
 中国邮电器材集团公司  
 
  
112 China Great Wall Computer Group 
Corp. 
Into China Electronic Information 
Industry Group Corp. 
2005 
 中国长城计算机集团公司  中国电子信息产业集团公司  
 
113 China Satellite Communications Corp. 
中国卫星通信集团公司 
Into China Aerospace Science and 
Technology Corp. 
2009 
   
 
中国航天科技集团公司  
115 China Water Conservancy and 
Electric Power Co. 
Into China Water Investment Corp. 
中国水利投资公司 
2004 
 中国水利电力对外公司  
 
  
116 China Water Investment Corp. 
中国水利投资公司 
Into China Yangtze River Three Gorges 
Project Develop. Corp. 
2008 
   中国长江三峡工程开发总公司 
 
 
118 China Agricultural Reclamation 
(Group) Corp. 
Into China Agricultural Develop. Corp. 
中国农业发展集团总公司 
2009 
 中国农垦(集团)总公司  
 
  
119 China Animal Husbandry and 
Commerce (Group) Corp. 
To create China Agricultural Develop. Corp. 
中国农业发展集团总公司 
2004 
 中国牧工商(集团)总公司  
 
  
120 China Seed Group Corp. Into China Sinochem Corp. 2007 
 中国种子集团公司  中国中化集团公司  
 
122 China Arts and Crafts Import and 
Export Corp. 
To create China Technology (Group) Co. 
中国工艺（集团）公司 
2006 
 中国工艺品进出口总公司  
 
  
123 China Foreign Trade Transportation 
(Group) Corp. 
Into China Sinotrans Changhang Group 
Co., Ltd. 
2008 
 中国对外贸易运输(集团)总公司  
 
中国外运长航集团有限公司  
124 China Native Produce and Animal 
Products Import and Export Corp. 
Into COFCO Import & Export (Group) 
Co., Ltd. 
2004 
 中国土产畜产进出口总公司  
 
中粮进出口(集团)有限公司  
126 China Light Industry Products Import 
and Export Corp. 
Into China General Technology Group 
中国通用技术集团 
2008 
 中国轻工业品进出口总公司  
 
  
127 China National Complete Plant Import 
and Export (Group) Corp. 
Into National Develop. and Investment 
Corp. 
2009 
 中国成套设备进出口(集团)总公司  国家开发投资公司 
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129 China Overseas Engineering Corp. Into China Railway Engineering Corp. 2003 
 中国海外工程总公司  中国铁路工程总公司  
 
130 China Biological Products Corp. 
中国生物制品总公司 
Into China Pharmaceutical Group Corp. 
中国医药集团总公司 
2009 
     
131 China Medical and Health Equipment 
Import and Export Corp. 
Into China Biotechnology Group Corp. 
中国生物技术集团公司 
2005 
 中国医疗卫生器材进出口公司 
 
   
132 China Record Co. Into China Chengtong Holding Co. 2008 
 中国唱片总公司  
 
中国诚通控股公司  
134 China Fuma Forestry Machinery 
Group Co., Ltd 
Into China Machinery and Equipment 
(Group) Co. 
2007 
 中国福马林业机械集团有限公司  
 
中国机械装备(集团)公司  
137 China Duty Free (Group) Corp. 
中国免税品(集团)总公司 
Into China Travel Service Group Ltd. 
中国国旅集团有限公司 
2003 
     
138 China Tourism Business Service 
Corp. 
Into China Travel Service (Group) Co. 
中国中旅(集团)公司 
2004 
 中国旅游商贸服务总公司 
 
   
140 China Emerging (Group) Corp. Into China General Technology Group 2009 
 中国新兴(集团)总公司  中国通用技术集团  
 
142 China New Age Holdings (Group) Co. 
中国新时代控股(集团)公司 
Into China Energy Conservation 
Investment Corp. 
2010 
   
 
中国节能投资公司  
143 Zhuhai Zhenrong Co. Into South Light (Group) Co., Ltd. 2015 
 珠海振戎公司  南光(集团)有限公司  
 
144 China Ocean Aviation Group Corp. 
中国海洋航空集团公司 
Into China Machinery and Equipment 
(Group) Co. 
2007 
   
 
中国机械装备(集团)公司  
146 China Electronic Engineering Design 
Institute 
Into National Develop. and Investment 
Corp. 
2009 
 中国电子工程设计院  国家开发投资公司  
 
147 China Huanqiu Engineering Co. 
中国寰球工程公司 
Into China National Petroleum Corp. 
中国石油天然气集团公司 
2005 
     
148 China Coal International Engineering 
Design and Research Institute 
中煤国际工程设计研究总院 
To create China Coal Science and Technology 
Group Co., Ltd. 
中国煤炭科工集团有限公司 
2008 
     
149 China Haicheng International 
Engineering Investment General 
Into China Light Industry Group Corp. 
中国轻工集团公司 
2008 
267 
Hospital 
 中国海诚国际工程投资总院  
 
  
150 China Textile Industry Design 
Institute 
Into China National Petroleum Corp. 
中国石油天然气集团公司 
2007 
 中国纺织工业设计院 
 
   
151 China Nonferrous Engineering Design 
and Research Institute 
Into China Metallurgical Construction 
Group Corp. 
2005 
 中国有色工程设计研究总院  中国冶金建设集团公司  
 
158 China Electric Power Engineering 
Consulting Group Corp. 
To create China Energy Construction Group 
Co., Ltd. 
2011 
 中国电力工程顾问集团公司  
 
中国能源建设集团有限公司  
159 China Hydropower Engineering 
Consulting Group Corp. 
To create China Power Construction Group 
Co., Ltd. 
2011 
 中国水电工程顾问集团公司  中国电力建设集团有限公司  
 
160 China Water Resources and 
Hydropower Construction Corp. 
To create China Power Construction Group 
Co., Ltd. 
2011 
 中国水利水电建设集团公司  
 
中国电力建设集团有限公司  
163 China Printing Group Corp. 
中国印刷集团公司 
Into China National New Holdings 
Limited Liability Co. 
2012 
   
 
中国国新控股有限责任公司  
164 Panzhihua Iron and Steel (Group) Co. Into Anshan Iron and Steel Group Co. 2010 
 攀枝花钢铁(集团)公司  鞍山钢铁集团公司 
 
 
165 Hanxing Metallurgical and Mining 
Administration Bureau 
Into China Metals & Minerals Import & 
Export Corp. 
2004 
 邯邢冶金矿山管理局  中国五金矿产进出口总公司  
 
166 Luzhong Metallurgical Mining Group 
Co. 
Into China Metals & Minerals Import & 
Export Corp. 
2009 
 鲁中冶金矿业集团公司  
 
中国五金矿产进出口总公司  
167 Changsha Institute of Mining and 
Metallurgy 
Into China Metals & Minerals Import & 
Export Corp. 
2009 
 长沙矿冶研究院  中国五金矿产进出口总公司  
 
168 China Luckai Film Group Co. 
中国乐凯胶片集团公司 
Into China Aerospace Science and 
Technology Corp. 
2011 
   中国航天科技集团公司  
 
169 Shenyang Chemical Industry Research 
Institute 
Into China Sinochem Corp. 
中国中化集团公司 
2007 
 沈阳化工研究院 
 
   
170 China Huayuan Group Co., Ltd. 
中国华源集团有限公司 
Into China Resources (Group) Co., Ltd. 
华润(集团)有限公司 
2006 
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171 Hualian Develop. Group Co., Ltd. 
华联发展集团有限公司 
Into OCT Group Co. 
华侨城集团公司 
2005 
     
173 China Huandao (Group) Co. Into China Chengtong Holding Co. 2006 
 中国寰岛(集团)公司  
 
中国诚通控股公司  
174 China Yangtze River Shipping 
(Group) Corp. 
Into China Sinotrans Changhang Group 
Co., Ltd. 
2008 
 中国长江航运(集团)总公司  中国外运长航集团有限公司  
 
176 Shanghai Institute of Shipping and 
Transportation Science 
Into China Shipping (Group) Corp. 
中国海运(集团)总公司 
2010 
 上海船舶运输科学研究所  
 
  
179 Rainbow Group 
彩虹集团公司 
Into China Electronic Information 
Industry Group Corp. 
2013 
   中国电子信息产业集团公司  
 
181 Shanghai Pharmaceutical Industry 
Research Institute 
Into China Pharmaceutical Group Corp. 
中国医药集团总公司 
2010 
 上海医药工业研究院  
 
  
184 Tianjin Cement Industry Design and 
Research Institute 
Into China Agricultural Mechanization 
Research Institute 
2005 
 天津水泥工业设计研究院  
 
中国农业机械化科学研究院  
185 China International Engineering 
Consulting Design Institute 
Into China New Age Holdings (Group) 
Co. 
2004 
 中机国际工程咨询设计总院  
 
中国新时代控股(集团)公司  
186 China Post and Telecommunications 
Advisory Design Institute 
中讯邮电咨询设计院 
Into China United Telecommunications 
Co., Ltd. 
中国联合通信有限公司 
2006 
     
188 China Gezhouba Group Co. 
中国葛洲坝集团公司 
To create China Energy Construction Group 
Co., Ltd. 
2011 
   中国能源建设集团有限公司  
 
189 Sanjiu Enterprise Group (Shenzhen 
Southern Pharmaceutical Factory) 
Into China Resources (Group) Co., Ltd. 
华润(集团)有限公司 
2007 
 三九企业集团(深圳南方制药厂)  
 
  
* China Economic and Technical 
Investment Guarantee Co., Ltd. 
Into National Develop. and Investment 
Corp. 
2006 
 中国经济技术投资担保有限公司  国家开发投资公司  
 
* China Sinotrans Changhang Group 
Co., Ltd. 
Into China Merchants Group Co., Ltd. 
招商局集团有限公司 
2015 
 中国外运长航集团有限公司  
 
  
* China National New Holdings Limited 
Liability Co. 
To create State Electric Power Investment 
Corp. 
2015 
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 中国国新控股有限责任公司  
 
国家电力投资集团公司  
* China Grain Logistics Group Corp. 
中国华粮物流集团公司 
Into COFCO Import & Export (Group) 
Co., Ltd. 
2013 
   中粮进出口(集团)有限公司  
     
* Indicates firms that were created or put under SASAC’s management after 
publication of the original 2003 list. 
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